Abstract

Historically, issues of gender, race and the environment have received little attention in mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship. Great strides have been made, however, in interrogating the inadequacies of the field in these areas and, similarly, in demonstrating the necessity of expanded definitions of security and violence in IR. Despite these strides, mainstream environmental security discourse mimics traditional IR security discourse. In both, gender, class, nation and race are crucial to the political mobilization of identity and the enemy-creation process characteristic of IR; raced, classed and gendered “others” are represented as threats to national security. For mainstream environmental security discourse, “overpopulation” in non-Western countries captures a lion’s share of attention and, like traditional security discourse, the bodies of women act as an important site for its construction. With particular attention to population growth, I examine mainstream environmental security discourse as well as mainstream media discourse in the US to expose the manner by which race, class and gender are utilized in the construction of environmental security concerns.

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Constructing Blame: Overpopulation, Environmental Security and International Relations

In 1999, world population reached six billion. While calls for greater efforts at quelling population growth reached a fevered pitch that year, demands for population control programs are by no means new. In fact, fear of “overpopulation” has gained much credibility in the mainstream US print media and in the literature of some environmental and women’s organizations, as well as the field of International Relations (IR). For instance, although Sierra Club currently maintains that it has no official position on “overpopulation,” a 1996 edition of its magazine Sierra featured a full-page ad from The Balance Activist (Population-Environment Balance) asking readers if they were fed up with traffic jams, scarce housing, deteriorating environmental quality, and the degenerating quality of life in general. Readers were asked to convert their frustration into action against the underlying cause of these social ills – overpopulation. The writers went on to blame unchecked population growth and immigration for environmental destruction, the destruction of “our” carrying capacity as well as “the social conditions necessary for maintaining our free society in the American tradition” (The Balance Activist 1996). Similarly, in December 2000 the International Planned Parenthood Federation began a letter to “concerned friends” of the organization that as of September 2000, “more than 6 billion people are living on our small planet” (International Planned Parenthood Federation 2000/2001:1). The authors went on to write, “pollution, starvation, acid rain, global warming, deforestation and high death tolls from natural disasters are among some of the many symptoms of our overcrowded planet” (International Planned Parenthood Federation 2000/2001:1).

Historically, ecological concerns have not been a primary area of focus for mainstream IR scholars, and similarly, issues of gender and race have garnered little, if any, attention. The androcentrism, anthropocentrism and hegemony of whiteness characteristic of much mainstream IR scholarship, however, have been exposed and challenged from a variety of positions. In response, many scholars have broadened the scope of IR to include issues of gender, race, class and the environment and have drawn attention to the necessity of expanded definitions of security and violence within the field – definitions which recognize environmental security and other issues of “low politics” as legitimate, if not essential, components of IR. In this paper, I argue that despite these strides, the discourse of the emerging mainstream environmental security paradigm mimics traditional IR security discourse. In both, gender, class, nation and race are crucial to the political mobilization of identity and the enemy-creation process characteristic of IR; raced, classed and gendered “others” are represented as threats to national security. For mainstream environmental security discourse, overpopulation in non-Western countries captures a lion’s share of attention and, like traditional security discourse in IR, the bodies of women act as an important site for its construction. The creation of raced, classed and gendered “others” serves to legitimate Western neocolonial efforts in so-called “developing” (read “backwards”) countries. As a result, often coercive – if not genocidal – population control programs targeting non-Western women (and women of color and poor women in the US) have been “justified” by virtue of the status of these women and communities as “other.”

To expose and interrogate the manner by which race, class and gender are utilized in the construction of environmental security concerns, I examine the discourse of the emerging paradigm of environmental security as it relates to population growth. I also examine mainstream US media discourse on population
and the environment and, thus, “popular” interpretations of environmental security, which I argue both reflect and support constructions of the “other” within the IR sub-field of environmental security, as well as policy prescriptions for addressing population growth.

This project is comprised of two main sections. Section one includes a brief overview of mainstream IR theory. Next I discuss my analytical framework, which draws on postcolonial feminism as well as the insights of many ecofeminist and indigenist scholars, with particular emphasis on the themes of intersectionality, representation and praxis common to all three perspectives. I begin section two with a discussion of discourse and the methodological tools I employ for examining the discourse of the emerging paradigm of environmental security as well as mainstream US media discourse on population and the environment. This is followed by an overview of the population debates within International Relations. Next I examine the emerging, mainstream environmental security paradigm and its discourse and mainstream US media discourse on population and the environment. Finally, I present several alternative interpretations of environmental security, and the consequences of population-control policies as well as visions for collective, progressive social action.

