Is Democracy Good for Women: Differential Effects of Democratization Women's vs. Men's Well-being: 1970-2015

by

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Abstract

This study focuses on differential effects of a country's democratization across the continuum of developed/developing countries and across gender – contrary to most prior studies, which focus on the overall worldwide effects. Using multilevel longitudinal models to analyze the impact of democracy on men and women from 1970 to 2015, this study uncovers that positive effects of democratization are contingent upon the interaction of two factors: economic development of a country and a person's gender. The results not only show that women and men benefit differentially from the growth of democracy as a function of countries' level of development, but also that—in contrast to men's well-being—women's economic opportunities, schooling, health, and life expectancy decline during democratization in all but the most developed countries. The discussion concludes by emphasizing plausible processes that support these differential outcomes as a function of gender and suggests solutions that may help to rectify these effects.

Biography

Barbara Wejnert Associate Professor of Political Sociology and prior Chair of the Department of Global Gender Studies—came to the State University of New York, University at Buffalo, by way of the Departments of Development Sociology and Sociology at Cornell University. She has written or edited several books and numerous papers related to democratizing and globalizing processes and their consequences for women. Her papers have been published in the American Sociological Review, Annual Review of Sociology, Marriage and Family Review and other journals. Her 2014 book on the *Diffusion of Democracy*, published by Cambridge University Press, presents an innovative assessment of 187 sovereign countries that challenges established thinking about the diffusion of democracy over a 200-year period.

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Is Democracy Good for Women: Differential Effects of Democratization on Women's vs. Men's Well-being: 1970-2015

INTRODUCTION

> *Success without democracy is improbable; democracy without women is impossible.* —Madeleine K. Albright (National Democratic Institute, 2016)

Since the 1970s, the number of democracies across the world has approximately doubled and there is a pervasive belief that liberal democracy, human rights, and equality go hand-in-hand with being modern and more-developed. Accordingly, since the turn of the millennium, many studies have focused on the relations between quality of life, democracy, and development (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Kapstein & Coverse 2008; Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), as well as on the positive impact of democratization on development and societal well-being (Shafer 1994). These studies indicate generally that democracy has brought substantial improvements to people's lives and is a path to increased levels of literacy, education, industrialization, urbanization, and overall well-being of citizens. Democracy is considered a symbol of progress, wealth, a high standard of living, freedom, liberty, and happiness, as well as a sign of modernity and the forces that advance the technological and cultural progress of world societies (Lipset 1960; Lipset 1994; Joffe, 2009). Furthermore, economic problems are believed to be ameliorated with the adoption of democracy (Lederer 1992), leading financial institutions often to require that countries democratize in order to receive financial aid or to be eligible for foreign investment (Robinson 2004; Wolf 2001). Consequently, societal yearning for democracy gave birth to a third wave of democratization and the spread of democracy appears to follow a process of diffusion (Wejnert 2005; Wejnert 2014). It is little wonder, then, that global diffusion of democracy led to an increase in curiosity of scholars, policymakers, and the public as to which guarantees are fulfilled by democracies; what type of countries and which groups within countries benefit the most from outcomes of democracy on people's well-being (Przeworski et al. 2000); and whether democracy benefits well-being of socially disadvantaged groups, like women, equally with more privileged groups.

Most studies have focused on the overall worldwide effects or the effects on a particular country as opposed to differential effects across the continuum of developed/developing countries. In addition, the effects of worldwide changes in democratization as a function of gender are rarely studied in a comparative way or on a large scale. Such an approach seems necessary in view of the complexity of the interactive processes of democratization and development. Furthermore, this complexity is enhanced by variation in the temporal unfolding of these processes across different countries and world regions. In the case of gender, it is quite possible that the beneficial effects of democratization are not uniformly equal, nor occur temporally at the same rate, in all groups within a society. Indeed, individuals holding privileged status, such as men in most societies, may be the most rapidly benefited relative to individuals of subordinated status, especially in many traditional societies.

Responding to the paucity of research, the objective of this paper is to present new evidence on effects of democratization as a function of a country's level of development and gender. This study uses hierarchical linear models (HLM) to assess the impact of democracy on women's vs. men's well-being during a peak of the third wave of democratization and the era of globalized development (i.e., development dominated by a global market economy) from 1970 to 2005. This paper is structured to outline the conceptual understanding, analytical methodology, research approach, key findings, and drawn conclusions of the research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptualization of Democracy

In his Gettysburg address on November 19, 1863, Abraham Lincoln declared that, "democracy is the government of the people, for the people and by the people"[1] and as such it calls for political inclusiveness, equal rights, freedom and representative politics. Theoretically, democracy has been described as a political system that should guarantee to every adult citizen the right to vote, to be elected, and to avoid tyranny. Democracy should also guarantee "essential" rights such as general freedoms, self-determination, moral autonomy, and human development while protecting essential personal interests, political equality, peace-seeking and prosperity (Dahl 1989, p. 31). It is viewed as a political system in which: (i) the political power of elites is minimized and that of non-elites is maximized (Bollen, 1980); (ii) government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990); and (iii) economic equality, protection of knowledge and health, and environmental sustainability is present (Campbell and Pölzlbauer, 2010). Generally, scholars believe that: (i) democracy is linked to a higher standard of living (for a review, see Przeworski & Limongi, 1997); (ii) political parties, elections, and the taste for freedom—the essential components of democracy—have spread across the world (Cardozo, 2009); and (iii) due to the development of networks between countries and the modeling of existing democracies, democracy diffuses globally (Wejnert, 2014). Not surprisingly, many researchers and policymakers consider democracy the ultimate political system that is the most beneficial to societal development and it leads to increase of freedom, equality and people's well-being.

Conceptualization of Well-Being

The theoretical concept of well-being (also called quality of life) can be approached from two separate perspectives. An individual's or nation's objective well-being is typically appraised by measuring such factors as income, level of education, fertility rate, GNP/c, nutrition and life expectancy (Andrews and Robinson 1991). Studies of this sort are conducted predominantly by international agencies (e.g., the International Labor Office, the United Nations, and the World Bank) and agencies associate with national governments (e.g., Russian Academy of Science). An alternative approach is to measure well-being as it is perceived and assessed by individuals themselves—the subjective well-being. Studies conducted for the past fifty some years, predominantly by American scholars, describe the subjective well-being "as the way specific life concerns, and evaluation of them, fit together in people's thinking" (Andrews and Inglehard 1979: 74). The latter is multifactorally determined, but the different predictors range greatly in the extent of their contribution. As prior research has indicated, measurement of either objective or subjective well-being is an effective tool for assessing the social impact of changes in living conditions generated by democratic growth (Stycos, Wejnert and Tyszka 2002).

This study follows classic studies on objective well-being (Andrews and Inglehard 1979, Andrews and Robinson 1991), and on democracy and well-being (e.g., Held 2000), and defines well-being as it "entails being able to work and to consume, being sufficiently educated to know what choices one can make in life" and hence "the well-being can be measured via the conditions that people face independently of their actions" (Przeworski et al. 2000, 4).

Democracy and Well-Being

One might assume that the growth of democracy would improve the well-being of all citizens, women as much as men, as reflected by increases in the former's (i) representation in the workforce, (ii) pay equivalence, (iii) equal educational opportunities, and (iv) health care and life expectancy. Indeed, in the long-term women, alike men, do achieve heightened improvement in countries that achieve a high-level democracy and development (Molina and Purser, 2010) and gain political rights in democracies (Fallon, 2003, 2010). And once empowered, women significantly contribute to the improvements resulting from democracy and development in terms of (i) increased education and decreased dropout rates of their daughters (Coleman, 2004; Kabeer, 2005; Luz and Agadjanian 2015; Shahidul, 2013); (ii) increased ratios of girl-to-boy enrolment in primary and secondary education which directly increases a country's GNP (Hill and King, 1995; United Nations Millennium Project, 2005: 47); (iii) increased autonomy in health decisions regarding maternal and family health and fertility (Beer 2009; Coale and Banister, 1996; Murthy 1996), which leads more generally to increases in societal health (Bloom, Wypij and Gupta, 2001); (iv) increased participation in the labor force (Beer 2009); (v) increased engagement in civil society, including feminist movements that demand gender equality and advancement of women's rights (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Fallon, 2010); (vi) increased political and legal awareness and engagement in national politics, thereby establishing policies that protect minorities (Murthy 2001, 1996; Rueschmeyer 1998; Tripp et al., 2014); and (vii) increased input into policymaking, which typically invests in areas relevant to families (Benge, 2006) (see Figure A in Appendix A).

Not always, however, adoption of democracy improves women's well-being equally to men. There are recent findings that are discordant with conclusions about the benefits of democratization for women. For instance, during the transition to a global market economy and democracy in former Soviet countries, relative to men, women's employment declined substantially (Wejnert, 2002), as did their rate of inclusion in politics. In some of these countries, a decline in the provision of women's health care, especially medical assistance at birth, led to an alarming increase in maternal mortality (Wejnert, Parrot and Djumabaeva 2008; Wejnert, Steimetz and Prakash, 2013).

Similar processes are being observed in currently democratizing West Africa, where the interplay between gender relations, democratization, and economic empowerment of women (e.g., via microfinance) is challenged by persistent economic crisis and a dominant patriarchal ideology in gender relations (Belanger, 2012). The demise of domestic manufacturing (an economic domain in which women are particularly involved), the decline in the practicality of small farms and rural areas, and the privatization of some of the governmental institutions that are vital to women's employment and services has had a particularly negative impact on women (Belanger, 2012).

The outcomes of democracy are also conditioned by the quality of democratic system. As Paxton and Kunovich (2003) argue, in regimes that are weakly democratic, the election of women as legislative representatives is rare. Women are able to secure legislatorial seats only when countries gain electoral experience-- a curvilinear trend (Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna, 2012).[2] At the same time, regimes of emerging democracies often co-opt the voice of women suppressing demands for gender equality, e.g., in Chile political parties absorbed gender issues into their own agendas diminishing the need for pro-women policies, and in South Africa, democratically elected leaders asked women to withdraw from political participation for the sake of families thus silencing their demands (Welsh, 2012).[3]

Democracy and Women

As studies indicate, democracy impact women's well-being via at least four pathways a) women's political engagement, b) women's movements and their international alliances, c) effects of global market economy, and d) foreign aid. First, democracy opens the door to women's political engagement and, since the suffrage movement, women have been able to secure the right to vote and to ask for a broad range of social and political benefits using strategies associated with movements (Beckwitz, 2007; Markoff, 2003; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). In Africa, a burgeoning women's political engagement secured gender quota and the largest number of women's parliamentary seats in the world (Tripp, Casimiro, Kwesiga and Mungwa, 2014), in post-communist Europe women's movement defended women's rights (Avdeyeva, 2015), while in North America it led to the establishment of pro women policies in Canada, Mexico, and the United States (Bayes and Hawkesworth, 2006. Nonetheless, as studies demonstrate women's legislative representation is altered by quality of democracy (Fallon, Swiss and Viterna, 2012) and the power of women's movements is in part determined by the pro-women, global events (Paxton, Hughes and Green, 2006)

Second, democracy is associated with the formation of transnational alliances, groups, and networks, bringing together individuals in collective actions aimed at principles of equality and accountability (A.T. Kearny, 2001; Teune, 2002). Networks lead to the diffusion of democracy (Wejnert, 2014), and networks empower minorities by opening opportunities to social movements that thrive when they have strong international alliances (Tripp et al., 2014). Indeed, solidarity of women's movements and organizations has helped to promote gender equality in Latin America (Bayes, Begne, Gonzalez, Harder, Hawkesworth and Macdonald, 2006; Bayes and Hawkesworth, 2006), on the African continent (Tripp 2015), and in Eastern Europe (Wejnert and Spencer 1996, part II) and has helped several countries to acquire the gender quota, especially after the Beijing conference of 1995 (Paxton et al. 2006). In contrast, limited solidarity deterred the successful implementation of pro-gender policies in South Africa (Hassim, 2006).

