Abstract

This paper explores and assesses the gains made by women in the paid labor force in the three decades since industrialization and state expansion "took off" in the Middle East and North Africa, fueled largely by oil revenues. The focus is on patterns of women's employment in the formal sector, an important indicator of women's status, access to economic resources, and equity.

The structural determinants of women's employment are: a) state policy and national development strategy; b) class location; and c) gender arrangements and cultural understandings. While women's overall labor force participation rate remains low in comparison to other regions – attributable to the type of development pursued in the region and to the specificities of the sex/gender system in Arab-Islamic countries – there has been a steady increase in modern sector employment, particularly in government services. Intra-regional differentiation of women's employment is explained by state legal and economic policy (for example, export-oriented manufacturing versus capital-intensive oil-centered growth). It is argued that one must look at economic and political factors, and not just cultural, in the specification of women's roles and status, especially including access to employment.

Sources of data are census and statistical reports from various countries, United Nations data, other secondary sources, and the author's research travels and interviews.

About the Author

Valentine Moghadam was born in Iran and studied in Canada and the United States, earning a Ph.D. in sociology at The American University in 1986. She is currently Senior Research Fellow at the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University in Helsinki, Finland. Since March 1990 Val has been the coordinator of the UNU/WIDER research programme on women and development. Her research areas include women and social change in the Middle East, women and development in the Muslim world, Iran and Afghanistan. She has published widely on these topics, and recently coordinated a research project on the gender dynamics of economic and political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Her book, Women and Social Change in the Middle East, will be published by Lynne Rienner in 1993.

Women's Employment in the Middle East and North Africa: The Role of Gender, Class, and State Policies

by

Valentine M. Moghadam

United Nations University

Working Paper
#229
June 1992

Women and International Development
Michigan State University
202 International Center, East Lansing, MI 48824-1035
Phone: 517/353-5040; Fax: 517/432-4845
E-mail: *wid@msu.edu*; Web: *http://www.isp.msu.edu/WID/*

See back page for ordering information and call for papers

WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: THE ROLE OF GENDER, CLASS, AND STATE POLICIES

Introduction

The position of women within the labor market is frequently studied as an empirical measure of women's status (Chafetz 1984; Farley 1985; Giele 1977). Access to remunerative work in the formal sector of the economy--as distinct from outwork, homework, or other types of informal-sector activities--is regarded by many feminists as well as women-in-development (WID) researchers, as an important indicator of women's social positions and legal status. For theorists and activists who argue that women's economic dependence on men is the root cause of their disadvantaged and devalued status, change in the structure of labor force opportunities and rewards is the key target (Chafetz 1990). Many studies examining the rise in women's paid employment worldwide and the structure of work opportunities for women have concluded that women are better off in paid employment than in unpaid family labor (Finlay 1989; ILO/INSTRAW 1985; Joekes 1987; Lim 1983, 1990; Moghadam 1990). Households also benefit when women control income and spending, and the well-being of children is increasingly linked to female education and income (Blumberg 1989; Dwyer and Bruce 1988). Moreover, societal benefits include diminishing fertility rates with increasing female employment (Bodrova and Anker 1985; Caldwell and Ruzica 1987; McDonald 1985).

Nonetheless, much feminist and WID scholarship has documented the adverse conditions under which many women work, particularly in developing countries with authoritarian regimes and weak labor protection codes. Marxist and feminist researchers have been especially critical of multinational factory employment, and much ink has been spilled over the exploitation of women in export processing zones and free trade zones (Lim 1990). During the 1970s and 1980s, many studies argued that the new or changing international division of labor was predicated upon the globalization of production and the search for cheap labor, and that the feminization of labor, especially in textiles and electronics, was the latest strategy of international capital (Elson and Pearson 1980; Young et al. 1981). A major debate revolved around whether this new utilization of women's labor reduced or improved women's economic status (Tiano 1987; Ward 1984). Most of the case studies in the literature came from Latin America, especially Mexico, and from Southeast Asia, particularly South Korea and Malaysia (See Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983).

Ester Boserup--whose landmark study (Boserup 1970) launched the field of women-in-development by arguing that the process of economic development had marginalized women producers--has recently addressed the debate (Boserup 1990). She notes that

industrialization has opposing effects on different groups of women. "Whereas young women are drawn into industrial employment and increasing numbers of educated women obtain white-collar jobs in social and other services, the situation of older, uneducated women may deteriorate because the family enterprises in which they work may suffer from competition with the growing modern sector" (Boserup 1990:24). In the same essay Boserup states that when development is rapid, it is inevitable that these changes create tensions between sexes and generations and that pressure groups appear which seek to preserve or reintroduce the traditional, hierarchical cultural pattern. She cites the "oil rich countries in the Arab world, which have attempted to preserve the family system of domesticated and secluded women by mass importation of foreign male labor, and in which mass movements of Muslim revival pursue the same aim" (Boserup 1990:24). Boserup does not specify which oil rich countries she had in mind. The richest Arab countries have the smallest populations and import labor; they are not beset by Muslim revivalism. Rather, it is the larger, labor - exporting Middle Eastern countries, and where women have been participating in the work force in growing numbers, which have seen Muslim revivalism. Boserup's statement reflects confusion about the Middle East and about women's positions within the region.

This paper is concerned with the issues raised above. Following from the premise that an important indicator of women's status is the extent of integration into the formal labor force, the paper explores and assesses women's employment opportunities and the specific characteristics of the paid female labor force in the Middle East and North Africa. The paper also identifies the structural determinants of women's access to remunerative work in the formal sector of the economy, and provides an explanation for the variations in the region. Attention to this region is important, because a) it is under-researched outside of Middle East Studies, b) it is frequently left out of book volumes on women workers in the world economy, and c) it is a good test of assumptions and propositions about capital's global quest for cheap labor, and about the relationship between female employment and female emancipation.

Because it is often assumed that variables associated with culture, including the presumed centrality of Islam, provide sufficient explanation for women's roles and status in the Middle East, I begin the paper by addressing the issue of "culture." This is followed by background information on the diverse economic and political features of the region. I then introduce an explanatory framework which rests on the concepts of (and interactions between) gender, class, state policy, and development strategy in the determination of women's roles and status. The final sections describe how these structural determinants have operated over time and space.

This study reveals that while the region still lags behind other regions in terms of women's labor force participation rates, women's integration into the work force has been rising steadily since the 1960s in all Middle Eastern countries except Iran. The low participation rates compared with other regions are explained in terms of (1) the specific type of development strategy pursued in the Middle East, including limited industrialization, and (2) the gender system in Arab-Islamic countries. At the same time, there is considerable differentiation within the region in terms of women's status and employment opportunities. The salient explanatory factors here are (1) women's class location, (2) state policy and the nature of the political elites, and (3) industrialization policy: export-led industrialization or oil-centered growth.

On the Importance of "Culture" in the Middle East

In all societies, cultural institutions and practices, economic processes, and political structures are interactive and relatively autonomous. Each social formation is located within and subject to the influences of a national class structure, a regional context, and a global system of states and markets. In some societies, notably the industrialized West, economic relations and structures tend to predominate, playing a stronger role in the workings of policy and in the reproduction of the society as a whole. In other societies and at other times, cultural or ideological matters may override other considerations. In part because modernization is fairly recent in the Middle East, and partly because of earlier colonial encounters with the West, culture (cultural defensiveness, cultural self-definition) tends to play a stronger role in Middle Eastern societies. At the heart of culture lie concepts of male and female, womanhood, masculinity, and the family--gender. Cultural identity generally, and gender specifically, have become increasingly politicized in the Middle East. Where women are regarded as the custodians of cultural values and traditions in the face of real or perceived external challenges, we can expect women's roles to be more privatized than public, and their reproductive functions in particular to be fetishized.

The gender configurations that draw heavily from religion and cultural norms to govern women's employment patterns and women's lives in the Middle East are not unique to the Muslim countries of the region but are also present in the Jewish state of Israel. Women cannot initiate divorce, and rabbinical judges are reluctant to grant women divorces. As in Saudi Arabia, Israeli women cannot hold public prayer services. The sexual division of labor in the home and in the society is largely shaped by the Halacha, or Jewish law, and by customary practices that continue to discriminate against women (Aloni 1984). Marital relations and the marriage contract in Israel, governed by Jewish law, determine that the

husband should pay for his wife's maintenance, while she should provide household services.

That women's legal status and social positions are worse in Muslim countries than anywhere else is a common view. The prescribed role of women in Islamic theology and law is often argued to be a major determinant of women's status. Women are viewed as wives and mothers, and gender segregation is customary if not always legally required. Whereas economic provision is the responsibility of men, women must marry and reproduce to earn status (Youssef 1978). Men (but not women) have the unilateral right of divorce; a woman can work and travel only with the written permission of her male guardian; family honor and good reputation, or the negative consequence of shame, rest most heavily with the conduct of women (Fluehr-Lobban 1989). Muslim societies are characterized by higher-than-average fertility, higher-than-average mortality, and rapid rates of population growth (Weeks 1988). Age at marriage affects fertility. An average of 34 percent of all brides in Muslim countries in recent years have been under 20 years of age, and the average number of children born to women in Muslim nations is six (Weeks 1988:15,20). The Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi (1987) has explained this rate in terms of Islamic fear of fitna: social and moral disturbance caused by single and unmarried women. Early marriage and childbearing, therefore, may be regarded as a form of social control.

The Muslim countries of the Middle East and South Asia also have a distinct gender disparity in literacy and education (Weeks 1988:27), and low rates of female labor force participation (Abu Nasr et al. 1985; Sivard 1985; Youssef 1978). High fertility, low literacy and low labor force participation are linked to the low status of women which in turn is often attributed to the prevalence of Islamic law and norms in these societies. It is said that because of the continuing importance of values such as family honor and modesty, women's participation in non-agricultural or paid labor carries with it a social stigma, and gainful employment is not perceived as part of their role (Azzam, Abu Nasr and Lorfing 1985:6; Mujahid 1985:128).

These conceptions, however, are too facile. In the first instance, the view of woman as wife and mother is present in other religious and symbolic systems. The Orthodox Jewish law of personal status bears many similarities to the fundamentals of Islamic law, especially with respect to marriage and divorce (Fluehr-Lobban 1989). Many of the patriarchal features of Muslim societies, including the "honor-shame complex" are also found in the Mediterranean (Pitt-Rivers 1977; Tillion 1983). The association of womanhood with motherhood was a longstanding feature of Western society. Secondly, the demographic patterns mentioned above are not unique to Muslim countries; high fertility rates are found in sub-Saharan African countries today (Weeks 1988), and were common in Western countries at the first stage of the demographic

transition (Tilly and Scott 1978). Thirdly, high maternal mortality and an inverse sex ratio exist in non-Muslim areas as well; in north India and rural China, female infanticide has been documented. In the most patriarchal regions of West and South Asia (including India) there are marked gender disparities in the delivery of health care and access to food, resulting in an excessive mortality rate for women (Boutalia 1985; Dréze and Sen 1989; B. Harriss 1986; Miller 1981; Papanek 1989; Weeks 1988). Thus, women's disadvantaged position in the Middle East cannot be attributed solely to Islam. Religious and cultural specificities do shape gender systems, but they are not the most significant determinants and are themselves subject to change.