SECTION ONE: MAINSTREAM IR AND ITS CRITICS

Written scholarship on foreign policy and the state dates back to 400 BCE with The Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (Thucydides 1951) and 4 BCE with Kautilya’s Arthasastra (Kautilya 1986). However, the field of IR itself came into being as numerous scholars sought practical solutions to the problem of war, particularly as the First World War came into full force. IR theory was intended to analyze war and the causes of war to improve the lot of humankind (Groom 1994:2). The realist school (see Morgenthau 1948; Carr 1939; Bull 1977; Huntington 1995) and to a lesser extent, the neo-realist (see Waltz 1959; Krasner 1978) and interdependence/pluralist schools (see Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane 1986; Kegley 1993; McMillan 1997) came to dominate the field and comprise what many now refer to as mainstream IR. It was assumed that this framework, one characterized by “hard and ruthless analysis” (Carr 1939:9), would provide the answers to war and peace which scholars so desperately sought.

Within the mainstream IR framework, realist theory continues to hold great influence. For realist theorists, states (which are unitary and rational) are the principal actors in the international realm and the primary units of analysis. Similarly, the security of states is the most important consideration for realist scholars. These key assumptions reflect a particular conception of human behavior that, although not absent in Arthasastra or The Peloponnesian War, is generally associated with the Hobbesian construction of human nature (Hobbes 1962). First, realism is a rationally based theory built upon the assumption that the world can be objectively known and controlled. Following the works of Kant, realist scholars contend that there exists a set of universal and self-evident “Truths” comprehensible through human reason (Hoffman 1994:29). Realist scholars argue that all free persons share the capacity for reason and rationality and thus seek to maximize benefits, minimize costs and risks, and operate on the principles of prudence and amorality. The drive to dominate is also considered a universal characteristic of humans, who are by nature – according to Hobbes (1962) – inherently selfish, untrustworthy and conflictual.
The realist conception of human nature is extended to states, which are similarly viewed as untrustworthy and motivated by the drive to dominate. The realist model is an essentially conflict driven model as actors (states) are presumed to engage in zero sum games in an anarchic international realm. National interest is defined as power and self-preservation, with power (primarily military, but also economic) seen as the means by which states resolve and deter conflict. The violence that occurs in the world of anarchy is legitimized by national interest. Peace, on the other hand, is elusive for realists like Morgenthau (1948) who argue that there can never be peace, only truces based upon the overwhelming power of dominant states. Power and survival are due in part to the resources nations may command and their geopolitical positioning. Regard for nature in realist theory is also heavily influenced by the Hobbesian state of nature analogy (Hobbes 1962), with nature regarded as that which must be controlled and tamed (Tickner 1992:101). Moreover, true “progress” and survival for states lay in their ability to exploit and dominate nature.

The level of analysis for neo-realist (a.k.a. structural realist) scholars shifts from the state to the state system. Structural realists emphasize relations within the state system and include in their model the recognition of international regimes as actors. Waltz (1959), perhaps the best-known structural realist, suggests that the international system is shaped by, and shapes, state behavior (Keohane 1999:164). In other words, neo-realism allows for the contextualization of action between states. Neo-realists reject the assumption that states seek power over all other interests, believing that different systemic conditions force states to define their self-interests in different ways (Keohane 1999:175). Unlike the realist emphasis on power as an end in itself, neo-realists consider security the highest end (Schweller and Priess 1997:11), though this still refers to security between states, which, like realism, is primarily predicated on power through military might. In fact, the fundamental assumptions of classical realism remain largely the same in neo-realist theory. In both, power is defined as having the ability to force, intimidate and/or coerce other actors into doing what they do not want to do, and despite the recognition of non-state actors, neo-realists still consider states to be rational and primary actors.

Interdependence theorists (within the pluralist school) recognize the roles of state and non-state actors in international relations; in other words, pluralists recognize a plurality of actors in the international arena. Unlike realism, adherents to this theoretical framework view human nature as potentially cooperative as opposed to innately selfish, and they challenge the realist construction of the state as unitary and rational. Furthermore, unlike realist theory, interdependence theory suggests that international politics includes not simply national security issues, but a host of concerns ranging from economic to environmental issues; conflict, then, is not necessarily viewed as the defining characteristic of global politics (D’Amico 1994:58). Thus, military security does not hold the dominant position in this framework. In fact, cooperation and interdependence between states may lessen the potential for international conflict (McMillan 1997:40). Similarly, interdependence theorists emphasize the multiple channels that connect society and international regimes. International regimes refer to sets of rules, procedures and institutions that guide interactions between and among actors, thus providing a degree of order in the international realm and, ideally, greater opportunity for cooperation (Viotti and Kauppi 1999:215).