Third, scholars posit that the beneficial effect of democracy for women stems from the international collaboration of democratic countries within a market-driven economy that advances the technological and cultural development, and proliferates modern technology, media, and the Internet. The modern development also facilitates international and cross-national political discourse on citizens' rights, including the rights of women (Beneria 2003, Beneria & Bisnath 2004; Castels, 2000; Hutton & Giddens, 2000; Henisz, Zelner & Guillen, 2005; IMF, 1997).

Nonetheless, the effect of global market economy on well-being of women in comparison to men is mixed. On one hand, global market economy stimulates a surge of jobs for women but these jobs are low-paid, tenuous as industries promulgate wage inequality to increase profit (Sequino 2000: 1222) and most countries support women's employment but not occupational achievement (Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Moreover, states endorse market economy to achieve rapid develop but often cut welfare expenditures to increase economic profits and move the responsibility of basic protection and care (including childcare and help to single mothers) from the national and state government to individuals and families, like for example in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Britain and the United States in the 1980s (Kingfisher, 2002: 32-49).

Fourth, it has been argued that adoption of a democratic system broadens countries' opportunity to receive foreign aid and the aid often requires the provision of rights and equality for women and other minorities (Dollar & Kraay, 2000). For example, in Africa, the desire "to be seen as compliant with donor objectives" led to women's empowerment and implementation of policies of gender equality (Tripp et al., 2014: 13). Nonetheless, Kosack (2003) demonstrates that the impact of financial aid on the quality of life of women is effective only in democracies but is ineffective (and possibly harmful) in autocracies, suggesting that aid receiving countries should implement pro-democratic policies to enhance outcomes for women.

Unfortunately, it is unclear whether such detrimental effects of democratization on women relative to men are limited to these pathways and presented cases, or whether these cases point to more general effects across world's regions. The empirical study below, attempts to shed light on these issues.

METHODOLOGY

Database

In this study, the democracy data are drawn from Polity IV database for years 1970-2015 where the predictors of democracy level are assessed with the continues index of 0-10 (Marshall and Gurr 2017). There are several advantages in using Polity IV scale: (i) longitudinal assessment of democracy data, (ii) assessment of democracy growth on eleven-point scale of 0-10, where 0 indicates non-democracy and 10 fully developed democracy, (iii) high construct validity of the scale where the democracy construct defines criteria for democracy as an "ideal model" (Dahl 1998: 38) characterized by the competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executives (Gurr, Jagger and Moore, 1990; Marshall and Gurr 2014), (iv) high convergent validity with other scales. The Polity IV democracy index is highly correlated with democracy scales of Gasiorowski (1993), Bollen (1980), Arat (1991), Vanhauen (1990), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) the correlations ranged between 0.85 -0.92, $p < 0.01$ (convergent validity of the scale) (Jagger and Gurr 1995 a, b). In addition, the Polity IV democracy index is also highly correlated with 0-100 scales (divided by 10) of global democracy ranking (Campbell and Polzlbauer 2010); the correlation $r=.93$, $p<0.01$. Moreover, democracy data from Polity IV are comparatively assess with popularly used scale of Freedom House (Freedom House, 2009) yielding high correlation $r=0.92$, $p<0.01$ As Dahl (1998: 199) explains "although at this point a complete, reliable, and current account of all democratic countries in the world appears to be unavailable,

the two datasets Polity III [updated by Polity IV] and Freedom House allow fairly good estimates of democratization."

Importantly, in the Polity IV data, the polity score is a complex construct influenced by variables of democracy and autocracy, and individual democracy and autocracy scores are combined into a single polity or democracy-autocracy score varying from -10 to +10. It is impossible to dispute that most polities have both democratic and autocratic features. Nonetheless, deriving data according to the more complex, heterogonous scale of polity the prediction scheme would yield unclear results due to unknown weight of democracy and autocracy that account for the effects. Thus, this study uses homogenous scale of a variable of democracy and derives democracy score as predictors of democracy's features and outcomes.

The database also includes indicators of well-being. The indicators are assessed yearly for each sovereign country from 1970-2015 and derived from the United Nations and the World Bank datasets—the *World Development Indicators (WDI)* (World Bank, 2016) and the *Human Development Index (HDI)* (United Nations, 2016), and supported by *The World's Women 1970-2000* (United National Department of International and Social Affairs, 2001) and *Gender Inequality Index* (United National Development Program, 2015)

Operationalization of Democracy

This study understand democratization as a process of changing levels of countries' democracy overtime, i.e., democracy growth. Therefore, the constructed measurement of democracy allows the ability to characterize and define the term "democracy" and the level of its development as a developmental process from non-democracy to some achieved level of democracy (Dahl 1998). In contrast, democracy could be understood simply as a dichotomy on a scale of 0–1 where a country is either democratic or not democratic and countries would be assessed categorically, yielding a scaling of democracy as either "1" or "0." Such understanding does not reflect, however, the nature of democracy, which represents a continuous variable. States have accepted either some democratic principles while ignoring others, or have accepted most of the principles of democracy but differentially apply them across societal strata. Newly democratized African states, for example, claim to be democratic, but they do not follow unifying ideological principles or embrace a concept of balance of power by their governments (Converse and Kapstein 2008, Kissinger 2001, 26). Many countries that are called democracies are unstable democracies, easily reverting to an autocratic system. Good examples are Russia (Politkovskaya 2011) and Belorussia (Alexievich 2006, xii), which embraced democratic principles only for a few years, as well as most sub-Saharan African countries, where corrupt elections prevent a change in top leadership positions (Diamond & Plattner 2010, 47–50). Also, many democracies go through a cyclical process of democratization, a shift to autocracy and then re-democratization (e.g., Huntington 1992; O'Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead 1996) before reaching a point of stabilizing democratic system (Wejnert 2005).

Therefore, this study accepts Marshall and Gurr (2014, 2017) measurement on a scale, where the indicator of democracy is formed as a continuous index that is based on a scale of 0–10, where 0 means no democracy and 10 a fully developed democratic system (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Measurement of Democracy



Notes: Scale 0-10 (Polity IV data) (Marhall & Gurr, 2014; referenced by Dahl 2000)

Operationalization of Well-Being

As prior research indicate, measurement of objective well-being is an effective tool for assessing the social impact of changes in living conditions generated by democratic transitions (Wejnert, Stycos & Tyszka 2002). Drawn from development, health, and gender frameworks, the yearly outcome measures of effects of democratization on women's and men's well-being and control measures of countries' development are grouped by their categories:

Indicators of women's well-being

1. Women's labor force participation (as % of total labor force) per country
2. Women's literacy as adult literacy rate in population of females 15years and older
3. Ratio of females to males in elementary schools per country
4. Ratio of females to males in secondary schools per country
5. Fertility rate (total births per women in reproductive age: at least 15 years and older) per country
6. Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate per 100,000 live births) per country
7. Maternal care, births attended by skilled health staff (as % of total births) in a country
8. Women's life expectancy at births in a country

Indicators of men's well-being

9. Men's labor force participation (% of total labor force)
10. Men's literacy as adult literacy rate in population of males 15 years and older

In addition, to account for effect of democracy on each country's socioeconomic development and in turn, overall societal well-being, additional indicators of countries' development are added to the analysis.

Indicators of countries' development

11. GNP/capita, Atlas method (current US$) per country
12. Literacy rate in population (% of total population ages 15+ that is literate) (modeled ILO estimate) per country

The yearly measures of each indicator for each country allowed us to observe changes in the indicators as a function of time as well as democratic growth.

Statistical Models

To answer whether processes of democratization empower women and men, this study employs multiple growth models put forward by Singer (1998) and Singer and Willett (2003) to examine 151 countries that were independent from 1970 to 2005, the time of the Third Wave of democratization (Huntington, 1992) and the expansion of the global free market economy (Cardozo, 2009; Porter, 2000). For the total number of countries in the world n= 151, assessed yearly across 36 (from 1970 thought 2005), the yearly measured number of observations in countries in the world totals to N = 5420.[4] Considering the large number of data points (N) and the type of used statistical models even small variation in outcome variables is important to note.

This study considers effects of democratic growth as a joint function of changing yearly characteristics within each country and across countries worldwide. Thus, the strategy adopted in the analysis is to measure the impact of democracy on the various outcome variables (indicators) of socioeconomic development and gender by utilizing both within- and across-country variations in democracy. This study uses multilevel modeling to account for the within- and between-countries effects. Neglecting this hierarchical structure would lead to an underestimation of the standard errors of the coefficients, which might lead to the misinterpretation that effects are significant when they are not (Woodhouse, Rabash, Goldstein, & Min, 1996).

Each outcome variable is modeled as a function of time, democracy, and the interaction between time and democracy. In this way, one could interpret the coefficient as providing a correlation between the *movement to democracy* as well as *away from democracy* and *overtime changes* in the particular outcome variable. The interaction with time provides evidence on whether these correlations are strengthening or weakening over time. The equation that summarizes the longitudinal growth models employed are provided in Appendix B (see Appendix B).

The analyses are conducted with the *Multilevel Longitudinal (Growth) Models* used in prior statistical analyses assessing the initiation and growth of democracy (Wejnert, 2014). The modeling was implemented in "SAS PROC MIXED," a procedure that allows for hierarchical modeling (Singer 1998, Stinger and Willett 2003).[5] It should be noted that in subsequent models the fact that observations within the same country are more similar than observations among different countries creates dependence. This lack of independence was expressed as an intra-class correlation and was accounted for in the multilevel modeling.