As the discussion below and the tables will show, there is intra-regional variation in gender codes, as measured by differences in women's legal status, educational levels, fertility trends, and employment patterns. For example, gender segregation in public is the norm and the law in Saudi Arabia, but not so in Syria, Iraq, or Morocco (Ingrams 1988). Following the Iranian Revolution, the new authorities prohibited abortion and contraception, and lowered the age of consent to 13 for girls. But in Tunisia contraceptive use is widespread and the average age of marriage is 24 (Weeks 1988:26). Women's employment levels are dissimilar in such countries as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, South Yemen, and Algeria. Changes and variations across the region and within a society are linked to state economic and legal policies. It is important not to regard "culture" as a constant; it is variable, and the extent of its impact depends on other factors, notably on the depth and scope of development, on state policy, and on class and social structure.

But while women's employment has been on the rise, it still lags behind that of other regions in the world, although not too far behind Latin America. In 1975, the percentage of economically active females among those of working ages in Muslim countries (which would include those of Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia as well as the Middle East) was less than half of that in non-Muslim countries (Mujahid 1985:114). By the 1980s, the female share of the labor force was still lower in Middle Eastern countries than elsewhere (8.8 percent in Algeria in 1987, 13.8 percent in Syria in 1984). In 1985, regional female labor force participation rates were as follows: Africa, 32 percent; Latin America, 24 percent; Asia (including Middle East), 28 percent; Middle East separately, 11.4 percent (ILO/INSTRAW 1985:18-19). In 1980, the ratio of women to men in the labor force was lowest in the Middle East (29 percent) and highest in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, where the ratio was 90 percent (Sivard 1985:13). Figure 1 illustrates the regional disparities. According to a United Nations survey, "the level of women' work [is] consistently low in countries with a predominantly Muslim population, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and the Syrian Arab Republic, where cultural restrictions that discourage women from doing most

types of work are common" (cited in Blumberg 1989:81). Once again, only "culture" is provided as an explanation.

Economic and Political Features of the Region

The countries of the Middle East and North Africa differ in their social composition, economic structures, and state types. Some of the countries have sizable Christian populations (e.g., Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq); others are ethnically diverse (Iran, Lebanon); some have strong working class movements and trade unions (Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, Turkey); others have nomadic and semi-sedentary populations (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman). In almost all countries, a considerable part of the middle classes have received Western-style education. Politically, the state types range from theocratic monarchism (Saudi Arabia) to secular republicanism (Turkey). Middle East states have been characterized as "authoritarian-socialist" (Algeria, Syria, Iraq), "radical Islamist" (Iran, Libya), "patriarchal-conservative" (Saudi Arabia, Morocco), and "authoritarian-privatizing" (Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt). In many but not all of the countries of the Middle East, defense spending consumes a considerable part of the central government expenditure (Looney 1988).

Economically, the countries of the region can be divided into the following groups: a) oil economies poor in other resources, including very small populations (United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya); b) mixed oil economies (Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Egypt); and c) non-oil economies (Israel, Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Yemen). the countries are further divided into the city-states (such as Qatar and the UAE), the "desert states" (for example, Libya and Saudi Arabia), and the "normal states" (e.g., Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Syria). The latter have a more diversified structure and their resources include oil, agricultural land, and large populations. Some of these countries are rich in capital and import labor (e.g., Libya, Suadi Arabia, Kuwait), while other are poor in capital or are middle-income countries that export labor (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen). Consequently, human and material resources--including the development or skills, or "human capital formation"--differ among these various types. There is variance in levels of overall development, including urbanization, industrialization and infrastructural development, and in standards of living and welfare. The structure of the labor market and the characteristics of the labor force, including the female labor force, are also varied.

Overall, and unlike Latin American and Southeast Asia, industrialization has been fairly limited in the region, and this has served, among other things, to limit female labor force participation. It should be noted that industrialization began in Latin American and Southeast Asia earlier than it did in the Middle

East. In the case of South Korea, first the Japanese and then the Americans played a role in the expansion of agricultural and industrial production, as well as education. In Brazil and Mexico, foreign investment played an important role in propelling industrialization (N. Harris 1986). The success of East Asian countries in making a transition to export-led industrialization in the early 1960s contributed to their rapid economic growth, facilitated by the rapid expansion of world trade in the 1960s (Jenkins 1991). By contrast, in the Middle East the rate of industrial expansion remained slow until the mid-1950s. The industrialization. Between 1955 and 1975 the industrialization of the Middle East (with the notable exception of Israel) followed a classic pattern of import-substitution industrialization (Mabro 1988).

Those countries rich in oil and poor in other resources (category [a] above) have chosen an industrial strategy based on the transformation of hydrocarbon resources into petroleum products and petrochemicals. A strategy relying on oil, gas and finance, which is heavily capital-intensive and minimizes the use of labor, is not conducive to women's employment. The industrialization of other countries (categories [b] and [c] above) have followed a typical pattern of import-substitution. Mabro (1988) notes that unlike Latin America, ISI in the Middle East did not evolve into manufacturing for export. Due to oil revenues, governments chose to extend the import-substitution process, moving into capital-intensive sectors involving sophisticated technology. Investment in iron and steel plants, petrochemicals, car assembly plants, and similar industries, turned out to be costly and inefficient, and not conducive to increased female employment.

For the OPEC countries, foreign exchange from oil revenues constituted the accumulation of capital, although an industrial labor force in the manufacturing sector was also created. In both the oil and mixed oil economies the contribution of petroleum to the national income, both direct and indirect, is such as to make the apparent share of other sectors appear insignificant. Exceptions to this pattern are Turkey, Tunisia, Israel and Morocco. Of these four countries, only Tunisia exports oil, though its oil share of exports is lower than that of OPEC countries (42% in 1985 compared to Saudi Arabia's 97% or Iran's 85%). The other countries have had to rely on exports of manufacturers and agricultural goods. Notable among them is Turkey; in 1984 manufacturing constituted 54 percent of GDP (Mabro 1988). (Egypt under Sadat tried to follow the Turkish model and liberalize its economic system in order to promote industrial exports. But is was less successful than Turkey.) What should be noted is that in the non-oil economies, female labor force participation is higher than elsewhere and is indeed encouraged.

In the 1980s, all Middle Eastern countries were beset by economic and political difficulties. The global oil market became

very unstable, leading to fluctuating and declining prices. The near-collapse of prices in 1986 (from $28 per barrel to $7 per barrel) had repercussions throughout the Middle East in terms of austerity measures, decreased availability of development aid and the re-evaluation of major development projects. In the 1980s, countries of the Middle East, and especially North Africa, experienced low or negative economic growth rates, declining state revenues, and high levels of indebtedness to foreign creditors. In some cases (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria), debts became truly enormous in relation to the country's economic capacities; Turkey was on the World Bank's list of "severely indebted middle-income countries." The most active Arab borrowers from the World Bank--Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia--have had to impose austerities on their populations as a result of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment policy packages, and several have experienced "IMF riots." High population growth rates, coupled with heavy rural-urban migration, have concentrated larger numbers of the unemployed in major urban areas. The livelihood of lower middle-class and working-class women (and men) has been adversely affected by the debt and the inflationary-recessionary cycles which have been plaguing the region, especially in Morocco, Algeria, Iran, and Egypt. The austerities required by debt servicing and structural adjustment, social disparities, and political repression have tended to de-legitimate "Western-style" systems and revive questions of cultural identity, including renewed calls for greater control over women's mobility. It is in this context of economic failures and political delegitimation that Islamist movements are presenting themselves as alternatives. These movements are especially strong in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey. The extent and strength of Islamist movements vary across the region. In general they do not call for total female domesticity; indeed, among their supporters are many educated women and university students (Moghadam 1991b). But insofar as cultural concerns take precedence over economic ones, the question of women's autonomy and mobility, including active participation in the paid labor force, will remain a controversial one.

Table 1 illustrates some economic characteristics of Middle Eastern countries, as well as juridical features relevant to women. A key factor shared by all countries except Tunisia and Turkey is the absence of a comprehensive civil code. Most of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are governed, in varying degrees, by Islamic canon law, the Sharia. (Similarly, Israeli law is based on the Halacha.) Like the laws and traditions of the other world religions, Islam does not prescribe gender equality or equal treatment before the law.

Conceptual Framework: Gender, Class, the State, and Development Strategy

The foregoing provided background information on the main economic, political, and cultural features of the countries of the region. In this section I provide an explanatory framework for women's employment that rests on gender, class, the state, and development strategy as the principal structural determinants.

Sex/Gender System

According to Papanek (1990:163), "Gender differences, based on the social construction of biological sex distinctions, are one of the great 'fault lines' of societies--those marks of difference among categories of persons that govern the allocation of power, authority, and resources." Contemporary gender systems are often designed by ideologies and inscribed by law, justified by custom and enforced by policy, sustained by processes of socialization and reinforced through distinct institutions. Gender bias is a systemic feature of all societies and is found in varying degrees in all institutions: the family, religion, the educational system, and the labor market. The allocation of resources, whether at the level of the household, the market, or the state, has historically been marked by gender bias in favor of men and against women. In the Middle East, many aspects of the gender system remain patriarchal in the classic sense (Kandiyoti 1988), with a strong emphasis on family roles for women. One consequence of the gender system informed by Islam is that certain occupations, such as factory work, marketing, or sales work, are considered unsuitable for women in many Middle Eastern countries. In general, and at the current stage of industrialization, the better factory jobs are allotted to men.

But gender differences are not the only "fault lines"; they operate within a larger matrix of other socially constructed distinctions, such as class, ethnicity, religion, and age, which give them their specific dynamics in a given time and place. Gender is thus not a homogeneous category; it is internally differentiated and elaborated by class, ethnicity, age, and education. To paraphrase Michael Mann (1986:56), gender is stratified and stratification is gendered. In the Middle East, the gender system has changed, especially and most rapidly in the past 30 years. A principal cause of that change has been state-sponsored education, economic development, the expansion of the state apparatus, and attendant alterations in the size and structure of the labor force. As part of these macro-level changes, women have been integrated into productive sectors and the public sector in most countries of the Middle East.

Social Class

Class constitutes a basic unit of social life and thus of social research. Class is here understood in the Marxian sense of determination by ownership or control of the means of production; social classes also have differential access to political power and the state. Class location shapes cultural practices, worldviews, patterns of consumption, lifestyle, reproduction, and quality of life.