By recognizing the “interconnections between social and natural systems” and by challenging “conventional constructs as well as the policy predispositions informed by them” (MIT Press 1998: Series Forward), interdependence theorists and liberal institutionalists (also part of the pluralist school)
have made significant strides in bringing environmental concerns into the realm of IR. Litfin (1998) argues that sovereignty is being “greened,” meaning that prevailing political institutions and norms of sovereignty are being redefined to address concerns over global ecological destruction. In this vein, scholars have also expanded notions of power and national security, offering a greater understanding of the multiplicity of actors in IR. For example, Haas, Keohane and Levy (1995) provide numerous examples of actors cooperatively and successfully addressing environmental issues through international regimes. In fact, they suggest that regimes are imperative to guiding state behavior towards environmental protection. In sum, these scholars offer a “reconfiguration of political space” (Litfin 1998:2) within which environmental degradation may be rightly seen as one of the most pressing issues of our time.

An ecological perspective on security holds that “only by understanding the complex functioning of living systems as wholes, and their interactions with their environment, can we hope to solve our contemporary ecological crises” (Tickner 1992:120). The work of many interdependence and liberal institutionalist scholars has certainly gone a long way in demonstrating these interconnections. Despite its contributions, the pluralist school still tends to accept the basic worldview of realism, particularly as it relates to the realist conception of power as “power-over” or domination. Furthermore, like realist and neo-realist theorists, pluralist scholars tend to be men from an educated elite of the “First World” thus providing a “view from the top” or rather “a vantage point of relative privilege that shapes their vision of the world” (D’Amico 1994:61).

**Feminist Interventions Into IR**

Although realism and to a lesser extent neo-realism and pluralism continue to comprise the bulk of mainstream IR theory, many scholars, including feminist IR theorists, are challenging the fundamental biases of mainstream IR (see e.g. Tickner 1994; D’Amico 1994; Pettman 1996; Peterson 1992; Sylvester 1994). In a variety of ways, feminist IR scholars (ranging from liberal to postmodern) demonstrate that women are effectively homeless in mainstream IR, given that “the soldier, the citizen, the political subject, and the state are gendered male” (Pettman 1996:viii). The realist and neo-realist construction of states often, for instance, hinges upon characteristics of rationality, self-interest and a lack of moral restraint, which are socially constructed masculine characteristics (Tickner 1994:30-1). On the other hand, characteristics such as emotion, interdependence and idealism – characteristics often associated with femininity – are perceived as inferior and, in fact, liabilities in the conduct of international relations (Tickner 1994:31). Furthermore, realism and neo-realism have been constructed such that the state, men and war are positioned as the foundations of theory, thus privileging the goals of mastery and power-over while ignoring the experiences and insights of women vis-à-vis the international realm.

While pluralist theorists address issues of gender, they tend to focus on adding women to the sphere of IR rather than challenging the androcentric construction of the field itself. Thus, feminist contributions within the pluralist framework are often perceived as additive as opposed to transformative. Rather than simply looking for women in international relations, gender analyses should be utilized to expose “the gender-based assumptions of the central perspectives on world politics” (D’Amico 1994:62). Inadequate gender – as well as class and race – analyses have had severe consequences for women as related to definitions of security and violence in IR. Traditional IR definitions of each have obfuscated
violence against women (including rape, torture, murder and economic exploitation) under the assumption that such violence is a private, domestic concern, rather than a public, international concern. By ignoring violence against women, the masculinist discourse of mainstream IR actually perpetuates it.

Although discussion of specific liberal, socialist and postmodern feminist contributions to IR is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note the contributions that scholars sympathetic to each perspective have made to understanding and explaining world politics.¹ Postcolonial feminist, ecofeminist and indigenist perspectives, however, by virtue of their focus on intersectionality, representation and praxis, are given the pride of place in the analytical framework for this paper. It is to these perspectives that I now turn.