To compare the effects of democratization on men's and women's well-being across all countries in the world including the poorest countries, semi-developed countries and wealthy countries, worldwide investigations are followed by comparable analyses of groups of countries according to their level of development that extend prior classification of countries according to their

position in the world system. These positions include *more-developed (core), semi-developed (semi-peripheral)*, and *less developed (peripheral*) countries (Siegle, Weinstein and Halperin 2004, Wallerstein 1974). To record a country's position in the world system, this study uses the Snyder & Kick (1979) classification supplemented by its more recent modifications (Bollen & Appold, 1993; Smith & White, 1992) and updated by ranking of countries according to GDP that is used in a dataset the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank, 2016), and the *Human Development Index (HDI)* (United Nations, 2016) that depict the actual level of human development per country (see Appendix C for the list of countries within each group).

RESULTS

Observed Statistics

For illustrative purposes, across the world, as Table 1indicates, women's in comparison to men's well-being is higher in democracies than in not democratic countries, and the level of well-being increases with an increase of the level of democracy. Specifically, women labor force participation and life expectancy increase, maternal mortality and fertility rate decline, and women are better educated. Accordingly, as Table 1 demonstrates:

a) Women's labor force participation is nearly 50% higher (42.4% versus 36.2%) in democratic than in nondemocratic states,
b) Women's health care provisions are better as measured by the availability of maternal care (92% vs. 78%), by the rate of maternal mortality (99 versus 382 maternal deaths per 100,000 births), and the fertility rate that is twice lower (2.5 vs. 4.8),
c) Literacy rates are much higher (84% vs. 61%) and equal for men and women, while in non-democratic countries women's literacy rates are, on average, 15% lower than men's.

Furthermore, when accounting for countries' level of development and level of democracy, on average, women's economic position, health care provisions, and literacy are higher in more-developed democracies than in more-developed non-democracies (autocracies) and higher in less developed democracies than less-developed autocracies:

a) Near four times as many women participate in labor force in more-developed democracies than in more-developed autocracies (44.5% versus 11.8%), whereas the rate is almost similar in less developed democracies and autocracies,
b) In more-developed democracies women's fertility rate is twice as low, maternal death ratio is lower and life expectancy longer by 7 years than in more-developed autocracies.
c) The female literacy rate of 94.6% is more than 20 % higher in more-developed democracies than in more-developed autocracies.

Table 1. The Effects of Democratic Growth on Women's and Men's Well-Being in Democratic and Non-Democratic Countries across the World: 1970-2015 [1]

Countries[2]	INDICATORS OF WOMEN'S WELL-BEING							
Democratic: democracy score above 6 points on scale 0-10 *	Female Labor Force (%)	Medic. Assisted Births (%)	Maternal Death*	Fertility Rate	Life Expectancy Female	Life Expectancy Male	Female Literacy (%)	Male Literacy (%)
Mean**	42.4	92	99	2.5	74.4	68.5	84	89
Non democratic: democracy score =0								
Mean***	36.2	78	382	4.8	62.1	57.7	61	76
Countries	INDICATORS OF WOMEN'S WELL-BEING							
Democratic: democracy score above 6 points on scale 0-10	Female Labor Force (%)	Medic. Assisted Birth (%)	Maternal Death*	Fertility Rate	Life expectancy Female	Life Expectancy Male	Female Literacy (%)	Male Literacy (%)
Well-developed[3]								
Mean	44.5	99.6	8.2	1.8	79.8	73.8	94.6	97.7
Low developed								
Mean	42	90.6	139.4	3.0	71.2	65.0	83.1	88.3
Non-democratic: democracy score =0								
Well-developed								
Mean	11.8	98.8	9.1	3.8	72.8	70.0	70	76
Low developed								
Mean	36.8	78	390	5.0	61	57.0	61	75

Notes: [1]Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Gurr 2014) and Freedom House (2016) merged with the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016) and database Nations, Democracy and Development 1800-2005 (Wejnert 2007). [2] The mean value of each indicator is recorded across years 1970-2015. [3] As well-developed are recorded well-developed core countries, as low developed are recorded semi and low developed countries, on 3 point development scale of well, semi and low developed countries. *Countries with democracy score above 6 on a democracy scale 0-10 are considered stable, congruent democracies (Dahl 2000). ** Mean represents the mean value of an indicator across all democratic countries in the world from 1970 to 2015. *** Mean represents the mean value of an indicator across all non-democratic countries in the world from 1970 to 2015.

The demonstrated differences in women's and men's well-being are not longitudinal projections and attest only to average differences between democratic and non-democratic countries but they do not explain functional relations between predictors and outcomes dimensionally. Also, the data do not accurately depict the position of women in countries that are in the process of *transition to democracy* or in countries where the *democracy level greatly fluctuates*. A clear example of this is found in Russia, which had a democracy level of two (on a scale of 0–10) in the early 1990s, became more democratic with a score of four in the mid-1990s, then moved to a democracy level of zero by the early 2000s. Another example is found in post-colonial Sierra Leone that was low-level democracy in the late sixties until 1971, became autocracy for almost two decades and eventually, after a prolonged civil war, became the mid-level democracy by 2002. In both countries, changes in the democracy level correlate with the varying social position of women (Stycos, Wejnert and Tyszka 2002).

Predictor Models

The interaction between democracy growth and the well-being of women and men is illustrated on a comparative, worldwide scale in the empirical analyses presented in Tables 2 and 3 below.

Tables 2 and 3 show results from multi-level growth models for the world, as well as a comparison of the most developed, semi-developed, and less-developed countries, with each row of the table presenting the results for a different outcome measure. In order to provide information on the general time trends in the sample and to compare them with the effect of democratization, each outcome measure is presented as an unconditional model that includes time effect and as a conditional model that includes democratization and time effects.
Worldwide models: The results found in the broader world community support the common assumption of scholars, policymakers, and the public alike that democratization improves societal well-being and, thus, is beneficial to the modern development of countries. When looking at the effects of time compared to the additional effect of democratic growth on indicators of countries' development, it is evident that democratic growth further enhances the temporal trend of increasing countries' development and in turn overall societal well-being, i.e., it correlates with an increase in GNP per capita (in the equation of democracy and time with *GNP/c*) and an increase in literacy rates (in the equation of democracy as well as democracy and time) (see Table 2).

Table 2. The Predicted Effects of Growth of Democracy on Women in comparison to Men across the World: 1970–2005[1]

MODELS	Intercept and Time Effects				Democracy Effect			Log-Likelihood
	Intercept		Intercept * year		Democracy overtime (democracy * year)			-2RLL
Women								
1. Women's Labor Force (%) Unconditional model	35.9*	(.98)	.27*	(.03)				18163.2
Conditional	36.2*	(.98)	.27*	(.03)	-.11*	(.02)	.001(.002)	18153.0
2. Women's Literacy (%) Unconditional model	62.69*	(3.1)	.7*	(.1)				6154.6
Conditional	62.7*	(3.06)	.7*	(.1)	-.009	(.12)	.0007(.01)	6014.2
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools (%) Unconditional model	46.34*	(.85)	1.3*	(.04)				32093.4
Conditional	46.34*	(.91)	1.5*	(.06)	.07	(1)	-.06*(.009)	32067.3
4. Girls to Boys in secondary school (%) Unconditional model	46.6*	(1.06)	1.28*	(.046)				32109.3
Conditional	46.5*	(1.1)	1.48*	(.06)	.1	(.1)	-.055*(.009)	32092.2
5. Fertility Unconditional model	4.07*	(.15)	-.02*	(.004)				12114.9
Conditional	4.25*	(.15)	-.005	(.005)	-.053*	(.01)	-.002*(.0008)	12085.6
6. Maternal Mortality Unconditional model	135.7*	(18.7)	15.4*	(1.7)				51742.2
Conditional	144.4*	(19.2)	17.9*	(1.8)	-1.99	(1.76)	-.6*(.17)	51719.5
7. Maternal Care Unconditional model	35.2*	(2.9)	2.29*	(.17)				33882.4
Conditional	33.16*	(2.98)	2.03*	(.18)	.58*	(.21)	.055*(.019)	33849.1
8.Women's Life Expectancy Unconditional model	57.08*	(1.19)	0.95*	(.059)				31300.4
Conditional	57.17*	(1.25)	1.3*	(.07)	.03	(.13)	-.048*(.01)	31290.8
Men								

9. Men's Labor Force (%) Unconditional model	55.22*	(2.4)	.53*	(.035)				8840.6
Conditional	55.18*	(2.4)	.54*	(.035)	.01	(.01)	-.0025(.0016)	8825.3
10. Men's Literacy (%) Unconditional model	78.1*	(2.4)	.5*	(.04)				4822.0
Conditional	78.3*	(2.5)	.5*	(.35)	-.04	(.08)	.003 (.006)	4733.6
11. Boys to Girls in elementary schools (%) Unconditional model	53.66*	(.95)	1.2*	(.05)				32098.4
Conditional	53.5*	(1.1)	1.4*	(.06)	.1	(.1)	.055 (.008)	32091.1
12. Boys to Girls in secondary schools (%) Unconditional model	53.4*	(1.06)	1.28*	(.046)				32106.3
Conditional	53.5*	(1.1)	1.45*	(.06)	.1	(.1)	.05 (.009)	32090.1
Country's Development								
13. Literacy Society (%) Unconditional model	70.4*	(2.69)	.0037*	(.001)				4057.7
Conditional	70.5*	(2.68)	.0009	(.001)	.006*	(.001)	.0006*(.0001)	4006.2
14. GNP/c Unconditional model	2.73*	(.3)	.15*	(.028)				14771.3
Conditional	2.74*	(.31)	.12*	(.027)	-.01	(.01)	.008*(.001)	14755.4

Notes: [1]Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Gurr 2014) merged with data *Freedom in the World 1994–2009* (Freedom House 2009) and with the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016). For all the models, the impact of democracy on women and men across the world is analyzed during the era of globalized development and a peak of the third wave of democratization from 1970 to 2005. *Coefficient at least twice its standard error. Values in parentheses depict standard errors. The total number of observations in countries in the world N = 5420, the total number of countries n= 151. For all the models, variance estimates are presented in Table A, Appendix D.

With regard to well-being, at first glance it seems that there are no discrepancies in the positive effects of democratic growth on women compared to men because indicators specific to women's health are improving, i.e., the fertility rate is reduced, maternal care is improving, and maternal mortality is declining over time. However, a closer investigation of the findings points to unexpected effects.

First, in contrast to men, women's labor force participation is negatively associated with the growth of democracy over time (negative covariate estimates in the equation of democracy with women's labor force in Model 1, Table 2); a yearly increase in the level of democracy by one *reduces* women's labor force participation by -.11%, while no effect on the men's labor force is depicted. Considering that the percentage of women incorporated into the labor force either did not change or slightly increased from 1970–2005 in economically more-developed, stable democracies (UN Women, 2015), the depicted decrease in labor force participation must reflect a change in either new or transitional democracies of less developed countries. I return to this hypothesis when discussing the results of countries categorized by the level of their development.

Second, a decline in the primary and secondary schooling of girls, measured as a ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary schools, is depicted with the growth of democracy over time (see Models 3 and 4, Table 2).[6] It could be that the indicated decrease in women's labor force participation caused a decline in the status of women in families and lowered women's influence on decision-making within families, which eventuated in the low enrolment of female children in schools. Such an assumption is in accord with Coleman (2004) and other studies indicated earlier in this paper.