In the highly stratified societies of the Middle East and North Africa, social class location, in addition to state action and the level and pace of economic development, act upon and modify gender relations and women's social positions. Although state-sponsored education has resulted in a certain amount of upward social mobility and has increased the numbers of women willing and able to fill the administrative and welfare jobs in the ever-expanding state systems as well as in the private sector, women's access to resources, including education, is largely determined by their class location. That a large percentage of urban employed women in the Middle East are found in the services sector, or in professional occupations, can be understood by examining their social class background. As in other Third World countries where social disparities are great, upper- and upper-middle class, urban women can exercise a greater number of choices (certainly vis-à-vis lower-middle class, working-class, urban poor or peasant women) and thus become much more "emancipated." In 1971 Safilios-Rothschild wrote that professional and marital roles become compatible due to the availability of cheap domestic labor and the extended family network. This was still true in 1990 for women from wealthy families, although except in Morocco, middle-class women in the large Middle Eastern countries are less likely to be able to afford domestic help these days and more likely to rely on a mother or mother-in-law. While at the level of ideology and policy some states are committed to women's participation in industrial production (such as in Egypt), the system extracts the labor of women in economic need without giving them the social services to coordinate their productive roles in the family and workplace (Badran 1982:80).

As with their role in production and work generally, class also shapes women's choices and practices in reproduction. Fertility patterns are largely a class phenomenon; women's employment and fertility have also been found to be negatively correlated (Bodrova and Anker 1985; Caldwell and Ruzicka 1987). Educated middle-class and upper-class women in the professions tend to have fewer children, as the World Fertility Survey found for Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. For example, while on average the desired number of children in Egypt is four, and the mean number of children ever born to illiterate mothers is 4.4, it drops to 2.1 for women with secondary school educations. The mean number of children even born to university

educated women is 1.8 (World Fertility Survey No. 42: The Egyptian Survey, November 1983).

Development: Industrialization and State Policies

In the 1960s and 1970s, the Middle East participated in a global process variously called the internationalization of capital (Palloix 1977), the new (or changing) international division of labor (Frobel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1980; Southall 1988), and global Fordism (Lipietz 1982). In this regard, the transnational corporations (TNCs) were significant, as were national development plans and domestic industrialization projects. Whether seen in terms of "modernization" (i.e., social differentiation, emergence of a division of labor, urbanization and rationalization) or of uneven development (the production of relative surplus value by workers and its appropriation by owners of capital; unequal distribution; uneven spread of capitalist rations), the process of industrialization and its concomitants (see Walton 1987) were present in the Middle East. State expansion, economic development, oil wealth, and increased integration within the world system combined to create educational and employment opportunities for women in the Middle East. Since the 1960s, there has been both an increase in recorded urban female labor force participation, especially among working mothers in the age groups 25-44 and greater unemployment and underemployment. Although all regions saw a rise in the rates of labor force participation, the largest increase was reported for the Middle East, at 53 percent (ICRW 1980:9). In developing countries women's employment increased significantly during the 1970s; especially high increases were in Syria and Tunisia, where women's labor increase topped that of men (ILO/INSTRAW 1985:35).

For about ten years after the oil price increases of the early 1970s, a massive investment program by the oil-producing countries affected the structure of the labor force not only within the relevant countries, but throughout the region, as a result of labor migration. Since then, the urban areas have seen an expansion of the female labor force, as women have occupied paid positions in factories and offices, as workers, administrators, and professionals. Feminist concerns and women's movement also emerged, and by 1980 most Middle Eastern countries had women's organizations dealing with issues of literacy, education, employment, family law, and so on. These social changes have had a positive effect in reducing traditional sex segregation and female seclusion, and in producing a generation of middle-class women not dependent on family or marriage for survival and status.

The process of incorporation of women in the labor market was mediated by the state which, in Third World countries, is an active economic agent and a major actor in its own right. The state can act as a facilitator or an obstacle in the integration of female

citizens in economic (and political) life. Legal changes and state-sponsored education in particular have affected women's work opportunities. Indeed, the work potential of Middle Eastern women has increased with education. Literacy rates are still low in comparison to Latin America and East Asia, and there remains a serious gender disparity in educational attainment, but state-financed education has produced a generation of women who actively seek employment. The positive relationship between female education and non-agricultural employment is marked throughout the Middle East. Census data reveal that each educational level is reflected in a corresponding increase in the level of women's non-agricultural employment, and in lower fertility (Chamie 1985b). Women's education has weakened the restrictive barriers of traditions and increased the propensity of women to join the labor force. It seems to increase the aspirations of women in certain sectors of society for higher income and better standards of living (Azzam, Abu Nasr and Lorfing 1985:11). Most importantly, female education and employment have undermined patriarchal attitudes and practices (Mernissi 1987).

Most of the large Middle East countries (i.e, the countries in category [b], except Israel) embarked on a development strategy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI), where machinery was imported to run local industries producing consumer goods. This was associated with an economic system characterized by central planning and a large public sector. Mabro (1988) and Richards and Waterbury (1990) are sympathetic to ISI, but they recognize the distortions and unintended consequences of this development strategy. What should be added is that while ISI opened up some employment opportunities for women--for example, in state-run factories or in industrial plants in the private sector receiving state support--import substitution industrialization tended to be capital-intensive and to favor male employment. The countries in category [a], i.e., the oil economies, chose a strategy that relied on oil, gas and finance, which minimizes the use of labor (Mabro 1988:690), and offers insignificant employment opportunities for women. In contrast, the utilization of an export-led development strategy, accompanied by an influx of multinational corporations into a country, tends to be associated (at both general and case study levels of analysis in the Third World) with extensive use of women's labor, leading to increases in women's labor force participation and particularly to increases in women's share of manufacturing (Standing 1989).

Oil-Based Development and Women's Labor Force Participation

For the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, increased oil revenues and foreign exchange facilitated changes in the structure of the economy. The augmentation of the activities of capital was followed by increased employment of men and an expansion of the labor force involved in industry and services.

These changes affected women, too, who were increasingly brought into the labor force. Massive intra-regional migration of men from the labor surplus countries of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and North Yemen to better paying jobs in the oil-rice states of the region (such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE) also affected women's employment patterns. Among other things, the working age population remaining in the rural areas came to be dominated by women (Chamie 1985b:3). Some of the labor receiving countries experienced a dramatic rise in women's labor force participation; this was true for Bahrain and Kuwait, although not so for Libya and Saudi Arabia. The female activity rate in Bahrain reached 11.1 percent in 1981, while in Kuwait the female economically active population doubled between 1970 and 1980. By 1980, women's employment represented 18.8 percent of total salaried employment (ILO 1985a). In a 1982 special economic report on South Yemen (the PDRY), the World Bank estimated women's employment at more than 20 percent. Here, too, between 1976 and 1984 the number of women working in the public and mixed sectors together doubled. The migratory trend created labor shortages in agriculture and in the labor markets of the sending countries (Azzam, Abu Nasr and Lorfing 1985). In some cases the agricultural sector became dependent on its female resources. Male out-migration also increased the phenomenon of feamle-headed households (ILO 1985b).

Concomitantly, new job vacancies were created in the service and industrial sectors that were filled by women. For relatively well-educated women, services (teaching, health and welfare), were, and remain, the main areas of possibility, while in the more developed Middle Eastern countries (such as Turkey and Egypt), women's participation increased in commercial and industrial undertakings and in public administration. During the period of rapid growth, some governments tended to provide generous benefits to working women. In Iraq, the ruling Baath party encouraged a wide range of employment for women, who by the late 1970s comprised 30 percent of the country's medical doctors and pharmacists, 33 percent of its teachers and university lecturers, 33 percent of the staff of government departments, 26 percent of workers in industry, and 45 percent of those on farms. Maternity leave was comparatively generous, and pregnant women's jobs were protected (a practice adopted from socialist countries). In Turkey, too, a woman on maternity leave was given the right to return to the job she held before childbirth. Employment protection also existed in Iran: labor legislation enacted before the Revolution and retained for most of the 1980s provided women with 12 weeks of maternity leave (ILO 1985a:16). Thus, Middle Eastern women have had a role in development as both participants and beneficiaries.

But in the Middle East, as elsewhere in the Third World, the formal economy could not absorb all the entrants to the labor force, and the urban population in developing countries has been growing rapidly due to natural population growth and to high in-migration rates (Portes and Benton 1984). Consequently, the period

also saw unemployment, the expansion of the urban informal sector, and the rising phenomenon of female heads of households resulting from male migration, separation, divorce, and widowhood. In 1980, women's share of unemployment was generally higher than their share of employment (ILO/INSTRAW 1985:36). For example, women's share of unemployment in Syria was 16 percent; in Tunisia, it was 18 percent. Low wages tended to enlarge the informal sector and to push women into it.

The degree of occupational choice that women had within the structure of employment was linked to the type of industrialization the country was undergoing, the extent of state intervention and size of the public sector, and the class background of women entering the labor force. In some places development and state expansion afforded women a range of work opportunities in the professional labor market that was wider than that in the most industrialized societies of the West. This was particularly striking in Turkey, where in the 1970s the female share of teaching, banking, and the medical profession reached one-third, and where one in every five practicing lawyers was female (Kazgan 1981). A similar pattern has been found for other Third World countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, and India. Cross-national studies indicate that in societies undergoing capitalist development, there is a curvilinear relationship between the level of industrial and economic development and the range of options open to women in professional careers. At intermediate levels, there are higher proportions of women in professional schools and also in the professional labor market than at either extreme. In such countries, law, medicine, dentistry and even engineering constitute a "cluster" of occupations that appear as women's options (Safilios-Rothschild 1971).

But class is another explanatory variable. With regard to women's access to high-status professions in Turkey, Oncu (1981) suggested that a kind of affirmative action or quota system may have been operating for the upper class, limiting the social mobility of the lower classes. She suggested that under conditions of rapid expansion, the elite recruitment patterns into the most prestigious and highly remunerated professions are maintained by the admission of women from the upper reaches of the social hierarchy (Oncu 1981:189).

Industrialization and Female Proletarianization

TNCs created employment opportunities for many women throughout the Third World, leading to the globalization of women's labor (Joekes 1987), or the feminization of labor (Standing 1989). An important feature of the global restructuring of employment affecting women workers has been the relocation of labor-intensive industries from industrially developed to developing countries in search of cheap labor, mostly young, unmarried, and inexperienced

women to engage in industrial work (ILO/INSTRAW 1985:21). Textiles and clothing were the first industries relocated, followed by food processing, electronics, and in some cases pharmaceutical products. In this process, various forms of subcontracting arrangements were made to relocate production, or subsidiaries set up with foreign or partly local capital. This TNC relocation has affected women mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean and in Southeast Asia. The most important areas of activity for foreign investors in the export manufacturing sector in developing countries has been the textiles and clothing and electronics industries. Five countries dominate in terms of the size of their EPZ operations: Hong Kong, South Korea, Puerto Rico, Singapore and Taiwan. Rather less important but still substantial are EPZs in Brazil, Haiti, Malaysia and Mexico (Joekes and Moayedi 1987:21). Over the years, a majority of jobs created in the export manufacturing sector has gone to women (Standing 1989). Indeed, Joekes and Moayedi (1987) note "the disproportionate access that women have to export manufacturing employment and their overwhelming importance as suppliers for the export manufacturing sector."