**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

Reviewing three literatures is an arduous task, at best. However, the themes of intersectionality, representation and praxis common to postcolonial feminist theory and strands of ecofeminist and indigenist scholarship bare the inclusion of all three literatures in this project. Moreover, these three themes are integral to an interrogation of the utilization of race, class and gender in the construction of environmental security concerns about population growth, are essential to illuminating policy responses to “overpopulation rhetoric,” and finally are important for highlighting alternative perspectives on environmental security. On one hand, these common themes could justify the placement of ecofeminist and indigenist theories as sub-headings of postcolonial feminist theory. On the other hand, the arguments within ecofeminism and indigenism upon which I focus also add to and critique some of the ideas associated with postcolonial feminism – thus their placement as a sub-heading may not be altogether fair.² In the pages to follow, I provide a brief introduction to each perspective and then proceed with thematic discussions of all three, followed by a brief summation of the necessity of using these perspectives in this project.

**Introductions**

Postcolonial feminist scholars interrogate the representation of women within Western, mainstream discourse to illustrate both the discursive and concrete ways in which women are impacted by (post)colonial structures and relations of power. Postcolonial feminism has been substantially influenced by postcolonial theory, which generally argues that, although the era of direct territorial occupation under colonization may be largely over, current international hierarchies, relations of power and geographical boundaries are presently determined by relations characteristic of colonialism (Pettman 1996:26). Based on this understanding of present international power relations, postcolonial scholars seek to unravel the metanarratives of Western Civilization and expose the link between (neo)colonization and the Western pursuit of “Truth” and “racist power and cultural supremacism” (Prakash 1995:202). Ultimately, postcolonial scholars seek to reveal and disrupt the nexus between power and knowledge, and to expose the value-laden and politically-motivated definitions and representations of the “other” which, among other things, are used as “justification” for current relations of power and exploitation within and among countries. The writings of Said (1978, 1997), Ashcroft, et. al. (1989), Bhabha (1990), and Prakash (1995) challenge Western knowledge (re)production and reveal the relations of power that underlie it. Finally, in challenging definitions of power in IR,
postcolonial scholars also underline the propensity of IR theorists to discuss power only as it relates to “statist affirmation[s] of its centrality to the ‘national interest,’” as well as their tendency to view power only in economic and military terms, rather than recognize the power inherent in the construction of knowledge (Darby and Paolini 1994:381). Otherwise stated, traditional definitions of power obfuscate ideological power and, similarly, the power behind constructions of knowledge and explanations of the “reality” of world politics.

While postcolonial feminist scholars draw upon the postcolonial framework, they go further by demonstrating the discursive and concrete interconnectedness of class, race, nation, and gender and the ways (neo)colonial relations impact the lives of women (and men) around the world (e.g. Mohanty 1991a, 1991b; Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Ahmed 1992; Spivak 1987). While the inclusion of “marginalized constituencies” in the US within postcolonial feminism is contested, I also include multicultural feminists such as hooks (2000), Smith (1998), Hurtado (1996) and Margaret Anderson and Patricia Hill Collins (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e) in my discussion of postcolonial feminism. Like Mufti and Shohat, I refuse “to separate the linked histories of race as well as the contemporary complication of communities within and across the borders of nation-states” because “it is impossible to discuss issues of nation and gender in national isolation” (Mufti and Shohat 1997:2-3).

The second of the three primary elements in my analytical framework is ecofeminism. Those who have adopted the label “ecofeminist” tend to agree that ecofeminism grew out of the non-violent, anti-nuclear, peace, feminist and environmental movements of the late 1970s and 1980s. At its core, ecofeminism is a woman-identified movement that asserts the interdependence, value and integrity of all living things (Mies and Shiva 1993; Baker 1993; Starhawk 1989; Merchant 1980). At the same time, ecofeminism is not a unified theory, nor are all strands of ecofeminism useful to this project. Sturgeon (1997b) categorizes five strands of ecofeminism based on different yet related understandings of the “woman/nature relationship”: critiques of patriarchy; environmentalist analyses; materialist analyses; arguments that women are biologically closer to nature; and spiritual ecofeminism/feminist spirituality. The various strands of ecofeminism are often contradictory, particularly as they relate to discourses of race. Ecofeminist scholars who engage environmental issues through the lens of intersectionality and focus on the role of global capitalist processes are given the pride of place in this project (such as Shiva 1989, 1993, 1997; Mies 1993; Mies and Shiva 1993; Warren 1997; Sturgeon 1997a, 1997b; Kirk 1997). These scholars explicitly link the ideologies and structures of anthropocentrism, classism, sexism, heterosexism, racism and ethnocentrism to global economic/political relations of power in examining ecological destruction.