Third, unexpectedly and in seeming contradiction to the comparative statistical assessment of democratic and nondemocratic countries (presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 above), female life expectancy is shown to decrease with an increase in democracy, i.e., an increase in democracy

by a score of one in interaction equation of democracy with time correlates with a decrease in women's life expectancy by -.05 per year. Considering that life expectancy in more-developed, strongly democratic countries is either stable or steadily increasing according to the literature, lower-developed, democratizing countries must largely account for the decrease. I expect analyses of groups of countries to shed more light on these findings.

Models of groups of countries: To assess whether the general findings are similar for all countries regardless of differences in their level of development, the same models were assessed in cross-regional analyses of the more-developed (core), semi-developed (semi-peripheral), and less-developed (peripheral) countries (see Table 3).

Table 3. The Predicted Effects of Growth of Democracy on Women's and Men's Well-being in Well-Developed, Semi-Developed, and Low-Developed Countries: 1970–2005[1]

	INTERCEPT		EFFECT of TIME		DEMOCRACY EFFECTS			
MODELS FOR COUNTRIES	Intercept		Intercept * year		Democracy		Democracy*year	
A.WELL-DEVELOPED								
Women's well-being								
1. Women's Labor Force (%)	37.17*	(1.06)	.17*	(.06)	-.02	(.05)	.02*	(.005)
2. Women's Literacy (%)	98.1*	(.25)	.019*	(.01)	1.3	(1.5)	-.2	(.2)
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools	48.4*	(.25)	.013	(.02)	.039	(.025)	-.0009	(.002)
4. Girls to Boys in secondary schools	50.7*	(.8)	.16*	(.07)	-.1	(.08)	-.009	(.008)
5. Fertility	2.03*	(.11)	.01	(.011)	-.019	(.01)	-.004*	(.001)
6. Maternal Mortality	90.88*	(2.52)	.6*	(.07)	-.13*	(.05)	-.029*	(.005)
7. Maternal Care	99.13*	(.19)	-.035*	(.01)	.05*	(.01)	.005*	(.0008)
8. Women's Life Expectancy	76.6*	(.42)	.17*	(.02)	.07*	(.02)	.005*	(.002)
Men's well-being								
9. Men's Labor Force (%)	90.88*	(2.52)	.6*	(.07)	-.13*	(.05)	-.029*	(.004)
10. Men's Literacy (%)	97.63*	(.33)	.11*	(.02)	.17*	(.02)	-.009*	(.002)
Country's development								
11. GNP/c	13.08*	(2.35)	1.17*	(.25)	-.27	(.22)	-.03	(.02)
12. Literacy Society (%)	88.7*	(2.2)	.002*	(.001)	.007*	(.002)	-.0002	(.0001)

B.SEMI-DEVELOPED								
Women's well-being								
1. Women's Labor Force (%)	30.7*	(1.86)	.42*	(.049)	.037	(.02)	-.016*	(.002)
2. Women's Literacy (%)	74.5*	(4.7)	.65*	(.17)	-.1	(.11)	.007	(.009)
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools(%	46.96*	(.74)	.11*	(.026)	-.05*	(.02)	-.007*	(.002)
4. Girls to Boys in secondary schools (%)	49.06*	(1.76)	.29*	(.06)	-.1*	(.05)	-.015*	(.005)
5. Fertility	3.87*	(.3)	-.07*	(.008)	-.017*	(.006)	.0007	(.0006)
6. Maternal Mortality	110.9*	(32.5)	-.6	(2.2)	1.4*	(.7)	-.01	(.07)
7. Maternal Care	79.9*	(4.87)	.4	(.28)	.48*	(.21)	-.02	(.02)
8. Women's Life Expectancy	69.42*	(1.27)	.37*	(.047)	.01	(.01)	-.009*	(.001)
Men's well-being								
9. Men's Labor Force (%)	69.9*	(3.98)	.61*	(.096)	.03	(.01)	-.0016	(.002)
10. Men's Literacy (%)	90.09*	(.2.7)	.11	(.11)	-.002	(.03)	-.004	(.003)
Country's development								
11. GNP/c	4.23*	(.85)	.103*	(.05)	-.09*	(.03)	.015*	(.004)
12. Literacy Society (%)	76.6*	(3.6)	.01*	(.001)	.001	(.001)	-.00045*	(.0001)

Table 3. Continues…

C. LESS-DEVELOPED								
Women's well-being								
1. Women's Labor Force (%)	38.3*	(1.13)	.19*	(.03)	-.14*	(.02)	.005*	(.002)
2. Women's Literacy (%)	53.39*	(3.95)	.78*	(.15)	.013	(.21)	-.001	(.018)
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools(%	43.68*	(.67)	.17*	(.02)	.04	(.03)	-.017*	(.003)
4. Girls to Boys in secondary schools (%)	40.23*	(1.18)	.39*	.039	-.01	(.05)	-.01*	(.004)
5. Fertility	5.13*	(.17)	-.055*	(.005)	-.01	(.008)	-.0013*	(.0007)
6. Maternal Mortality	432.0*	(55.8)	2.79	(4.16)	-3.03	(2.6)	.38	(.24)
7. Maternal Care	55.86*	(3.8)	.51*	(.18)	.015	(.35)	-.0009	(.02)
8. Women's Life Expectancy	59.27*	(1.16)	.34*	(.023)	.007	(.019)	-.007*	(.001)
Men's well-being								
9. Men's Labor Force (%)	44.3*	(2.68)	.54*	(.04)	-.018	(.01)	.0004	(.002)
10. Men's Literacy (%)	70.46*	(3.37)	.5*	(.13)	-.11	(.17)	.008	(.014)
Country's development								
11. GNP/c	1.67*	(.22)	.027	(.019)	-.0087	(.01)	-.0003	(.001)
12. Literacy Society (%)	57.4*	(3.04)	.009*	(.0006)	-.0009	.0008	-.000005	(.00007)

Notes: Only conditional models are presented in Table 3. Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Gurr 2014) merged with the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016). For all the models, the impact of democracy on society at large and women is analyzed during the era of globalized development and a peak of the third wave of democratization from 1970 to 2005. *Coefficient at least twice its standard error. Values in parentheses depict standard errors. **For clarity, only conditional models that predict the effect of democratic growth on outcome variables are reported here. The total number of observations in well-developed countries N = 1532, number of countries n = 42; in semi-developed N = 2519 number of countries n = 70; and in low-developed N = 1369, number of countries n = 39. For all the models, variance estimates are presented in Table A, Appendix D.

More-developed countries: In more-developed, core countries, democratization is positively associated with most of the indicators of women's well-being. Female labor force participation increases with an increase in democratization over time. Female health improves as indicated by a decline in the fertility rate (the coefficient of democracy in the fertility equation is -.004), improvement in maternal care (the coefficient of democracy in the maternal care equation is +.05 and the same coefficient in the interaction equation is +.005), a decline in maternal mortality (the coefficient of democracy in the maternal mortality equation is -.13 and the same coefficient in the interaction equation is -.029), and an increase in life expectancy (the coefficient of democracy in the female life expectancy equation is +.07 and the same coefficient in the interaction equation is +.005). At the same time, women's education also increases as indicated by the positive coefficient of democracy in the elementary schooling equation (albeit not significantly, perhaps due to the limited variance resulting from the relatively high levels of education already achieved). In sum, in more-developed countries, democratization benefits women by increasing their job opportunities, schooling, and health, and by prolonging their life expectancy.

The positive effects of democratization on indicators of men's well-being and countries development are also depicted. Of the tested indicators, the societal and men's literacy level increase, while the impact on the already high GNP per capita is not significant. At the same time, men's labor force is shown to decline, which suggests that the expansion of the women's labor force due to democratic growth is even more significant (see Table 3, Models 1 and 10).

Semi-developed countries: In contrast, negative effects of democratic growth on women's well-being in semi-peripheries are depicted. Women's participation in the labor force declines with increasing democratization in the interaction equation by -.16% which is contrary to a depicted increase in the women's labor force over time when democracy effects are not accounted for (the coefficient of the effect of time on women's labor force is +.42%). Women's education is also shown to decline although it increases over time when democracy effects are not considered. In an average country, the percentage of females among students in elementary and secondary schools is shown to decline by -.05% and -.1%, respectively.[7] Moreover, these indicators also decline in the interaction variable between time and democracy, with coefficients of -.007% in the elementary and -.015% in the secondary education equation.[8] The negative effects appear even stronger in light of the absence of the influence of democratic growth on men's literacy (in the equation of neither democratic growth nor democracy with time).

A depicted increase in maternal mortality is also disturbing, especially since it coincides with a decline in female life expectancy. With an increase in the level of democracy by a score of +1, female life expectancy declines on average by -.009 per year and maternal mortality increases by +1.4 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births (such increase is particularly significant considering that on average, maternal mortality is approximately 10-15 per 100,000 live births in more-developed countries). These negative outcomes on women's life expectancy continue over time, as indicated by the negative coefficients in the equations of democracy and time.

The only positive impact of democratic growth in semi-peripheries is a decrease in the fertility rate and an increase in maternal care, which are most likely highly correlated. As the literature indicates, modernization of medical facilities and better training of medical personnel takes place during democratic growth due in part to an increase in foreign aid and professional contacts with medical personnel in more-developed countries (Timberg & Halperin 2013: 77-85, 224-234). An increase in maternal care attests to the possibility of reversing the negative trend in maternal mortality and life expectancy under the condition of the sustainability of democracy. However, the sustainability of democratic growth in countries that are not more-developed is uncertain as new fragile democracies often revert to autocracies (Converse and Kapstein, 2008; Owen, 2005).

The results of the impact of democratic growth on the well-being of men and countries' development are mixed in semi-peripheries. In contrast to shown increase of well-being over time, democratization does not lead to an overall higher societal standard of living in these countries. The coefficient of the interaction between democracy and GNP per capita (GNP/c) is negative and significant (-.09) but positive in the equation with democracy and time (+.015). This negative trend is consistent with the initial economic decline in transitional democracies (Herspring, 2003) and with prior investigations of the disadvantaged position of middle economies within the process of the global diffusion of democracy assisted by the global market economy (Garrett, 2004). The impact on literacy indicator is not significant except for the indicated decline in societal literacy over time, which most plausibly accounts for the decline in female enrolment in elementary and secondary schooling. At the same time, democracy growth does not significantly influence indicators of men's well-being.

Less-developed countries: It seems that women in peripheral countries do not benefit from democratic growth either, however, unlike in semi-peripheries, indicator of women's labor force become positive in the interaction models of democratic growth and time.