In the Middle East, free production zones were established in Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Democratic Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia (Frobel et al. 1980). Iran, a world market factory, commenced operations in 1974 with United States and West German capital investment, to produce shoes, leather goods, textiles and garments (Frobel et al. 1980, Appendix, Table III-17/18). However, most of the workers were men. The kinds of concentrations of women's labor in TNCs that are characteristic of Southeast Asia and some Latin American and Caribbean countries are rarely found in the Middle East, in part because this type of industrialization has not been pursued by all the countries of the region. Mabro has suggested that Iran would probably have embarked upon an export-oriented strategy, but that the Revolution and the war with Iraq arrested the process of industrial development (Mabro 1988:692). This would also explain the decline in female industrial employment in the years immediately following the Revolution (Moghadam 1988) and subsequent fall of overall female employment in the Islamic Republic (Moghadam 1991a).

In part due to import-substitution policies, and partly due to excess reliance on oil revenues, industry in the Middle East has failed to make progress comparable to that achieved in India, Brazil, Korea, or Singapore. Among Arab countries, Morocco is the country in which industry makes the largest relative contribution to GDP: 18.6 percent. Morocco also enjoys a relatively high share of manufacturing in its merchandise exports: 32 percent. It also has the highest percentage of women in production, and nearly half of the economically active women in the urban areas are engaged in textile work, although much of this is homework (CERED 1989:103-104). Those countries with the largest shares of manufacturing in their merchandise exports are Israel with 80 percent and Turkey with 57 percent (Mabro 1988:695). Other Middle Eastern countries

do not usually come near the top 50 in ranking of world manufacturing production. This has implications for patterns of female employment. It appears that lower levels of industrialization and manufacturing for export means less female proletarianization and activity in the productive sectors.

For the Middle East as a whole, one does find a correlation between industrial strategy and female labor force participation. The data suggests that export-led industrialization and women's employment are positively related. Those countries with export-led industrial (and agricultural) strategies and higher levels of women women's labor force participation are Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey. During the 1980s, in Tunisia, 40 percent of all employed women worked in the industrial sector; in Morocco it was nearly 30 percent (ILO/INSTRAW 1985). A study of the Moroccan clothing industry showed that the proportion of women workers was higher, both within and between firms, when the product was for foreign markets (Joekes 1982).

But in the case of Turkey, more women are engaged in agricultural work than in the modern industrial sector. Although Turkey's proximity to Europe and its greater participation in the international division of labor have drawn more into world market activities, most of these activities are in the informal sector--unwaged, family-based production of agricultural goods or carpets. Agriculture, light manufacturing industry (tobacco, textiles-apparel, food-beverages, packaging of chemicals) and certain subdivisions of service industries are typically "feminine" occupations. But this constitutes a relatively small percentage of the Turkish female labor force. In 1985 fully 69 percent of the economically active female population of 5.5 million was in agriculture, and only 7.6 percent were production workers. Indeed, work in the manufacturing sector remains a predominantly male phenomenon in Turkey. In Israel, too, the most industrialized economy in the region, the role of women in industrial work is also negligible; the female share of production workers is about 14 percent. (See Tables 2 and 3.)

The limited participation of women in industrial production and manufacturing is illustrated in the tables. The female share of production work ranges from a low of 1 percent in Libya and Jordan (and next to nothing in the Gulf city-states) to highs to 23 percent in Morocco and 17 percent in Tunisia. The range is not substantially different from that in Latin American countries, but in East and Southeast Asian countries women workers constitute 20-30 percent of production workers (see Standing 1989, Table 5). Another difference is that fewer women production workers are salaried in the Middle East. The female share of manufacturing employees is lower in the Middle East than in Latin America and East and Southeast Asia, although again, Tunisia and Morocco depart from the norm.

Care must be taken in interpreting the high percentages recorded or Iran and Afghanistan. For there, much of what purports to be industiral activity for women is in fact of a rural and traditional type, such as carpet weaving. In the 1970s Iran was sometimes included in the varying lists of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs), and the development literature noted a significant increase not only in male but in female participation in industry. One study cited the increase in women's labor force participation in Iran in the same category as Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore (ILO/INSTRAW 1985:64). By 1976, industry's share of the total labor force was about one-third. According to ILO data, some 33 percent of the female economically active population in 1976 was engaged in industrial work. However, what this statistic masked as the dualistic nature of Iranian industry, and the polarization of the industrial labor force (both male and female) between workers in small and traditional workshops, and workers in large and modern factories (Moghadam 1987). Close examination of census data reveal that most women industrial workers were actually rural women involved in traditional manufacturing (carpets, handicrafts, clothing for the domestic market, etc.). A far smaller proportion was in the larger urban factories. Two-thirds of women in the category "female employers/own-account workers" were in manufacturing (ILO/INSTRAW 1985:49). A large percentage of women in "industrial/manufacturing" activities were found in the category "unpaid family workers."

Thus, one cannot escape the conclusion that if, as Joekes has argued, industrialization in parts of the Third World "has been as much female-led as export-led" (Joekes 1987:81), this is not pertinent to the Middle East. To be sure, in nearly all the large countries women are engaged in light manufacturing--clothing, woven goods, shoes, food processing, confectioneries. But in the cities of the Middle East, most women are marginalized from production, and especially from the formal sector productive process, and are concentrated in community, social and personal services. There does seem to be a widespread Middle Eastern attitude that factory work is not suitable for women--although this may itself be a function of the limited demand for women's labor, given the current stage of industrialization in the Middle East. The exceptions are Morocco and Tunisia.

State Policy and Women's Status

As Jean Pyle (1990) has found for the Republic of Ireland, state policy can have contradictory goals: development of the economy and expansion of services, and the maintenance of the "traditional" family. In some cases, this strategy has worked. In other cases, the unintended consequences of development has been the growth of a stratum of educated women actively seeking employment. Economic need, too, motivates women from various social classes. Still, state policy is an essential part of the

equation that makes up the status of women. Employment opportunities and the structure of the work force, especially as far as women are concerned, are to a great extent determined by the state's legal and social policies, in addition to its economic development strategy.

Turkey provides a nearly unique example (the other being Tunisia) of a country that replaced the Islamic personal status laws with a civil law code regulating personal and family relations and equalizing the duties and responsibilities of the sexes. The Turkish state has frequently been authoritarian, but is has been consistently secular. A consequence has been the expansion of professional opportunities for women in law (Abadan-Unit 1981:26). Unlike most Muslim countries, Turkey has women judges and magistrates. But during the 1980s there was a slight shift in the state orientation. The social-democratic years of the 1970s were halted by a military coup in 1980. Since 1983, some 700 Koranic schools have been established throughout the country, and their graduates have raised calls for Islamization. Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, the architect of a tough stabilization and structural adjustment program, was also the most openly Islamic Turkish leader in modern times.

One area where the Turkish state has been deficient is in the provision of literacy and education, especially for girls. Between 1975 and 1985 the illiterate female population declined from 49 percent to 32 percent, but the reduction of male illiteracy was much steeper, from 24 percent to 13 percent. In 1985, women constituted fully 70 percent of the illiterate population. These illiteracy figures may help to explain the large number of Turkish women in agriculture, mentioned above.

In the late 1950s under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's public sector expanded significantly through a series of Egyptianization decrees (1956-1959) which gave the Government control of foreign-owned assets, such as the Suez Canal. This was followed in the early 1960s by the adoption of a highly centralized development policy approach and a massive wave of nationalizations of Egyptian-owned enterprises in industry, banking, trade and transport. At the same time, the Government embarked on an employment drive whereby state-owned enterprises were forced to include among their annual targets the creation of significant numbers of new jobs, while the administrative apparatus of the state was also expanded rapidly both at the central and local government level. Equally important was the objective of spreading health and education services in urban and rural areas with a corresponding growth of government employment in these services (World Labor Report 1989:52). The state gave its political support to the education of women and to their integration into national development. The state's guarantee of a job to all high school and university graduates encouraged women, including women from working-class and

lower-middle class families, to take advantage of the government's free education policy.

Labor Law 91 of 1954, over and above its guarantee of equal rights and equal wages, made special provisions for married women and mothers. Later, under Sadat, these provisions were expanded to facilitate women's labor market participation. This law was applied primarily in the public and government sectors, which made jobs in these areas particularly attractive to women. As a result, the state has become the single most important employer of women (Hoodfar 1991).

In more recent years, the Egyptian government has been faced with the difficult issue of how to reduce its commitment to job creation in the fact of severe recessionary conditions in the economy. This is in the context of a record level of 15.5 percent overall (open) unemployment, according to the 1986 population census (8 from 7 percent in the 1976 census), and with poor prospects for either the domestic productive sectors or the Arab oil-rich markets to create significant job opportunities for Egyptian workers. Moreover, high inflation has effectively eroded the financial advantage of the white-collar work force. This has fueled social tensions--including the growth of Islamism. Another consequence has been the reveiling of working women (see Hoodfar 1991).

In Tunisia, government policy after independence prioritized women's emancipation and integration in development, and the Constitution and civil code reflected and reinforced that position. In the Constitution all citizens are ensured the same rights and obligations as well as equality before the law. President Habib Bourguiba was instrumental in obtaining a legal ban on polygamy and unilateral divorce. A law in 1960 made it possible for the minority of women who were members of the social insurance service (mainly those employed in industry, handicrafts, and services, and with the exception of housework) the right to pregnancy-leave six weeks before delivery and six weeks afterwards. During this period 50 percent of monthly wages were to be paid (SIDA 1974). In the 1980s, the distribution of the female labor force was more balanced in Tunisia than in many other countries: 26 percent in agriculture, 48 percent in manufacturing, 21 percent in services. Women's participation in formal politics matched the trends in employment. In 1981 there were 7 female deputies in parliament; in 1983 there were 50,000 women members of the ruling social-democratic Neo-Destour Party and 57,000 members of the National Union of Tunisian Women; and in 1985, 492 women were voted municipal councillors around the country (UNFPA/Ministère du Plan 1984). Still, economic problems have encouraged Islamist forces and threatened women's gains. In May 1989 Islamic tendencies competed openly in Tunisia's parliamentary elections, winning 14 percent of the total vote and 30 percent in Tunis and other cities, beating the main secular opposition party, the Movement of

Democratic Socialists, into third place (The Economist, July 8, 1989:48). Compared to his predecessor, the staunchly secular Habib Bourguiba, current president Ben Ali has built more mosques and restored Koranic universities.