The third part of my analytical framework is indigenism. Indigenous perspectives or indigenism, characterized by the works of LaDuke (1993, 1996), Churchill (1993, 1994, 1996, 1997), Churchill and LaDuke (1992), and Jaimes (1992), challenge – broadly speaking – environmental racism through an anti-colonialist framework, speak to the racism which underlies the dominant, Western development paradigm and illuminate diverse sites of resistance to environmental racism. To be sure, indigenism is a broad categorization, containing myriad standpoints. My focus upon the perspectives of Churchill, LaDuke and Jaimes is not to deny the diversity of views within indigenism, nor is it to assume that theirs are the only voices.
The term “indigenous” is itself multi-layered and highly contested, although many use it for political, social and cultural self-identification. Acceptance of this term indicates recognition of the linked histories of colonialism and neocolonialism as well as the destruction engendered by each; for instance, 98 to 99 percent of Native North America was exterminated, and 95 percent of the native landbase was expropriated during the period of conquest (Jaimes 1992:7-8). It also implies recognition of inequitable relations of power and the racism upon which representations of Native Americans as “other” (and thus, as exploitable) are built. Perhaps most importantly, many self-identify as indigenous/indigenist as part of a broader process of political empowerment, ideological positioning and resistance to the history and relations of exploitation just mentioned.

Themes

Intersectionality, representation and praxis are only three themes among many that postcolonial feminism and strands of ecofeminism and indigenism share. While it is beyond the scope of the paper to investigate these three perspectives indepth, their common themes of intersectionality, representation and praxis are critical to examining the ways in which gender, class, nation and race are utilized in the enemy-creation process characteristic of the emerging paradigm of environmental security in IR (as well as the US mainstream media) as it relates to population growth. For the following authors, focus on “intersectionality” highlights the structural dimensions of relations of domination, and “representation” stresses some of the ideological dimensions of exploitation. Finally, the understandings of “praxis” underscored by each of the authors shed light on alternative perspectives of environmental security as well as diverse sites of resistance to the creation of raced, classed and gendered scapegoats for environmental degradation.

Intersectionality

Intersectionality is based on an understanding that domination on the basis of race, class, gender, sexuality and nation – as well as age and ability – are interconnected and fundamental axes of society. Together, these form a structural pattern, or matrix of domination, which “affects individual consciousness, group interaction, and group access to institutional power and privileges” (Anderson and Hill Collins 1998a:4). The scholars highlighted in my analytical framework recognize and examine the ways race, nation, sexuality, gender, and class “function as interrelated ideologies that can produce relations of domination and subordination” (Smith 1998:xxiii) as well as systems of privilege and disadvantage. Understanding systemic relations of domination and exploitation is central to illuminating the construction of enemies within IR, the mainstream environmental security paradigm included. Rather than simply adding race, class and gender to my analysis, the lens of intersectionality highlights the structural connections between race, class, gender and nation, which is important to more fully understanding people’s lives, institutional arrangements, social issues and approaches to social change (Anderson and Hill Collins 1998a:3).

Intersectionality suggests the need for “relational thinking” or the recognition of power and gender subordination as relational, as gender is “differentially constructed according to race” as well as class, nation and sexuality (Hurtado 1996:95). Relational thinking requires going beyond simply understanding diversity. It requires, instead, an analytical framework that allows us to see linkages
among group experiences and highlights how oppression based on race, class, nation, sexuality and gender (as well as oppression based on age and physical ability) interacts to produce institutionalized inequality. Similarly, rather than simply identifying stories, experiences and knowledges excluded from the mainstream, the lens of intersectionality also highlights systems of power, which provides tools to “think about changing the system, not just documenting the effects of that system on different people” (Anderson and Hill Collins 1998a:6).

Analysis through the lens of intersectionality also foregrounds postcolonial feminist theory. Postcolonial feminists such as Mohanty (1991a, 1991b, 1997) and Ahmed (1992) draw attention to the multiple sites of racism, classism, gender and power, including local and global manifestations of race/gender/power relationships. Recognizing the multiple sites upon which locations of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, geographic location, politics, economics and social conditions come together in influencing the lives of women, praxis and feminist analysis are integral components of postcolonial feminist theory. In the same way, many postcolonial feminists argue that analyses of culture, ideology and socio-economic position should be contextualized in such a way as to account for the particular balance of power that exists in the world, including the interconnections between the First World and Third World (Mohanty 1991b:54).