First, the observed decrease in women's labor force participation weakens over time; the coefficient of democracy is negative (-.14), while the interaction between democracy and time is positive (+.005). Second, in contrast to semi-peripheries, a negative effect on the maternal mortality rate is not detected. Third, a regression in the ratio of girl to boy students over time is indicated (the coefficient of the interaction variable between democracy and time is -.017 and -.1, in elementary and secondary schools respectively) but, in contrast to studies for semi-peripheries, in the interaction with democracy, a positive relationship is detected (albeit insignificant). Fourth, democratization positively influences relative high fertility levels of an average 5.13 children per women in reproductive age (with an increase in the democracy level by one, women's fertility rates decreased by -.0013 per year) adding to the observed steady decline of fertility since 1970 (the coefficient of the interaction variable between fertility and time is -.055). Fifth, in the life expectancy equation, the coefficient of the interaction variable is still negative (-.007) and significant, in contrast to increase of women's life expectancy as a function of time.

At the men's well-being level and the effect of democratic growth on countries development, no statistically significant effects of democracy or democracy in interaction with time are depicted.

In all models reported in Tables 2 and 3 the low *p* values for the effect of democratic growth, and the significant difference in the obtained values of -2LL between models with and without democracy variables, confirm the statistically significant relationship between indicators of women's and men's well-being and the democratization of countries. The statistical significance of this study also confirms the variance estimates of the Hierarchical Growth Models. The random parts of all models are presented in Table 4 (see Table 4).

Table 4. Variance Estimates of Hierarchical Growth Models Predicting the Effects of Growth of Democracy on Women's and Men's Well-being across the World and across Groups of Countries: 1970-2005

		WORLD										
VARIANCE ESTIMATES	Women's labor force	Women's literacy	Girls to boys in primary school	Girls to boys in secondary school	Fertility	Maternal mortality	Maternal care	Women's life expectancy	Men's Labor force	Men's Literacy	Literacy-society	GNP/c
Residual	4.2* *(.1)*	2.8* *(.1)*	204.8* *(4.8)*	201.4* *(4.8)*	1.06* *(.02)*	29267* *(692.9)*	274.5* *(6.5)*	15.6* *(.3)*	.6* *(.01)*	1.8* *(.04)*	.01* *(.0003)*	1.9* *(.04)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	143.5* *(16.6)*	13.3* *(1.5)*	99.9* *(13.1)*	156.9* *(19.8)*	3.09* *(.36)*	50030* *(5989)*	1267.2* *(149.0)*	20.5* *(2.5)*	824.1 *(98.2)*	12.4* *(1.7)*	.1* *(.01)*	14.4* *(1.7)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.13* *(.02)*	1.5* *(.2)*	.16* *(.04)*	.3* *(.05)*	.001* *(.0003)*	407.3* *(50.1)*	4.15* *(.5)*	.4* *(.06)*	.17 * *(.02)*	1.1* *(.01)*	.0003* *(.00003)*	.1* *(.01)*
Covariance Countries' Intercepts & Slopes	-1.6* *(.4)*	-30.1* *(4.8)*	2.2* *(.5)*	4.2* *(.8)*	.001 *(.007)*	2698.8* *(442.9)*	-34.9* *(6.7)*	-1.7 *(1.01)*	.5 *(1.02)*	-13.3* *(.9)*	.0004 *(.0004)*	1.07* *(.13)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	18161.0	6022.2	32075.3	32100.2	12093.6	51727.5	33857.1	31298.8	8833.3	4733.4	3998.2	14763.4
AICC	18161.0	6022.3	32075.3	32100.2	12093.6	51727.5	33857.1	31298.8	8833.4	4733.5	3998.2	14763.4
BIC	18173.0	6034.3	32087.3	32112.3	12105.6	51727.1	33869.2	31310.8	8845.4	4734.2	3986.1	14763.4
-2LL	18153.0	6014.2	32067.3	32092.2	12085.6	51719.5	33849.1	31290.8	8825.3	4733.6	4006.2	14755.5
		WELL-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES										
Residual	.3* *(.02)*	.3 *(.2)*	.08* *(.006)*	.99* *(.07)*	.02* *(.002)*	438.5* *(42.1)*	.02* *(.002)*	.06* *(.004)*	.09* *(.008)*	.4 *(.4)*	.002* *(.0001)*	4.9* *(.4)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	14.3* (5.1)	3.2 *(1.7)*	.06* *(.03)*	1.05* *(.4)*	.03* *(.01)*	806.7* *(308.6)*	.4* *(.17)*	2.2* *(.8)*	104.3* *(36.9)*	9.2 *(3.8)*	.002* *(.0007)*	10.2* *(3.8)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.03* *(.01)*	.0004 *(.0004)*	.0003* *(.0001)*	.012* *(.005)*	.0003* *(.0001)*	10.2* *(3.9)*	.0007* *(.0003)*	.002* *(.0009)*	.06* *(.02)*	.001 *(.05)*	.00001* *(.000001)*	.15* *(.05)*
Covariance Countries' Intercepts & Slopes	-.27 *(.17)*	-.05 *(.03)*	.002 *(.001)*	.004 *(.03)*	-.001 *(.0009)*	-91.1* *(34.4)*	-.02* *(.002)*	-.018 *(.02)*	-2.2* *(.85)*	.02 *(.42)*	-.00004* *(.0008)*	1.07* *(.42)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	981.4	427.5	185.5	1208.0	218.4	2274.3	158.8	234.3	431.9	446.2	893.5	1946.2
AICC	981.5	427.3	193.5	1208.1	218.3	2274.5	158.6	234.4	432.0	446.3	893.3	1946.3
BIC	984.7	427.2	193.7	1211.3	215.1	2277.6	158.4	237.6	434.3	449.5	890.1	1949.5
2LL	973.4	435.5	196.9	1200.0	226.4	2266.3	166.8	226.3	423.9	438.2	901.5	1938.2
		SEMI-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES										
Residual	.82* *(.04)*	.8* *(.08)*	1.08* *(.06)*	5.04* *(.27)*	.04* *(.003)*	126.1* *(9.7)*	16.1* *(1.3)*	.2* *(.01)*	.57* *(.03)*	.8* *(.15)*	.002* *(.0001)*	2.8* *(.15)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	109.4* *(27.9)*	684.1* *(175.1)*	16.4* *(4.3)*	93.8* *(25.1)*	2.9* *(.7)*	32148.1* *(8308.1)*	657.7* *(176.4)*	51.3* *(13.1)*	44.4* *(12.1)*	220.1* *(85.5)*	.03* *(.01)*	21.1* *(5.5)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.06* *(.01)*	.8* *(.22)*	.01* *(.004)*	.09* *(.03)*	.001* *(.0005)*	147.1* *(38.2)*	1.8* *(.5)*	.07* *(.02)*	.25* *(.06)*	.6* *(.02)*	.00004* *(.00001)*	.06* *(.02)*
Covariance Countries' Intercepts & Slopes	-1.25* *(.5)*	-17.6* *(5.4)*	-.27* *(.1)*	-2.2* *(.74)*	-.04* *(.01)*	-239.4 *(405.1)*	-23.1* *(8.3)*	-1.2* *(.43)*	-2.2 *(2.1)*	-20.1* *(.03)*	-.0009* *(.0003)*	.23 *(.23)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	2378.4	991.3	1992.9	3480.7	207.0	3457.8	2332.7	1367.1	1794.9	891.3	1935.6	3031.2
AICC	2378.4	991.5	1993.0	3480.7	207.1	3457.9	2332.8	1367.2	1795.0	891.5	1935.6	3031.2
BIC	2384.2	997.2	1998.8	3486.5	212.0	3463.7	2338.6	1373.0	1800.0	897.2	1929.8	3037.1
-2LL	2370.4	983.3	1984.9	3472.7	199.0	3449.8	2324.7	1359.1	1786.9	882.3	1943.6	3023.2
		LOW-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES										
VARIANCE ESTIMATES	Women's labor force	Women's literacy	Female in elementary school	Female in secondary school	Fertility	Maternal mortality	Maternal care	Female life expectancy	Men's Labor force[1]	Men's Literacy	Literacy-society	GNP/c
Residual	1.78* *(.05)*	4.3* *(.29)*	3.1* *(.1)*	5.3* *(.17)*	.07* *(.004)*	427.9* *(18.3)*	25.7* *(1.1)*	1.17* *(.03)*	.63* *(.02)*	6.2* *(.01)*	.002* *(.0001)*	.42* *(.01)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	12.5* *(1.8)*	145.2* *(21.4)*	42.3* *(6.3)*	128.2* *(19.1)*	2.8* *(.4)*	274.6* *(42.1)*	132.3 *(19.7)*	13.08* *(1.8)*	682.3* *(99.6)*	67.5* *(9.6)*	.08* *(.01)*	4.5* *(.6)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.09* *(.01)*	1.9* *(.3)*	.04* *(.006)*	.11* *(.02)*	.003* *(.0009)*	14.9* *(2.36)*	2.3.5* *(4.3)*	.05* *(.008)*	.16* *(.02)*	2.1 *(.02)*	.0003* *(.0001)*	.03* *(.005)*
Covariance Countries' Intercept & Slopes	-2.3* *(.4)*	-34.8* *(6.9)*	-.68* *(.15)*	-2.2* *(.5)*	.005 *(.008)*	-11.1* *(2.5)*	-30.5* *(7.4)*	-.35 *(.2)*	2.6* *(1.1)*	-12.2* *(.04)*	-.0007* *(.00002)*	.23* *(.04)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	9557.3	4082.9	8178.2	10351.4	1131.4	15373.1	8410.7	8410.7	6134.9	4122.9	5983.1	5482.3
AICC	9557.3	4083.0	8178.2	10351.4	1131.5	15373.1	8410.7	8410.7	6135.0	4123.0	5983.1	5482.3
BIC	9567.7	4093.3	8188.5	10361.7	1141.8	15383.4	8421.0	8421.0	6145.3	4123.3	5972.8	5492.6
-2LL	9549.3	4074.9	8170.2	10343.4	1123.4	15365.1	8402.7	8402.7	6126.9	4120.9	5991.1	5474.3

Notes: [1]Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Gurr 2014) merged with the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016). *Coefficient at least twice its standard error. Values in parentheses depict standard errors. The total number of observations in the world N=5420, the total number of countries= 151; in well-developed countries N = 1532, number of countries n = 42; in semi-developed N = 2519 number of countries n = 70; and in low-developed N = 1369, number of countries n = 39. [1] The effect of democracy growth on men's educational opportunities are not significant in any models and the variances are not reported.

CONCLUSION

Extending prior research depicting positive effects of democratization on people's well-being, the current study shows that these positive effects are contingent upon the interaction of at least two factors: (i) *economic development* of a country and (ii) a person's *gender.* In general, the study found that during democratization citizens of poorer countries face great difficulties in overcoming the costs of political and economic restructuring than citizens of more-developed states. Furthermore, for women the costs are multiplicative. Across models, the negative outcomes of democratic growth for women are depicted regardless of shown positive or not statistically significant effect of democratic growth on development of countries.[9]

These research findings modify many studies that suggest improvements in women's well-being as the result of democratization. Despite the many ways in which democracy enhances citizens' well-being, the present findings suggest that during the era of globalized development, women, who have a greater variety of social roles, often the dual role of being producers and mothers, and have a more tenuous employment status than men, represent a disfranchised social group and thereby face a plethora of difficulties in countries that democratize. Although comprehensive research is needed to explore the causes of the negative effects of democratization on women, the current study suggests at least two possibilities.