In other cases, state managers remain wedded to the ideology of domesticity and refrain from encouraging women's participation in the paid labor force. Examples are Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, and Algeria. In North Yemen, the 1975 census and manpower survey listed only nine percent of all Yemeni women as participants in the urban modern sector labor force. These women are generally young, unmarried women in their late teens or early 20s, or widowed or divorced women. In Yemen, female factory workers actually exceeded female government employees (even though both categories represent a fraction of the total labor force in these areas); female production workers tend to be older, illiterate, of low socio-economic status and often migrants to the cities (Myntti 1985). In government offices women employees are veiled. Barriers to women's employment include the importation of foreign labor to compensate for men's out-migration (rather than training domestic female labor), inadequate access to education, and "culturally defined attitudes and practices. . . .lack of childcare facilities, and the legal code, the Sharia" (Myntti 1985). In 1983, only 2 percent of North Yemen women were literate, and the total fertility rate was 6.8. Fertility rates are high throughout the Gulf states, ranging from 5.9 in the United Arab Emirates to 7.5 in Kuwait (Azzam and Moujabber 1985:69).

A review of government policy in Saudi Arabia and in Algeria reveals that state personnel have designed policy not only to promote economic growth and development but also to reproduce traditional familial relations. In Saudi Arabia, women's place is in the home and their life is more circumscribed than in any other Middle Eastern country. The percentage of Saudi women who work outside the home, mainly in the teaching and health sectors, is about five percent. Saudi culture--devotion to Islam, extended-family values, the segregated status of females, and the al-Saud monarchic hegemony--is being formulated in an increasingly deliberate fashion, constituting a new political culture which acts as a screen to insure that technological and human progress remains within acceptable bounds (Gallagher and Searle 1985). For example, to minimize sensitivities concerning male physicians and female patients, a substantial number of Saudi female physicians are being trained, whose efforts will be directed toward female patients. In the wake of the Gulf crisis following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Saudi authorities called for wider participation of women in the labor force, but only "in the area of human services and medical services within the context of fully preserving Islamic and social values" (Ibrahim 1990).

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Algerian state promoted industrialization in tandem with the preservation of the close-knit

family union. Both the industrial strategy and the pro-natalist Boumedienne social policy worked against female employment. By the 1980s, as a result of a galloping birth rate, nearly three-quarters of its population was under the age of 30, and many were unemployed. According to the 1987 Census, the employed population numbers 3.7 million men and a mere 365,000 women--out of a total population of 13 million over the age of 15. The female share of the employed population is 8.8 percent. Still, this represents a steady increase in women's employment since 1966. Algeria's development strategy was one of heavy industrialization (partly on the assumption that it would eventually encourage mechanized agriculture). In the new, large-scale factories, such as steel works and petrochemicals, skilled workers were needed, and it was men who were trained for those jobs. The result was a very low female labor force participation in industry. As in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, women are an under-utilized source of labor--with adverse implications for fertility, population growth rates, and overall social development.

In the early 1980s the Algerian government began to make concessions to the growing number of Islamists in the National Assembly. A Family Code was drafted which alarmed many women and provoked protest demonstrations. The final bill, passed in 1984, gives women the legal right to work, but renders them economic dependents of men (Jansen 1987; Knauss 1987). In the midst of a privatization effort, faced with high rates of unemployment (in the order of 22 percent), a heavy debt servicing burden, and other assorted economics ills, Algerian policy-makers were unwilling to risk legislation that could potentially aggravate the situation, and thus conceded to the Islamists in the National Assembly. In the parliamentary elections of June 1990, the Islamist party won the most seats, a situation which North African feminists felt was bound to adversely affect women's existing fragile and limited rights (Baffoun 1990). In 1992, in the wake of further electoral gains on the part of the Islamists, the military stepped in and a new government banned the Islamist party. But Algerian middle class working women remain worried about their precarious position.

The result of the Algerian state's cultural conservatism is that women's participation in state and other social agencies is quite low when compared to male participation. For example, women comprise only 11 percent of the employees of ministries, 34 percent of schoolteachers, 24 percent of higher education instructors, and 36 percent of public health workers. There are no women in the sectors "affaires religieuses" and "protection civile" (Saadi 1991:93). Still, Algerian women are more likely to work in the government sector than in the private sector. Indeed, 86 percent of employed Algerian women are engaged in the public sector, as against 14 percent in the private sector (Saadi 1991:93). For Algerian men, the respective rates are 55 percent and 45 percent. Thus any contraction of the public sector through "structural

adjustment" will have devastating effects on women's fragile and limited employment situation.

Government sector employment--limited though it is--is important for Iranian women too. In Iran, nearly all women who are waged and salaried are in the public sector, where they enjoy insurance, pensions, and other benefits. But in the private sector they are likely to be "self-employed" or unpaid family workers in agriculture or rug-weaving workshops (Moghadam 1991a). Thus, formal/modern sector employment, especially opportunities within the civil service, is an advantage for Middle Eastern women and an important source of status and livelihood.

In Jordan, one finds an overall low crude participation rate (19.6 percent in 1984 for both men and women), due partly to a very high rate of population growth (about 3.8 percent annually) and a large under-15 population, high out-migration, and low female economic activity. During the 1970s the state encouraged education and indeed made education compulsory for nine years. There has consequently been an impressive increase in female education: by 1984-85 girls accounted for some 48 percent of the total school enrollment (Hijab 1988:96). The area of women's employment, however, has been less impressive. In 1979, the percentage of economically active women in the total labor force was only about four percent, while the female share of employees was only nine percent. As in Yemen, outmigration of Jordanian male labor did not result in an increasing number of women being brought into the wage labor market; rather their activities in informal sector and as unpaid family workers increased. Labor shortages due to migration led to labor importation, mainly Egyptians, at all levels of skills, rather than the training of women in marketable skills to meet the shortages (Mujahid 1985).

Jordan's Five Year Plan (1980-85) sought to further integrate women into the development process, and predicted an increase of the total number of women in the working age bracket, excluding agricultural workers, to nearly 14 percent (National Planning Council 1981). But by 1984 the crude female participation rate was only 4.8 percent. Nearly half of all women in the modern sector are in education, while textile workers represent about 30 percent of Jordan's female labor force. In an untoward economic situation characterized by a large external debt and high male unemployment, there has in fact been an implicit government policy to discourage female employment (Hijab 1988:114). In the first parliamentary elections since 1967, held in November 1989, 34 out of 80 seats were won by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamists. This political development, too, will likely minimize efforts to integrate women into public life, including the labor force.

In some cases, a regime's search for political legitimacy, a larger labor force, or an expanded social base have led it to

construct health, education and welfare services conducive to greater work participation by women, and to encourage women's activity in the public sphere. Examples are the Iraqi Baathists during the 1960s and 1970s, the Pahlavi state in Iran in the same period, and Tunisia under former President Bourguiba. In Egypt, since Nasser's time, many women have entered into previously male strongholds--universities, the administration, professions, industry, the business world, politics. But the economic crisis in Egypt, as well as rapid demographic growth, limit formal employment opportunities for women. Thus the vast majority of Egyptian women are engaged in the informal sector, as street vendors and hawkers, selling food and other wares, working at home as seamstresses, generally engaged in a myriad of small-scale income-generating activities.

"Socialist" ideology has sometimes motivated state support for female emancipation, including education and employment. An example is the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, or South Yemen). Legal reform in the 1970s, modeled after that of other socialists states, expressly targeted the "traditional" or "feudal" family as "incompatible with the principles and programme of the National Democratic Revolution, . . . because its old relationships prevent it from playing a positive role in the building up of society" (Molyneux 1985:155-156). Left-wing radicals were responsible for the 1970 Constitution which explicitly included women as part of the "working people" and "productive forces," who had both the right and the obligation to work (Molyneux 1985:159). The PDRY state consequently went further than any other Middle Eastern regime in legislating gender equality and mandating women's active involvement in the construction of the new order.

The active role of the state in national development has meant that for many women it is no longer a male guardian--father or husband--who is the provider, but the State. As Mernissi remarks, " . . . The North African woman of today usually dreams of having a steady, wage-paying job with social security and health and retirement benefits, at a State institution; these women don't look to a man any longer for their survival, but to the State. While perhaps not ideal, this is nevertheless a breakthrough, an erosion of tradition. It also partly explains the Moroccan women's active participation in the urbanization process: they are leaving rural areas in numbers equaling men's migrations, for a 'better life' in the cities--and in European cities, as well" (Mernissi 1984:448-449).

Characteristics of the Female Labor Force

During the 1980s, economic activity rates of women ranged from a low of 4.8 percent in Jordan, 6.8 in Syria and 7 percent in Algeria to highs of 18 percent in Kuwait, 22 percent in Turkey and

27 percent in Israel (ILO/INSTRAW 1985:13). In relation to Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, and of course the advanced industrialized countries, female activity rates in all age groups are quite low. Moreover, in general women's labor force participation tends to be concentrated in the age groups 15-29; it is even lower in the older age groups. The exceptions are Turkey and Israel, where female activity rates are both the highest in the region (over 45 percent), and fairly consistent across the age groups. They are followed by Tunisia, which has a 30 percent activity rate for women in the age group 15-34. Kuwait and Qatar also report fairly high activity rates (37 percent) for women ages 25-49; these are professional women who, in fact, comprise the female labor force in those countries.

For the region as a whole, the female share of the economically active population is reaching 20 percent, although there are higher female shares in Israel, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco. Other countries with large population (for example, Iran) do not count women in agriculture, the thereby report a very small female economically active population. In terms of employment status, and as seen in Table 4, the female share of the total salaried population is generally under 20 percent, from a low of 5.2 percent in the UAE and 9 percent in Iran to 17 percent in Morocco in 1982. Kuwait reports 20.8 percent female share, while Israel's female share is highest at 41.5 percent.

As seen in Table 5, the percentage of the economically active female population (EAP) that receives a wage or salary is high in Kuwati (97 percent) and Israel (79 percent), average in Syria (46 percent) and Egypt (30 percent), and low in Turkey (14 percent). The female share of the paid labor force in Morocco in 1982 was 17.6 percent. In Iran, the proportion of the female EAP that receives a wage appears high (51.6%), because the Iranian enumerators do not count rural women as part of the EAP. If they did, the statistic would probably be closer to Turkey's. In Turkey, the female share of the salaried labor force is a mere 15 percent. Fully 80 percent of the female labor force was classified "unpaid family labor" in 1980. These women are mostly in agriculture. In some cases women in agriculture are not enumerated (notably Iran among large countries), but large percentages of female agricultural workers are also found in Egypt and Syria.

Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the distribution of the female EAP in branches of industry, and the occupational distribution of the female EAP, respectively. As can be see in Table 6, the distribution in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait and Syria is skewed in favor of Group 9 of the major industry branches, that is, community, social and personal services. Turkey's female EAP is skewed in favor of Group 1, or agriculture. Tunisia's female labor force is more evenly distributed, and in a departure from the Middle Eastern norm, more women are in industry than in agriculture or services. The high incidence of women workers within the

"professional, technical, and related workers" group in most countries may be the outcome of occupational stereotyping prevalent in the region, where women cluster around specific jobs such as teaching and nursing. It may also be a function of the class distribution of income and work participation, whereby women from elite families are most likely to be those who are employed.

In terms of occupational distribution, in Muslim countries there appears to be a very low preference for women in sales work or even service work. Mujahid (1985:115) explains this in terms of cultural norms, as it is an occupation in which the likelihood of indiscriminate contact with outsiders is highest. This may also be an extension of a long-standing pattern in which the merchant class has been typically male, and the traditional urban markets--bazaars and souks--have been the province of men. It is, moreover, a function of socialization. In their recent study of sex role socialization in Iranian textbooks, Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari (1989) note that in both pre- and post-revolutionary textbooks nearly half of the lessons in which women are portrayed working, they are doing housework, and in both eras three-quarters of the lessons portraying women at work outside the home show them in professional positions (almost always teaching). The remainder portrayed women in agricultural work; no lessons in either set of texts portrayed women in blue-collar, clerical, or sales or service positions. Throughout the Middle East, the largest percentages of employed women are in the teaching professions.

Table 7 once again shows the concentration of women in professional occupations, although large percentages of the female labor force are also found in agriculture (Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Turkey), and in production (Morocco). There is a marked disinclination for women to enter into sales work or even clerical work, except in Israel. And all countries have minimal female presence in administrative and managerial occupations.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has surveyed patterns of women's employment over the past three decades in the modernizing countries of the Middle East and North Africa. An essential point of the endeavor had been to underscore the diversity of women's positions within the region, and to link women's status and work opportunities to their class location, state policies, and development strategies. Many studies on the Middle East, and of course commentaries by Islamists themselves, tend to understate the heterogeneity of the region; they project a uniform culture and exaggerate its importance, elevating "culture" or "religion" to the status of a single explanatory variable. In this paper, the view of culture and religion as fixed, uniform, and predominant in the Middle East is rejected; rather my position is that there is an interactive relationship of economic processes, political dynamics, and

cultural practices. Only through such an approach can variations within the region, and changes over time, be understood and explained.

On the other hand, there continues to exist an exceedingly large population of under-utilized labor, that is, women. Equity and empowerment remain elusive for women when access to economic resources is reserved mainly for men. To be sure, gains have been made since the 1960s, and more women have joined the salaried labor force. But women's labor force participation is still low in relation to that of other regions of the world, and, of course, low in relation to men's labor force participation. One reason cited in this paper is the general low level of industrialization in the region, and the small percentage of women in industrial jobs as compared with the Southeast Asian and Latin American NICs. A related reason is the economic crisis facing the region. This has resulted in part from the drop in real prices or primary commodities, including oil, throughout the 1980s (until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 raised the price of oil again). According to the UN, debt as a percentage of GNP for the Middle East and North Africa in 1989 rose to 70 percent; during the 1980s, the region's debt increased from 4.4 billion dollars to 118.8 billion dollars (UN DPI 1989). In Israel, the serious economic plight has been alleviated by massive American aid. But elsewhere, though economic reforms, along with poverty, unemployment, and debt servicing have led to a spate of popular protests and "IMF riots" in Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey. It is in this context of social and economic crisis--and in the context of growing numbers of educated and employed women--that Islamist movements have gained ascendancy in the region, placing enormous political and ideological pressures on women.

But these movements have their contenders, too. Expanding education and employment have created a generation of Middle Eastern women who have become accustomed to working in the formal sector and indeed, expect it. There is growing evidence from around the world that employed women, including working class women with factory jobs, value their work for the economic independence and family support it provides, and for the opportunity to delay marriage and childbearing. In many countries, young women in particular are able to escape restrictive family circumstances, and to enjoy "horizon-broadening" experiences and the companionship of other women (Joekes and Moayedi 1987). Women in EZPs or in world market factories have been known to express satisfaction with their factory jobs. Tiano (1986) reports that almost two-thirds of respondents in a study of Mexican maquila workers declared that they would keep working at their job even if they did not need the money. Fatima Merniss's interviews with working women in a world market electronics plant show the value these women place on their jobs and the satisfaction employment brings to them. During a visit I made to a multinational pharmaceutical plant outside Casablanca in early December 1990, an informal survey revealed that

women workers enjoyed their jobs, were cognizant of the better conditions of work and higher wages at that plant, and would continue to work even if the household did not require their additional income. The workforce was unionized (the result of a bitter labor dispute some ten years earlier), and several of the women with whom I spoke had been or were workers' representatives. Transnational firms are not known for long-term stable employment, and women's continued employment in the large-scale private sector depends to a great extent upon the vagaries of international trade and the world market. At the same time, the public sector wage bill everywhere is in a state of contraction, as a result of structural adjustment policies of the 1980s. If Middle Eastern women were to lose their position in the labor market, it would certainly not be for reasons of religion or culture. Economic and political forces shape their employment opportunities to a far greater extent.

Table 1

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF MIDDLE EASTERN
AND NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1989

Country	Income level High	Medium	Low	Oil exporter	Labor exporter	Highly indebted	Signatory of CEDAW *	Comprehensive civil code
Afghanistan			X					
Algeria		X		X	X	X		
Bahrain	X			X				
Egypt		X		X	X	X	X	
Iran		X		X				
Iraq		X		X	X		X	
Israel		X						
Jordan		X			X			
Kuwait	X			X				
Lebanon					X			
Libya	X			X			X	
Morocco		X			X	X		
Oman	X			X	X			
Qatar	X			X				
Saudi Arabia	X			X				
Sudan			X		X	X		
Syria		X			X			
Tunisia		X		X	X	X	X	X
Turkey		X			X	X	X	X
UAE	X			X				
N.Yemen		X			X			
S. Yemen		X			X	X	X	

* Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979.

Non-Arab countries: Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Turkey.

Non-Muslim: Israel.

Sources : ILO World Labour Report 1984; World Bank, World Development Report 1985; UN DPI, Info. on CEDAW, 1989.

Table 2

Percentage of Females among Production Workers
(1970s and latest) (percent)

Country	Year	Production All Statuses*	Salaried
Afghanistan	1979	24.1	-
Algeria	1966	4.0	2.4
	1987	2.5	2.4
Egypt	1975	2.4	2.8 (1976)
	1984	5.8	-
Iran	1966	25.0	18.2
	1976	19.8	7.9
	1986	15.0	7.1
Iraq	1977	5.5	3.7
	1987	4.0	-
Israel	1972	12.1	-
	1987	13.4	14.3
Jordan	1979	1.0	-
Kuwait	1975	0.3	0.2
	1985	0.2	0.2
Lebanon	1970	10.0	8.1
Libya	1973	1.0	0.4
Morocco	1971	15.5	-
	1982	23.0	-
Sudan	1973	5.4	-
Syria	1970	5.3	4.0
	1981	4.0	3.0
	1984	3.8	-
Tunisia	1975	23.9	10.5
	1980	22.1	-
	1984	17.6	-
Turkey	1975	7.8	-
	1985	7.6	6.9
UAE	1975	0.1	0.1
	1980	0.1	0.1
Mexico	1960	10.4	-
	1970	12.8	10.9
	1980	16.8	15.3
South Korea	1955	13.2	48.6
	1966	25.2	19.3
	1975	28.0	27.7
	1980	25.8	28.5
	1988	31.1	29.3
	1989	31.0	31.6

* includes own-account, employer, unpaid family worker and wage worker.

Sources: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1989-90*, Table 2B, and *Retrospective 1945-89*, Table 2B (Geneva: ILO, 1990); *National Census of Population and Housing*, November 1986 (Total Country), Table 14, p. 39 (Tehran: Central Statistical Office, 1987).

Table 3

Percent Distribution of Economically Active Women by Status of Employment in Selected Countries, Various Years

Country (year)	Employers and own-account workers	Salaried employees		Unpaid family workers	Not classified by status	Total
Algeria						
(1977)	1.7	42.1		0.5	55.7	100%
(1987) *						
Tunisia						
(1984)	27.2	38.7	(14.3) **	20.5	13.4	100%
Egypt						
(1983)	17.0	42.3	(14.5)	30.0	10.5	100%
Morocco						
(1982)	14.5	36.3	(18.0)	27.5	21.6	100%
Bahrain						
(1981)	0.9	88.6	(11.7)	-	10.3	100%
Iran						
(1976)	10.2	39.3	(12.0)	32.4	17.9	100%
(1986)	19.6	51.6	(9.4)	21.5	7.0	100%
Iraq						
(1977)	10.6	27.3	(7.9)	58.0	3.6	100%
Israel						
(1982)	11.1	79.7	(40.0)	3.2	6.0	100%
(1986)	11.0	78.5	(41.1)	2.3	7.9	100%
Kuwait						
(1985)	0.2	97.7	(20.8)	-	2.0	100%
Syria						
(1979)	9.9	41.7	(12.0)	44.5	3.9	100%
(1981)	11.4	60.9	(8.7)	22.2	4.0	100%
(1983)	9.8	48.0	(12.4)	36.9	4.7	100%
Turkey						
(1985)	4.7	14.0	(15.3)	79.2	2.0	100%
UAE						
(1980)	0.8	97.5	(5.2)	-	1.5	100%

* Algeria's 1987 Census lists a female EAP of 492.442. Of that figure, 74% are employed ("occupées"), 13% are unemployed, and 13% are partly-employed housewives ("Femmes au foyer partiellement occupées").

** This column refers to the female share of total employees, in percent.

Note about Iran: The 1986 Census (indeed, all previous censuses) seriously undercounts the female economically active population. Out of a total female population of 24 million, of whom perhaps 12 million may be presumed to be of working age, only 1 million are counted. Of that number, 50% are classified as "employees".

Sources: ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1987, Table 2A; ILO, *Yearbook of Labour Statistics Retrospective 1945-89*, Table 2A; *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 1987* (Algiers 1989).