First, an emerging economic gap between social strata and along continuum of a privileged/disfranchised groups that results from an interaction between democracy and the global market economy, foster discrimination against disfranchised groups, such as women, which departs sharply from democratic values of equal provision for all citizens. This would seem especially true for less developed countries that move their political system towards democracy while simultaneously embracing a global market economy. Therefore, most plausibly, for women, in democracies of developing countries the costs of implementation of a global market economy, such as unemployment, unequal access to financial and other resources, and the resulting poverty (e.g., McKinnon, B, S. Harper, J. Kaufman, and Y. Bergevin, 2014) are substantial and overshadow positive outcomes of democracy.

Second, in contrast to the democratic principles of equality, freedom, and liberty, many democracies have poor integration of disfranchised citizens in social and political space, including weak implementation of pro-gender laws and limited opportunities for women's political leadership (Klasen 2002). Most democracies lack influential policy to create a pronounced emphasis on implementation of women's political rights--the right to hold public office and to vote (Avdeyeva, 2015; Metelska and Niedzielska, 1993), which leads to limited women's presence in legislature. Visibility of women in political spheres would most likely prevent withdrawal of resources from women during unstable economic conditions. It would also protect women who have emerged as elected leaders, activists and officials from intimidation, downgrading, bias assessment, and negative image of women politicians. Such harassment is a major barrier to women's political participation and threatens to undo many of the gains that have been made toward political and gender equality. Creation of inclusive political space for women would lead to sustainable and responsive democratic governance, and also, because gender equality is fundamental to global progress, prosperity, and peace (Annan 2002:3), it would lead to future improvements in societal life.

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NOTES

1. Lincoln borrowed the now-famous, three-part phrase from John Wycliffe who, in his 1384 translation of the Bible, wrote the "The Bible is for the government of the people, by the people, and for the people" (Familiar Quotations by John Bartlett, 1951 edition).

2. The quality of democracy is most commonly measured by the level of social equality, social diversity in public offices and competitiveness of an electoral system, existence of rule of law and competent political parties (Diamond and Moline, 2005).

3. In contrast, to counterbalance pro-democracy movements, authoritarian governments give nominal power to women to sidestep the democratizing processes, e.g., President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 1997 (Schmidt and Saunders, 2012) or President Pinochet of Chile (Walsh, 2012).

4. It is important to note that some countries were established after 1970 and their data include only years since their establishment.

5. Conceptually, the multilevel model can be viewed as a hierarchical system of regression equations, where longitudinal hierarchical data with one dependent variable is measured at the lowest level but some of the explanatory variables are measured solely at higher levels (Bryk & Raudenbush 1992; Marsh, Hau & Konk 2000). Multilevel analyses allow researchers to simultaneously consider multiple units of analysis within the same analysis. This methodology offers an attractive approach to the analysis of the longitudinal data of outcomes of democratic growth, as growth trends are allowed to vary within each country and across countries, and the growth modelling does not require all units to have the same number of data points over time, multilevel growth modelling is ideally suited to our investigation (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki and Galbraith, 2008, Goldstein 1995).

6. Notably, these findings contradict earlier arguments that a high correlation between women's literacy and democracy indicates that an increase in literacy among women either causes the democratization of countries or spurs democratic growth (Almond and Verba 1989; Lipset 1960). Rather, an increase in the female literacy rate seems to support prior findings that an increase in literacy is a function of democratic growth (Wejnert 2014, 188-193).

7. Although the decline seems small, the direction of change contrasts expected increase of the percentage of girls among primary and secondary students. Also, large number of data points, i.e., each data point depicts an average level of each indicators for each country and each year from 1970 through 2005 (36 years), suggests that relatively small yearly change in girls' education is a predictor of an indicated long-term trend.

8. As above mentioned, considering the large number of data points (N) which depicts yearly change in outcome variables, even small variations in outcome variables are important to note, especially if the direction of the change contradicts commonly

prevalent expectation. It is also important to note that the average variation in democracy depicts ups and downs of an average level of democracy across each group of countries, rather than a level of any particular country within a group.

9. Importantly, the indicator of a democratic growth accounts for yearly upwards and downwards in democracy level across the world and across each group of more/less developed countries. Therefore, this indicator takes into account downsizing level of democracy in Latin American countries in the 1980s that eventually stabilized at the mid-level of democracy; the initial increase of democracy in post-colonial African countries in the 1950-1960s followed by democratic withdraw in 1970-1990 and re-democratization in early 1990s at the low level of democracy; euphonious democratization of post-communist states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in early 1990s followed by a decline in democracy level in late 1990s and early 2000s (in some post-communist states the current level of democracy is at the lowest scores of democracy. Such country is, for example, Kyrgyzstan that used to be an isle of democracy in Central Asia but by the end of the first decade of the new millennium it turned into a low-level democracy having score of 2 on 0-10 democracy scale (see Appendix D for trends in democracy level across geographic regions)

10. Data derived from a database Polity IV (Marshall and Gurr 2014) and Freedom House (2016) merged with the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016) and database Nations, Democracy and Development 1800-2005 (Wejnert 2007).

11. The mean value of each indicator is recorded across years 1970-2015.

12. As well-developed are recorded well-developed core countries, as low developed are recorded semi and low developed countries, on 3 point development scale of well, semi and low developed countries.

Table 1. The Effects of Democratic Growth on Women's and Men's Well-Being in Democratic and Non-Democratic Countries across the World: 1970-2015 [1]

Countries[2]	INDICATORS OF WOMEN'S WELL-BEING							
Democratic: democracy score above 6 points on scale 0-10 *	Female Labor Force (%)	Medic. Assisted Births (%)	Maternal Death*	Fertility Rate	Life Expectancy Female	Life Expectancy Male	Female Literacy (%)	Male Literacy (%)
Mean**	42.4	92	99	2.5	74.4	68.5	84	89
Non democratic: democracy score =0								
Mean***	36.2	78	382	4.8	62.1	57.7	61	76
Countries	INDICATORS OF WOMEN'S WELL-BEING							
Democratic: democracy score above 6 points on scale 0-10	Female Labor Force (%)	Medic. Assisted Birth (%)	Maternal Death*	Fertility Rate	Life expectancy Female	Life Expectancy Male	Female Literacy (%)	Male Literacy (%)
Well-developed[3]								
Mean	44.5	99.6	8.2	1.8	79.8	73.8	94.6	97.7
Low developed								
Mean	42	90.6	139.4	3.0	71.2	65.0	83.1	88.3
Non-democratic: democracy score =0								
Well-developed								
Mean	11.8	98.8	9.1	3.8	72.8	70.0	70	76
Low developed								
Mean	36.8	78	390	5.0	61	57.0	61	75

Notes: [1]Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Gurr 2014) and Freedom House (2016) merged with the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016) and database Nations, Democracy and Development 1800-2005 (Wejnert 2007). [2] The mean value of each indicator is recorded across years 1970-2015. [3] As well-developed are recorded well-developed core countries, as low developed are recorded semi and low developed countries, on 3 point development scale of well, semi and low developed countries. *Countries with democracy score above 6 on a democracy scale 0-10 are considered stable, congruent democracies (Dahl 2000). ** Mean represents the mean value of an indicator across all democratic countries in the world from 1970 to 2015. *** Mean represents the mean value of an indicator across all non-democratic countries in the world from 1970 to 2015.

Table 2. The Predicted Effects of Growth of Democracy on Women in comparison to Men across the World: 1970–2005[1]

MODELS	Intercept and Time Effects				Democracy Effect			Log-Likelihood
	Intercept		Intercept * year		Democracy overtime (democracy * year)			-2RLL
Women								
1. Women's Labor Force (%) Unconditional model	35.9*	(.98)	.27*	(.03)				18163.2
Conditional	36.2*	(.98)	.27*	(.03)	-.11*	(.02)	.001(.002)	18153.0
2. Women's Literacy (%) Unconditional model	62.69*	(3.1)	.7*	(.1)				6154.6
Conditional	62.7*	(3.06)	.7*	(.1)	-.009	(.12)	.0007(.01)	6014.2
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools (%) Unconditional model	46.34*	(.85)	1.3*	(.04)				32093.4
Conditional	46.34*	(.91)	1.5*	(.06)	.07	(1)	-.06*(.009)	32067.3
4. Girls to Boys in secondary school (%) Unconditional model	46.6*	(1.06)	1.28*	(.046)				32109.3
Conditional	46.5*	(1.1)	1.48*	(.06)	.1	(.1)	-.055*(.009)	32092.2
5. Fertility Unconditional model	4.07*	(.15)	-.02*	(.004)				12114.9
Conditional	4.25*	(.15)	-.005	(.005)	-.053*	(.01)	-.002*(.0008)	12085.6
6. Maternal Mortality Unconditional model	135.7*	(18.7)	15.4*	(1.7)				51742.2
Conditional	144.4*	(19.2)	17.9*	(1.8)	-1.99	(1.76)	-.6*(.17)	51719.5
7. Maternal Care Unconditional model	35.2*	(2.9)	2.29*	(.17)				33882.4
Conditional	35.16*	(2.98)	2.03*	(.18)	.58*	(.21)	.055*(.019)	33849.1
8.Women's Life Expectancy Unconditional model	57.08*	(1.19)	0.95*	(.059)				31300.4
Conditional	57.17*	(1.25)	1.3*	(.07)	.03	(.13)	-.048*(.01)	31290.8
Men								
9. Men's Labor Force (%) Unconditional model	55.22*	(2.4)	.53*	(.035)				8840.6
Conditional	55.18*	(2.4)	.54*	(.035)	.01	(.01)	-.0025(.0016)	8825.3
10. Men's Literacy (%) Unconditional model	78.1*	(2.4)	.5*	(.04)				4822.0
Conditional	78.3*	(2.5)	.5*	(.35)	-.04	(.08)	.003 (.006)	4733.6
11. Boys to Girls in elementary schools (%) Unconditional model	53.66*	(.95)	1.2*	(.05)				32098.4
Conditional	53.5*	(1.1)	1.4*	(.06)	.1	(.1)	.055 (.008)	32091.1
12. Boys to Girls in secondary schools (%) Unconditional model	53.4*	(1.06)	1.28*	(.046)				32106.3
Conditional	53.5*	(1.1)	1.45*	(.06)	.1	(.1)	.05 (.009)	32090.1
Country's Development								
13. Literacy Society (%) Unconditional model	70.4*	(2.69)	.0037*	(.001)				4057.7
Conditional	70.5*	(2.68)	.0009	(.001)	.006*	(.001)	.0006*(.0001)	4006.2
14. GNP/c Unconditional model	2.73*	(.3)	.15*	(.028)				14771.3
Conditional	2.74*	(.31)	.12*	(.027)	-.01	(.01)	.008*(.001)	14755.4

Notes: [1]Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Garr 2014) merged with data *Freedom in the World 1994–2009* (Freedom House 2009) and with the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016). For all the models, the impact of democracy on women and men across the world is analyzed during the era of globalized development and a peak of the third wave of democratization from 1970 to 2005. *Coefficient at least twice its standard error. Values in parentheses depict standard errors. The total number of observations in countries in the world N = 5420, the total number of countries n= 151. For all the models, variance estimates are presented in Table A, Appendix D.

Table 3. The Predicted Effects of Growth of Democracy on Women's and Men's Well-being in Well-Developed, Semi-Developed, and Low-Developed Countries: 1970–2005[1]

	INTERCEPT		EFFECT of TIME		DEMOCRACY EFFECTS			
MODELS FOR COUNTRIES	Intercept		Intercept * year		Democracy		Democracy*year	
A.WELL-DEVELOPED								
Women's well-being								
1. Women's Labor Force (%)	37.17*	(1.06)	.17*	(.06)	-.02	(.05)	.02*	(.005)
2. Women's Literacy (%)	98.1*	(.25)	.019*	(.01)	1.3	(1.5)	-.2	(.2)
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools	48.4*	(.25)	.013	(.02)	.039	(.025)	-.0009	(.002)
4. Girls to Boys in secondary schools	50.7*	(.8)	.16*	(.07)	-.1	(.08)	-.009	(.008)
5. Fertility	2.03*	(.11)	.01	(.011)	-.019	(.01)	-.004*	(.001)
6. Maternal Mortality	90.88*	(2.52)	.6*	(.07)	-.13*	(.05)	-.029*	(.005)
7. Maternal Care	99.13*	(.19)	-.035*	(.01)	.05*	(.01)	.005*	(.0008)
8. Women's Life Expectancy	76.6*	(.42)	.17*	(.02)	.07*	(.02)	.005*	(.002)
Men's well-being								
9. Men's Labor Force (%)	90.88*	(2.52)	.6*	(.07)	-.13*	(.05)	-.029*	(.004)
10. Men's Literacy (%)	97.63*	(.33)	.11*	(.02)	.17*	(.02)	-.009*	(.002)
Country's development								
11. GNP/c	13.08*	(2.35)	1.17*	(.25)	-.27	(.22)	-.03	(.02)
12. Literacy Society (%)	88.7*	(2.2)	.002*	(.001)	.007*	(.002)	-.0002	(.0001)
B.SEMI-DEVELOPED								
Women's well-being								
1. Women's Labor Force (%)	30.7*	(1.86)	.42*	(.049)	.037	(.02)	-.016*	(.002)
2. Women's Literacy (%)	74.5*	(4.7)	.65*	(.17)	-.1	(.11)	.007	(.009)
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools(%	46.96*	(.74)	.11*	(.026)	-.05*	(.02)	-.007*	(.002)
4. Girls to Boys in secondary schools (%)	49.06*	(1.76)	.29*	(.06)	-.1*	(.05)	-.015*	(.005)
5. Fertility	3.87*	(.3)	-.07*	(.008)	-.017*	(.006)	.0007	(.0006)
6. Maternal Mortality	110.9*	(32.5)	-.6	(2.2)	1.4*	(.7)	-.01	(.07)
7. Maternal Care	79.9*	(4.87)	.4	(.28)	.48*	(.21)	-.02	(.02)
8. Women's Life Expectancy	69.42*	(1.27)	.37*	(.047)	.01	(.01)	-.009*	(.001)
Men's well-being								
9. Men's Labor Force (%)	69.9*	(3.98)	.61*	(.096)	.03	(.01)	-.0016	(.002)
10. Men's Literacy (%)	90.09*	(.2.7)	.11	(.11)	-.002	(.03)	-.004	(.003)
Country's development								
11. GNP/c	4.23*	(.85)	.103*	(.05)	-.09*	(.03)	.015*	(.004)
12. Literacy Society (%)	76.6*	(3.6)	.01*	(.001)	.001	(.001)	-.00045*	(.0001)

Table 3. Continues…

C. LESS-DEVELOPED								
Women's well-being								
1. Women's Labor Force (%)	38.3*	(1.13)	.19*	(.03)	-.14*	(.02)	.005*	(.002)
2. Women's Literacy (%)	53.39*	(3.95)	.78*	(.15)	.013	(.21)	-.001	(.018)
3. Girls to Boys in elementary schools(%	43.68*	(.67)	.17*	(.02)	.04	(.03)	-.017*	(.003)
4. Girls to Boys in secondary schools (%)	40.23*	(1.18)	.39*	.039	-.01	(.05)	-.01*	(.004)
5. Fertility	5.13*	(.17)	-.055*	(.005)	-.01	(.008)	-.0013*	(.0007)
6. Maternal Mortality	432.0*	(55.8)	2.79	(4.16)	-3.03	(2.6)	.38	(.24)
7. Maternal Care	55.86*	(3.8)	.51*	(.18)	.015	(.35)	-.0009	(.02)
8. Women's Life Expectancy	59.27*	(1.16)	.34*	(.023)	.007	(.019)	-.007*	(.001)
Men's well-being								
9. Men's Labor Force (%)	44.3*	(2.68)	.54*	(.04)	-.018	(.01)	.0004	(.002)
10. Men's Literacy (%)	70.46*	(3.37)	.5*	(.13)	-.11	(.17)	.008	(.014)
Country's development								
11. GNP/c	1.67*	(.22)	.027	(.019)	-.0087	(.01)	-.0003	(.001)
12. Literacy Society (%)	57.4*	(3.04)	.009*	(.0006)	-.0009	.0008	-.000005	(.00007)

Notes: Only conditional models are presented in Table 3. Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Gurr 2014) merged with the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016). For all the models, the impact of democracy on society at large and women is analyzed during the era of globalized development and a peak of the third wave of democratization from 1970 to 2005. *Coefficient at least twice its standard error. Values in parentheses depict standard errors. **For clarity, only conditional models that predict the effect of democratic growth on outcome variables are reported here. The total number of observations in well-developed countries N = 1532, number of countries n = 42; in semi-developed N = 2519 number of countries n = 70; and in low-developed N = 1369, number of countries n = 39. For all the models, variance estimates are presented in Table A, Appendix D.

Table 4. Variance Estimates of Hierarchical Growth Models Predicting the Effects of Growth of Democracy on Women's and Men's Well-being across the World and across Groups of Countries: 1970-2005

		WORLD										
VARIANCE ESTIMATES	Women's labor force	Women's literacy	Girls to boys in primary school	Girls to boys in secondary school	Fertility	Maternal mortality	Maternal care	Women's life expectancy	Men's Labor force	Men's Literacy	Literacy-society	GNP/c
Residual	4.2*	2.8*	204.8*	201.4*	1.06*	29267*	274.5*	15.6*	.6*	1.8*	.01*	1.9*
	(.1)	*(.1)*	*(4.8)*	*(4.8)*	*(.02)*	*(692.9)*	*(6.5)*	*(.3)*	*(.01)*	*(.04)*	*(.0003)*	*(.04)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	143.5*	13.3*	99.9*	156.9*	3.09*	50030*	1267.2*	20.5*	824.1	12.4*	.1*	14.4*
	(16.6)	*(1.5)*	*(13.1)*	*(19.8)*	*(.36)*	*(5989)*	*(149.0)*	*(2.5)*	*(98.2)*	*(1.7)*	*(.01)*	*(1.7)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.13*	1.5*	.16*	.3*	.001*	407.3*	4.15*	.4*	.17 *	1.1*	.0003*	.1*
	(.02)	*(.2)*	*(.04)*	*(.05)*	*(.0003)*	*(50.1)*	*(.5)*	*(.06)*	*(.02)*	*(.01)*	*(.00003)*	*(.01)*
Covariance Countries' Intercepts & Slopes	-1.6*	-30.1*	2.2*	4.2*	.001	2698.8*	-34.9*	-1.7	.5	-13.3*	.0004	1.07*
	(.4)	*(4.8)*	*(.5)*	*(.8)*	*(.007)*	*(442.9)*	*(6.7)*	*(1.01)*	*(1.02)*	*(.9)*	*(.0004)*	*(.13)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	18161.0	6022.2	32075.3	32100.2	12093.6	51727.5	33857.1	31298.8	8833.3	4733.4	3998.2	14763.4
AICC	18161.0	6022.3	32075.3	32100.2	12093.6	51727.5	33857.1	31298.8	8833.4	4733.5	3998.2	14763.4
BIC	18173.0	6034.3	32087.3	32112.3	12105.6	51727.1	33869.2	31310.8	8845.4	4734.2	3986.1	14763.4
-2LL	18153.0	6014.2	32067.3	32092.2	12085.6	51719.5	33849.1	31290.8	8825.3	4733.6	4006.2	14755.5
		WELL-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES										
Residual	.3*	.3	.08*	.99*	.02*	438.5*	.02*	.06*	.09*	.4	.002*	4.9*
	(.02)	*(.2)*	*(.006)*	*(.07)*	*(.002)*	*(42.1)*	*(.002)*	*(.004)*	*(.008)*	*(.4)*	*(.0001)*	*(.4)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	14.3*	3.2	.06*	1.05*	.03*	806.7*	.4*	2.2*	104.3*	9.2	.002*	10.2*
	(5.1)	*(1.7)*	*(.03)*	*(.4)*	*(.01)*	*(308.6)*	*(.17)*	*(.8)*	*(36.9)*	*(3.8)*	*(.0007)*	*(3.8)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.03*	.0004	.0003*	.012*	.0003*	10.2*	.0007*	.002*	.06*	.001	.00001*	.15*
	(.01)	*(.0004)*	*(.0001)*	*(.005)*	*(.0001)*	*(3.9)*	*(.0003)*	*(.0009)*	*(.02)*	*(.05)*	*(.000001)*	*(.05)*
Covariance Countries' Intercepts & Slopes	-.27	-.05	.002	.004	-.001	-91.1*	-.02*	-.018	-2.2*	.02	-.00004*	1.07*
	(.17)	*(.03)*	*(.001)*	*(.03)*	*(.0009)*	*(34.4)*	*(.002)*	*(.02)*	*(.85)*	*(.42)*	*(.0008)*	*(.42)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	981.4	427.5	185.5	1208.0	218.4	2274.3	158.8	234.3	431.9	446.2	893.5	1946.2
AICC	981.5	427.3	193.5	1208.1	218.3	2274.5	158.6	234.4	432.0	446.3	893.3	1946.3
BIC	984.7	427.2	193.7	1211.3	215.1	2277.6	158.4	237.6	434.3	449.5	890.1	1949.5
2LL	973.4	435.5	196.9	1200.0	226.4	2266.3	166.8	226.3	423.9	438.2	901.5	1938.2
		SEMI-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES										
Residual	.82*	.8*	1.08*	5.04*	.04*	126.1*	16.1*	.2*	.57*	.8*	.002*	2.8*
	(.04)	*(.08)*	*(.06)*	*(.27)*	*(.003)*	*(9.7)*	*(1.3)*	*(.01)*	*(.03)*	*(.15)*	*(.0001)*	*(.15)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	109.4*	684.1*	16.4*	93.8*	2.9*	32148.1*	657.7*	51.3*	44.4*	220.1*	.03*	21.1*
	(27.9)	*(175.1)*	*(4.3)*	*(25.1)*	*(.7)*	*(8308.1)*	*(176.4)*	*(13.1)*	*(12.1)*	*(85.5)*	*(.01)*	*(5.5)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.06*	.8*	.01*	.09*	.001*	147.1*	1.8*	.07*	.25*	.6*	.00004*	.06*
	(.01)	*(.22)*	*(.004)*	*(.03)*	*(.0005)*	*(38.2)*	*(.5)*	*(.02)*	*(.06)*	*(.02)*	*(.00001)*	*(.02)*
Covariance Countries' Intercepts & Slopes	-1.25*	-17.6*	-.27*	-2.2*	-.04*	-239.4	-23.1*	-1.2*	-2.2	-20.1*	-.0009*	.23
	(.5)	*(5.4)*	*(.1)*	*(.74)*	*(.01)*	*(405.1)*	*(8.3)*	*(.43)*	*(2.1)*	*(.03)*	*(.0003)*	*(.23)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	2378.4	991.3	1992.9	3480.7	207.0	3457.8	2332.7	1367.1	1794.9	891.3	1935.6	3031.2
AICC	2378.4	991.5	1993.0	3480.7	207.1	3457.9	2332.8	1367.2	1795.0	891.5	1935.6	3031.2
BIC	2384.2	997.2	1998.8	3486.5	212.0	3463.7	2338.6	1373.0	1800.0	897.2	1929.8	3037.1
-2LL	2370.4	983.3	1984.9	3472.7	199.0	3449.8	2324.7	1359.1	1786.9	882.3	1943.6	3023.2