Table 4
Characteristics of the Economically Active Population (EAP)
Various Countries, 1980s

Country (year)	Total pop.	Total EAP	% Female	Total salaried	% Female
Algeria					
(1983)	20,192,000	3,632,594	6.8	n.a.	n.a. *
(1987)	23,037,916	5,341,102	9.2	4,137,736	8.8
Bahrain					
(1987)	278,481	73,972	19.3	n.a.	n.a.
Egypt					
(1984)	45,231,000	14,311,300	21.4	6,376,800	14
Iran					
(1986)	49,400,000	12,820,291	10	5,327,885	9.4
Iraq					
(1977)	12,000,477	3,133,939	17.3	1,864,701	7.9
(1983)	14,700,000	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Israel					
(1987)	4,365,200	1,494,100	39.0	1,110,800	41.5
Kuwait					
(1985)	1,697,301	670,385	19.7	619,722	20.8
Morocco					
(1982)	20,449,551	5,999,260	19.6	2,429,919	17.6
(1986)	24,000,000	14,000,000	35.0	n.a.	n.a.
Qatar					
(1986)	369,079	201,182	9.4	196,488	9.6
Sudan					
(1973)	14,113,590	3,473,278	19.9	905,942	7.4
Syria					
(1984)	9,870,800	2,356,000	13.8	1,216,781 **	12.4 **
Tunisia					
(1984)	6,975,450	2,137,210	21.2	1,173,630	14.3
Turkey					
(1985)	50,958,614	21,579,996	35.4	6,978,181	15.3
UAE					
(1980)	1,042,099	559,960	5.0	518,969	5.2

* n.a. = not available ** data for 1983.

Sources: Compiled by the author from the following: CERED (Rabat 1989); Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 1987 (Alger 1989); ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1986, 1987 and 1988, Tables 1 and 2A; ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Retrospective 1945-89, Table 2A; World Bank, World Development Report, 1985, 1990.

Table 5

Percentage of Females among Manufacturing Employees (1970s - 1980s)

Country	Year	Female Share
Afghanistan	1979	59.6
Algeria	1977	6.9
	1987	7.8
Bahrain	1971	1.0
	1981	2.4
Egypt	1976	6.5
	1984	12.3
Iran	1976	38.4
	1986	14.4
Iraq	1977	17.2
	1987	14.6
Israel	1972	24.0
	1982	25.2
Jordan	1979	5.9
Kuwait	1975	13.8
	1985	2.5
Libya	1973	7.4
Morocco	1971	-
	1982	36.1
PDRY	1973	13.5
Qatar	1986	0.8
Sudan	1973	16.5
Syria	1970	10.5
	1981	10.5
Tunisia	1975	51.6
	1984	55.5
Turkey	1975	17.6
	1985	15.2
UAE	1975	0.6
	1980	1.2

Sources: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics Retrospective 1945-89 (Geneva: ILO, 1990), Table 2A.
ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1989-90 (Geneva: ILO, 1990), Table 2A.

Table 6

% Distribution of Female Economically Active Population in Branches of Industry, Selected Countries, 1980s

Country Year	Industry Branches: Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5	Group 6	Group 7	Group 8	Group 9	NAD	Total Number
Algeria 1985	3.6	11.9			2.7	2.7	3.0	75.7		-	326,000
Egypt 1984	41.2	0.003	8.6	0.3	0.6	6.8	1.1	13.7	23.8	4.7	2,354,600
Israel 1983	2.7	14.0		0.3	0.9	10.6	2.9	11.3	48.2	8.6	556,495
Kuwait 1983	0.08	0.25	0.96	0.05	0.89	2.2	1.5	2.2	89.3	1.5	132,128
Syria 1984	44.6	0.3	10.7	0.03	1.2	2.9	1.5	1.2	30.0	6.7	327,200
Tunisia 1984	22.1	0.4	40.6	1.1*	0.7	2.3	-	4.6	13.0	14.5	433,630
Turkey 1985	69.5	0.07	7.0	0.01	0.08	1.5	0.4	1.4	7.8	11.4	5,543,862

* This includes groups 4 & 7

Group 1 = agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Group 2 = mining and quarrying
Group 3 = manufacturing
Group 4 = electricity, gas and water
Group 5 = construction
Group 6 = wholesale/retail trade, restaurants and hotels
Group 7 = transport, storage and communication
Group 8 = financing, insurance, real estate and business services
Group 9 = community, social and personal services

NAD = not adequately defined, unemployed persons not previously employed, and/or unemployed persons previously employed.

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1988, Table 2A

Table 7

% Distribution of Female Labour Force by Occupation, Major Groups

Country Year	Group 1 (prof.)	Group 2 (ad. & mng.)	Group 3 (clerical)	Group 4 (sales)	Group 5 (service)	Group 6 (agric.)	Group 7 - 9 (prod.)	Not classified & unemployed
Egypt								
1984	17.6	1.8	12.9	5.5	2.7	41.3	6.5	11.3
Israel								
1983	28.9	1.7	27.1	5.3	14.9	1.6	8.9	10.2
Kuwait								
1985	27.2	0.2	14.3	0.75	53.7	0.04	0.37	1.5
Morocco								
1982	6.6	5.4		1.4	13.7	32.5	33.2	6.8
Syria								
1984	25.9	0.9	7.9	1.2	2.4	43.7	10.3	6.7
Turkey								
1985	5.5	0.1	4.5	0.9	1.6	69.0	6.9	10.8

Group 1 = Professional, technical and related workers.
Group 2 = Administrative and managerial workers.
Group 3 = Clerical and related workers.
Group 4 = Sales workers.
Group 5 = Service workers.
Group 6 = Agricultural, animal husbandry and forestry workers, fishermen and hunters
Group 7-9 = Production /related workers, transport equipment operators and labourers

Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1987, 1988, Tables 2B;
Retrospective 1945-89, Table 2B.

Figure 1



Source: Sivard (1985), p. 13.

References

Abadan-Unat, Nermin
1981 Social Change and Turkish Women. Women in Turkish Society, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat. Pp. 5-31. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Abu, Nasr J., N. Khoury and H. Azzam (eds.)
1987 Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World. The Hague: Mouton/ILO.

Afshar, Haleh
1985 The Position of Women in an Iranian Village. Women, Work and Ideology in the Third World, edited by Haleh Afshar. Pp. 66-82. London: Tavistock.

Aloni, Shulamit
1984 Up the Down Escalator. In: Sister is Global, edited by Robin Morgan. Pp. 360-364. New York: Anchor Books.

Amirahmadi, Hooshang
1990 Revolution and Economic Transition: The Iranian Experience. Albany: SUNY Press.

Azzam, H., J. Abu Nasr, and I. Lorfing
1985 An Overview of Arab Women in Population, Employment and Economic Development. In: Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World, edited by J. Abu Nasr, N. Khoury, and H. Azzam. Pp. 5-38. The Hague: Mouton/ILO.

Azzam, H. and C. Moujabber
1985 Women and Development in the Gulf States. In: Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World, edited by J. Abu Nasr, et al. Pp. 59-72. The Hague: Mouton/ILO.

Badran, Margot
1982 Women and Production in the Middle East and North Africa. Trends in History 2(3):59-88.

Baffoun, Alya
1990 Feminism and Fundamentalism: The Tunisian and Algerian Case. Paper prepared for the Round Table on Identity Politics and Women, UNU/WIDER, Helsinki, October 8-19, 1990.

Blumberg, R.L.
1989 Making the Case for the Gender Variable. Washington: Agency for International Development, Office of Women in Development.

Bodrova, Valentina and Richard Anker (eds.)
1985 Working Women in Socialist Countries: The Fertility Connection. Geneva: ILO.

Boserup, E.
1970 The Role of Women in Economic Development. New York: St. Martin's Press.

1990 Economic Change and the Roles of Women. In: Persistent Inequalities, edited by Irene Tinker. Pp. 14-26. New York: Oxford University Press.

Berik, Gunseli
1985 From "Enemy of the Spoon" to "Factory": Women's Labor in the Carpet Weaving Industry in Rural Turkey. Paper presented at Middle East Studies Association annual meetings, New Orleans, November 22-26, 1985.

1987 Women Carpet Weavers in Rural Turkey: Patterns of Employment, Earnings and Status. Geneva: ILO, Women, Work and Development Series No. 15.

Boutalia, Urvashi
1985 Indian Women and the New Movement. Women's Studies International Forum 8(2):131-133.

Bowen-Jones, Howard
1988 Agriculture. In: The Middle East, edited by Michael Adams. Pp. 697-717. New York: Facts on File.

Caldwell, John C. and Lado T. Ruzicka
1987 Demographic Levels and Trends. In: The World Fertility Survey: An Assessment, edited by John Cleland and Chris Scott. Pp. 741-772. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

CERED
1989 Femmes et Condition Feminine au Maroc. Rabat: Direction de la Statistique.

Chaftez, Janet
1984 Sex and Advantage: A Comparative Macro-Structural Theory of Sex Stratification. New Jersey: Rowman & Allanheld.

1990 Gender, Equity: An Integrated Theory of Stability and Change. Newbury Park: Sage.

Chamie, M.
1985a Labor Force Participation of Lebanese Women. In: Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World,

edited by J. Abu Nasr et al. Pp. 73-104. The Hague: Mouton/ILO.

1985b Women of the World: Near East and North Africa. Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce and Agency for International Development.

Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen
1989 Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Dwyer, D. and J. Bruce (eds.)
1988 A Home Divided: Women and Income in the Third World. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

El Mallach, Ragaei
1988 Arab Oil: Implications for the Future. In: The Middle East, edited by Michael Adams. Pp. 653-671. New York: Facts on File.

Elson, Diane and Ruth Pearson
1980 The Latest Phase of the Internationalization of Capital and its Implications for Women in the Third World. Discussion Paper No. 150. University of Sussex, Institute of Development Studies (June).

Farley, Jennie (ed.)
1989 Working Women in Fifteen Countries. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Finaly, Barbara
1989 The Women of Azua: Work and Family in the Rural Dominican Republic. New York: Praeger.

Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn
1989 Arab-Islamic Women: Participants in Secular and Religious Movements. Mimeo. Department of Anthropology, Rhode Island Collge.

Frobel, F., J. Heinrichs, and O. Kreye
1980 The New International Division of Labor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gallagher, Eugene B., and C. Maureen Searle
1985 Health Services and the Political Culture of Saudi Arabia. Social Science Medical 21(3):251-262.

Giele, Janet.
1977 Introduction: The Status of Women in Comparative Perspective. Women: Roles and Status in Eight Countries, edited by Janet Giele and Audrey Smock. Pp. 3-31. New York: John Wiley.

Harris, Nigel
1986 The End of the Third World: Newly-Industrialized Countries and the Decline of an Ideology. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.

Harriss, Barbara
1986 The Intrafamily Distribution of Hunger in South Asia. Paper for WIDER Project on Hunger and Poverty, Seminar on Food Strategies. Helsinki: World Institute for Development Economics Research.

Higgins, Patricia and Pirouz Shoar-Ghaffari
1989 Sex Role Socialization in Iranian Textbooks. Mimeo, Department of Anthropology, SUNY-Plattsburgh.

Hijab, Nadia
1988 Womanpower: The Arab Debate on Women and Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoodfar, Homa
1991 Return to the Veil: Personal Strategy and Public Participation in Egypt. In: Working Women: International Perspectives on Labour and Gender Ideology, edited by Nanneke Redclift and M. Thea Sinclair. Pp. 104-124. New York: Routledge.

Ibrahim, Youssef M.
1990 Saudis, Aroused by Iraqi Threat, Take Steps to Mobilize Population. New York Times (September 5):A1.

Ingrams, Doreen
1988 The Position of Women in Middle Eastern Arab Society. In: The Middle East, edited by Michael Adams. Pp. 808-814. New York: Facts on File.

International Center for Research on Women
1980 Keeping Women Out: A Structural Analysis of Women's Employment in Developing Countries. Washington: ICRW.

ILO/INSTRAW
1985 Women in Economic Activity: A Global Statistical Survey 1950-2000. Geneva: International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Santo Domingo: United Nations Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW).

ILO
1985 ILO and Working Women 1980-1985. Geneva: ILO.

1985a Growth and Adjustment in Asia: Issues of Employment, Productivity, Migration and Women Workers. Report of

the Director-General. Tenth Asian Regional Conference, Jakarta (December).

1985b Women at Work. Geneva: ILO.

Yearbook of Labour Statistics (various years). Geneva: ILO.

1989 Yearbook of Labour Statistics: Retrospective 1945-1989. Geneva: ILO.

1990 World Labour Report, 1989. Geneva: ILO.

Islamic Republic of Iran
1986 National Census of Population and Housing 1986. Tehran: Central Statistical Office, Plan and Budget Organization.

Jansen, Willy
1987 God Will Pay in Heaven: Women and Wages in Algeria. Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association annual meetings, Baltimore (November).

Jenkins, Rhys
1991 The Political Economy of Industrialization. Development and Change 22(2):197-231.

Joekes, Susan
1987 Women in the World Economy: An INSTRAW Study. New York: Oxford University Press.

1982 Female-Led Industrialization and Women's Jobs in Third World Export Manufacturing: The Case of the Moroccan Clothing Industry. Sussex: University of Sussex, Institute of Development.

Joekes, Susan and Roxanna Moayedi
1987 Women and Export Manufacturing: A Review of the Issues and AID Policy. Washington: ICRW.

Kandiyoti, Deniz
1988 Bargaining with Patriarchy. Gender & Society 2(3):274-289.

Kazgan, Gulten
1981 Labour Participation, Occupational Distribution, Educational Attainment and the Socio-Economic Status of Women in the Turkish Economy. Women in Turkish Society, edited by N. Abadan-Unat. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Knauss, Peter
1987 The Persistence of Patriarchy: Class, Gender and Ideology in Twentieth Century Algeria. New York: Praeger.

Lim, Linda
1983 Capitalism, Imperialism and Patriarchy. In: Women, Men and the International Division of Labor, edited by June Jash and Maria-Patricia Fernandez-Kelly. Pp. 70-92. Albany: SUNY Press.

1990 Women's Work in Export Factories: The Politics of a Cause. In: Persistent Inequalities, edited by Irene Tinker. Pp. 101-122. New York: Oxford University Press.

Lipietz, Alain
1982 Toward Global Fordism? New Left Review 132(March/April):33-47.

Looney, Robert
1988 Third World Military Expenditures and Arms Production. London: Macmillan.

Mabro, Robert
1988 Industrialization. In: The Middle East, edited by Michael Adams. PP. 687-696. New York: Facts on File.

Mann, Michale
1986 A Crisis in Stratification Theory? In: Gender and Stratification, edited by Rosemary Crompton and Michael Mann. Pp. 40-56. Cambridge: Polity Press.

McDonald, Peter
1985 Social Organization and Nuptiality in Developing Countries. In: Reproductive Change in Developing Countries, edited by John Cleland and John Hobcraft. Pp. 87-114. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mernissi, Fatima
1984 The Merchant's Daughter and the Son of the Sultan. In: Sisterhood is Global, edited by Robin Morgan. Pp. 447-453. New York: Anchor Books.

1987 Introduction: Muslim Women and Fundamentalism. In: Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society (revised edition). Pp. xii-xxix. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Miller, Barbara
1981 The Endangered Sex. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Moghadam, Val

1987 Industrial Development, Culture, and Working Class Politics: A Case Study of Tabriz Industrial Workers in the Iranian Revolution. International Sociology 2:151-175.

1988 Women, Work and Ideology in the Islamic Republic. International Journal of Middle East Studies 20:221-243.

1990 Gender, Development and Policy: Toward Equity and Empowerment. UNU/WIDER Research for Action Monograph Series (November).

1991a The Reproduction of Gender Inequality in Islamic Societies: The Case of Iran in the 1980s. World Development 19(10):1335-1350.

1991b Islamist Movements and Women's Responses. Gender & History 3(3):268-286.

Molyneux, Maxine

1985 Legal Reform and Socialist Revolution in Democratic Yemen: Women and the Family. International Journal of the Sociology of Law 13:155-156, 159.

Mujahid, G.B.S.

1985 Female Labour Force Participation in Jordan. In: Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World, edited by J. Abu Nasr et al. Pp. 103-130. The Hague: Mouton/ILO.

Myntti, Cynthia

1985 Women, Work, Population and Development in the Yemen Arab Republic. In: Women, Employment and Development in the Arab World, edited by J. Abu Nasr et al. Pp. 39-58. The Hague: Mouton/ILO.

Nash, June and Maria-Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (eds.)

1983 Women, Men and the International Division of Labor. Albany: SUNY Press.

National Planning Council, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

1981 Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 1980-1095. Amman: National Planning Council.

Office National des Statistiques

1989 Récensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 1987: Données Synthetiques. Algiers.

Oncu, Ayse
1981 Turkish Women in the Professions: Why So Many? In: Women in Turkish Society, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat. Leiden: E.J. Brill.

Palloix, Christian
1977 L'internationalisation du capital. Paris: Maspero.

Papanek, Hanna
1989 To Each Less Than She Needs, From Each More Than She Can Do: Allocations, Entitlements, and Value. In: Persistent Inequalities, edited by Irene Tinker. Pp. 162-181. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pitt-Rivers, Julian
1987 The Fate of Shechem or the Politics of Sex: Essays in the Anthropology of the Mediterranean. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Portes, Alejandro and Lauren Benton
1984 Industrial Development and Labor Absorption: A Reinterpretation. Population and Development Review 19(4):589-612.

Pyle, Jean
1990 Export-led Development and the Underemployment of Women: The Impact of Discriminatory Development Policy in the Republic of Ireland. In: Women Workers and Global Restructuring, edited by Kathryn Ward. Pp. 85 112. Ithaca: ILR Press.

Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury
1990 A Political Economy of the Middle East: State, Class and Economic Development. Boulder: Westview Press.

Saadi, Nouredine
1991 La Femme et la Loi en Algérie. Casablanca: Editions Fennec for UNI/WIDER.

Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina
1971 A Cross-Cultural Examination of Women's Marital, Educational and Occupational Options. Women and Achievement, edited by M.T.S. Mednick, et al. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority)
1974 Women in Developing Countries: Case Studies of Six Countries. Stockholm: SIDA Research Division.

Sivard, Ruth Leger
1985 Women: A World Survey. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities.

Southall, Roger (ed.)
1988 Trade Unions and the New Industrialization of the Third World. Ottawa and London: University of Ottawa and Zed Press.

Standing, Guy
1989 Global Feminisation Through Flexible Labour. ILO Working Paper No. 31. Geneva: International Labour Office.

Tiano, Susan
1987 Gender, Work, and World Capitalism: Third World Women's Role in Development. In: Analyzing Gender, edited by Beth Hell and Myra Marx Feree. Pp. 216-243. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Tillion, Germain
1983 The Republic of Cousins: Women's Oppression in Mediterranean Society. Translated by Quentin Hoare. London: Al-Saqi.

Tilly, Louise and Joan Scott
1978 Women, Work and Family. New York: Routledge.

UNFPA et la Ministére du Plan
1984 La Femme et La Famille Tunisienne a Travers Les Chiffres. Tunis: United Nations Fund for Population Activities, and the Ministry of Planning.

United Nations, Department of Pulbic Information (UN DPI)
1989 Economic Development: The Debt Crisis. New York: United Nations.

1989 Information Bulletin: The Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. New York: United Nations.

Walton, John
1987 Theory and Research on Industrialization. Annual Review of Sociology 13:89-108.

Ward, Kathryn
1984 Women in the World-Systems: Its Impact on Status and Fertility. New York: Praeger.

Weeks, John R.
1988 The Demography of Islamic Nations. Population Bulletin 43(4):1-51.

Weiss, Anita, M.
1989 The Consequences of State Policy for Women in Pakistan. Paper prepared for Seminar on the State and Social

Restructuring in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, MIT, Center for International Studies.

World Bank
1985 World Development Report, 1985. New York: Oxford University Press.

Young, Kate, Carol Wolkowitz, and Roslyn McCullagh (eds.)
1981 Of Marriage and the Market: Women's Subordination in International Perspective. London: CSE Books.

Youssef, Nadia
1978 The Status and Fertility Patterns of Muslim Women. In: Women in the Muslim World, edited by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie. Pp. 69-99. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
ISSN# 0888-5354

The WID Program at Michigan State University began its *Women in International Development Publication Series* in late 1981 in response to the need to disseminate the rapidly growing body of work that addressed the lives of women in Third World countries undergoing change. The series cross-cuts disciplines and brings together research, critical analyses and proposals for change. Its goals are: (1) to highlight women in development (WID) as an important area of research; (2) to contribute to the development of the field as a scholarly endeavor; and (3) to encourage new approaches to development policy and programming.

The *Working Papers on Women in International Development* series features journal-length articles based on original research or analytical summaries of relevant research, theoretical analyses, and evaluations of development programming and policy.

The *WID Forum* series features short reports that describe research projects and development programs, and reviews current policy issues.

NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS: To provide an opportunity for the work of those concerned with development issues affecting women to be critiqued and refined, all manuscripts submitted to the series are peer reviewed. The review process averages three months and accepted manuscripts are published within ten-to-twelve weeks. Authors receive ten free copies, retain copyrights to their works, and are encouraged to submit them to the journal of their choice.

Manuscripts submitted should be double-spaced, sent in duplicate, on disk or emailed (to wid@pilot.msu.edu) in WordPerfect compatible format and include the following: (1) title page bearing the name, address and institutional affiliation of the author; (2) one-paragraph abstract; (3) text; (4) notes; (5) references cited; and (6) tables and figures. The format of the article must follow the format as depicted in our "Style sheet". Submit manuscripts to Anne Ferguson, Editor, WID Publication Series, Women and International Development Program, 202 International Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1035, USA. Style sheets are available upon request.

TO ORDER PUBLICATIONS: Publications are available at a nominal cost and cost-equivalent exchange relationships are encouraged. To order publications or receive a listing of them, you may write to the WID Program, 202 International Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-1035, USA or check out our Web site (http://www.isp.msu.edu/wid/) which also has all the ordering information and an order form. Orders can also be sent to us via email at (wid@pilot.msu.edu).