		LOW-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES									
VARIANCE ESTIMATES	Women's labor force	Women's literacy	Female in elementary school	Female in secondary school	Fertility	Maternal mortality	Maternal care	Female life expectancy	Men's Labor force[1]	Men's Literacy	Literacy-society	GNP/c
Residual	1.78*	4.3*	3.1*	5.3*	.07*	427.9*	25.7*	1.17*	.63*	6.2*	.002*	.42*
	(.05)	*(.29)*	*(.1)*	*(.17)*	*(.004)*	*(18.3)*	*(1.1)*	*(.03)*	*(.02)*	*(.01)*	*(.0001)*	*(.01)*
Variance Between Countries Intercepts	12.5*	145.2*	42.3*	128.2*	2.8*	274.6*	132.5	13.08*	682.3*	67.5*	.06*	4.5*
	(1.8)	*(21.4)*	*(6.3)*	*(19.1)*	*(.4)*	*(42.1)*	*(19.7)*	*(1.8)*	*(99.6)*	*(9.6)*	*(.01)*	*(.6)*
Variance Between Countries Slopes	.09*	1.9*	.04*	.11*	.005*	14.9*	2.3.5*	.05*	.16*	2.1	.0003*	.03*
	(.01)	*(.3)*	*(.006)*	*(.02)*	*(.0009)*	*(2.36)*	*(4.3)*	*(.008)*	*(.02)*	*(.02)*	*(.0001)*	*(.005)*
Covariance Countries' Intercept & Slopes	-2.3*	-34.8*	-.68*	-2.2*	.003	-11.1*	-30.5*	-.35	2.6*	-12.2*	-.0007*	.23*
	(.4)	*(6.9)*	*(.15)*	*(.5)*	*(.008)*	*(2.5)*	*(7.4)*	*(.2)*	*(1.1)*	*(.04)*	*(.00002)*	*(.04)*
FIT STATISTICS												
AIC	9557.3	4082.9	8178.2	10351.4	1131.4	15373.1	8410.7	8410.7	6134.9	4122.9	5983.1	5482.3
AICC	9557.3	4083.0	8178.2	10351.4	1131.5	15373.1	8410.7	8410.7	6135.0	4123.0	5983.1	5482.3
BIC	9567.7	4093.3	8188.5	10361.7	1141.8	15383.4	8421.0	8421.0	6145.3	4123.3	5972.8	5492.6
-2LL	9549.3	4074.9	8170.2	10343.4	1123.4	15365.1	8402.7	8402.7	6126.9	4120.9	5991.1	5474.3

Notes: [1]Data derived from a database *Polity IV* (Marshall and Gurr 2014) merged with the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2016) and the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2016). *Coefficient at least twice its standard error. Values in parentheses depict standard errors. The total number of observations in the world N=5420, the total number of countries= 151; in well-developed countries N = 1532, number of countries n = 42; in semi-developed N = 2519 number of countries n = 70; and in low-developed N = 1369, number of countries n = 39. [1] The effect of democracy growth on men's educational opportunities are not significant in any models and the variances are not reported.

Figure 1. Measurement of Democracy



Notes: Scale 0-10 (Polity IV data) (Marhall & Gurr, 2014; referenced by Dahl 2000)

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APPENDIX A

Figure A. Positive effects of women's empowerment on children, families and societal development as demonstrated by research.









APPENDIX B

The following equation summarizes the two-level hierarchical growth model employed for the whole world:

$Y_{ij} = (\beta_{00} + \beta_{10}Year_{ij} + \beta_{10}Democ_{ij} + \beta_{11}(Democ_{ij})(Year_{ij}) + (e_{oj} + e_{1j}Year_{ij} + r_{ij})$

Where $e_{oj} \sim N(0, \tau_{00})$ $e_{1j} \sim N(0, \tau_{10})$ $r_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$

Y_{ij}	the outcome variable
β_{00}	represents an average level of a well-being indicator (intercept) in 1980
$\beta_{10}Year_{ij}$	represents an average change in an indicator as a function of time
$\beta_{10}Democ_{ij}$	represents an average level of an indicator in 1980 as a function democracy
$\beta_{11}(Democ_{ij})(Year_{ij})$	represents an average level of an indicator as a function of time and democracy
τ_{00}	represents variation in an indicator level between countries (between countries' intercepts)
τ_{10}	represents variation between countries' temporal rate of an indicator change (between countries' slopes)
σ^2	represents residual (the within country variance)
ij	the subscript denotes the within-country level (level-1)
j	the subscript denotes the between-countries level (level-2)

The dependent variable Y is understood as the intercept β_{00} and slope $\beta_{10}Year_{ij,}$ as well as a function of democracy and a function of time and democracy. The fixed terms in the model contain fixed effects for the intercept (β_{00}), for the effect of time ($\beta_{10}Year_{ij}$), for the effect of democracy ($\beta_{10}Democ_{ij}$), and for the effect of democracy and time $[\beta_{11}(Democ_{ij})(Year_{ij})]$. The random terms of the model contain three estimates of variances: the intercept (e_{oj}) represents variation in an indicator between countries in the world; the slope of time ($e_{1j}\ Year_{ij}$) represents variation in the slope of the temporal rate of an indicator's change between countries in the world; and the within-country residual (r_{ij}) represents variation in an indicator's level within countries or the departure from the predicted score of the i^{th} country's actual score on an indicator in 1980 (for the random terms of all models see, Table 4).

To allow the intercept and the slope to vary across countries, a structure of the variance-covariance was selected using goodness-of-fit statistics and the UN (unstructured) structure was indicated as fitting the data the best (Singer and Willett, 2003). Comparison of the results of the UN model with the simple model, which did not impose additional structure on the error covariance matrix (beyond the heteroscedastic structure of the intercept and slopes as outcome models), indicated that, once the covariance of the intercepts and slopes had been introduced, no additional autoregressive error structure needed to be added. Nevertheless, one more test was performed with results leading to the same conclusion.

APPENDIX C

Classification of Countries According to the Level of Development

To compare the effects of democratization on women's well-being across all countries in the world with the effects across the less-developed, semi-developed and more-developed countries, the worldwide analyses were followed by comparable analyses of groups of countries recorded according to their position in the world system of the *core* (more-developed)*, semi-peripheries* (semi-developed) and *peripheries* (less developed) countries (Wallerstein 1974, Wejnert 2014). Considering arguments about the dynamic nature of countries' position in the international market (e.g., Smith & White 1992), the prior the Snyder & Kick (1979) classification supplemented by its more recent modifications (Bollen & Appold, 1993; Smith & White, 1992), presents a limitation to the analysis. Thus, I compare and supplement Snyder & Kick (1979) classification and its modification (Bollen & Appold, 1993; Smith & White, 1992), with the *Human Development Index* (UN Human Development Report, 2016) that depicts the actual level of human development per country, and with the classification of the World Bank: the *World Development Indicators* (World Bank 2016) that classifies countries' according to GDP level. I match the high-income countries (World Bank 2016) with countries recorded as having a very high human development level (UN Human Development Report 2015) and with classification of (Bollen & Appold, 1993; Smith & White, 1992). Specifically, as core countries, I classify countries with very high income and very high human development index. Countries that meet criteria of only one classification are recorded as semi-developed. Similarly, countries that are recorded as both medium income as well as medium to high human development level, are considered semi-developed countries, whereas countries that meet criteria of only one classification are recorded as less-developed. All low income and low human development countries are recorded as less-developed.

Thus as the *more-developed*, *core* countries are recorded: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Qatar, Japan, Korea Rep. (S. Korea), Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States

As the *semi-developed*, *semi-peripheries* were recorded: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Rep., Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guyana, Guatemala, Egypt, Ecuador, Bosnia Herzegovina, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland , Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Macedonia, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia (from HUM Dev IND HIGH), Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia.

As the *peripheries* were depicted: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Repub., Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Korea Dem. Rep. (N. Korea), Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zimbabwe.

Due to missing data on indicators of societal and/or women's well-being, several countries are not included in the study, including Angola, Brunei, Namibia, Yemen Arab Republic, and Zaire.

APPENDIX D

Figure B. Observed Patterns of World Democratization from 1800 to 2005



Source: Research created from Wejnert database *Nations, Democracy and Development: 1800-2005* (Wejnert 2007). Figure modified based on Wejnert, B. 2014. *Diffusion of Democracy. The Past and Future of Global Democracy*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Figure C. Observed Patterns of World and Regional Democratization from 1800 to 2005



The steep decrease in democratization level in the Latin America 1810-1830 is a result of the rapid growth of the number of sovereign but not democratic countries in the region in which in 1800, only one and strongly democratic country was present --the US. The capital letters A,B,C,D,E indicate rapid change (increase or decline of democracy level due to political and socio-economic changes experienced by countries within each geographic region.

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