Recognition of environmental destruction is not necessarily absent in postcolonial feminist writing; however, ecofeminists such as Mies and Shiva (1993), Sturgeon (1997a and 1997b), and Kirk (1997) clearly foreground the link between the matrix of domination and environmental destruction in their work. For instance, Mies and Shiva explain “wherever women acted against ecological destruction or/and the threat of atomic annihilation, they immediately became aware of the connection between patriarchal violence against women, other people and nature” (1993:14). Through the lens of intersectionality, the relationship between environmental destruction and capital accumulation may be demonstrated, and thus the role of capitalist patriarchy in creating “otherness” in service of capital accumulation (Kirk 1997:349).

For indigenist scholars, intersectionality is often demonstrated by highlighting the history of Manifest Destiny (and/or westward expansion in the US) as well as the ideological bases of the dominant, Western development paradigm (like, as previously mentioned, postcolonial and ecofeminist scholars do). Churchill explains that “sexism, racism and all the rest arose here as a concomitant to the emergence and consolidation of the Eurocentric nation-state form of sociopolitical and economic organization” (Churchill 1993:422). The authority of the state depends on its ability to maintain internal cohesion, which is predicated on constructions of territorial integrity and the control of Native lands (Churchill 1993:422). Thus, struggles for indigenous land rights destabilize the state’s ability “to continue imposing a racist, sexist, classist, homophobic, militaristic order upon non-Indians” (Churchill 1993:422). Hence, through the lens of intersectionality, indigenist scholars expose and disrupt the material and ideological bases for the exploitation of indigenous lands and communities.

Intersectionality is useful in highlighting not only the structural bases for relations of exploitation, but the systemic conditions allowing for the objectification and degradation of the earth as well. The ecofeminist, postcolonial feminist and indigenist voices privileged in my analytical framework argue that we must stop treating the earth as a resource simply to be consumed. Furthermore, they reveal the links
between the dominant, Western development paradigm and ecological devastation. The dominant Western development paradigm is steeped in seventeenth-century Enlightenment thinking that promotes the view that “progress” entails mastery over that which was defined inferior, including nature, women and “other” peoples. Binary relationships constructed in the service of Western development schemes both categorize and control “reality” and privilege, for instance, civilization over “barbarity,” culture over nature, scientific knowledge over “old wives’ tales” and so forth. As a variety of feminist scholars argue (see for instance, Mies and Shiva 1993; Kabeer 1994) these mutually exclusive categories privilege socially constructed masculine characteristics over feminine, thus inferiorizing that which is perceived as feminine.

Rather than viewing nature as a living being, the Enlightenment roots of the dominant Western development paradigm reduce the natural environment to a dead, inert object – a process essential to industrialization and profit maximization; “rendering nature as a dead, inert object was essential for eliminating the fears that the mining of metals and fuels crucial for the coming industrial revolution was a violation of nature’s inner resources” and inherent value (Tickner 1992:105). In fact, the “civilization” of nature as an indicator of human progress itself becomes a justification for imperialism (Tickner 1992). The methodological determinism of the Enlightenment model of knowledge production advances this process further by promoting a view of nature and society broken down into their constituent parts, thus allowing the exploitation of each without appearing to impinge upon the whole (Kabeer 1994:73).

Projects undertaken to “civilize” the wilderness through resource extraction treat natural resources and the “land itself as commodities for exchange” (Grinde and Johansen 1995:4). This worldview was globalized with the expansion of both the state-system and the market economy. Thus, “empty lands” were and are civilized through the “expertise of a ‘superior culture’” (Tickner 1992:107).

Rooted in the Enlightenment model of knowledge production (which continues to shape our understandings of economic, political and social realities) and based on racist, sexist, classist ideologies and feminized and instrumental understandings of nature, the dominant, Western development paradigm justifies the expendability of women, nature and indigenous communities. In its promotion of efficiency, control and “civilizing missions,” this model of knowledge production “justifies” the subjugation of all that does not coincide with Western culture, as the history of Western culture is the standard against which all others are judged. Nature and “other” men and women are seen as impediments to the enhancement of the “greater good” of (white) society through development and progress within the white supremacist capitalist-patriarchal system. Like the dominant Western development paradigm, under westward expansion, “the underlying motivation prompting the genocide of Native Americans, the lust for their territories and the resources within them, is typically hidden behind a rhetoric extolling the ‘settlement’ of essentially vacant and ‘undiscovered’ lands. To admit otherwise risks revealing that the past motive for genocide exists as much today, and in some ways more so” (Churchill 1993:7).

The ideologies noted above also underpin internal colonialism (Jaimes 1992; Churchill 1993). Internal colonialism is “a particularly virulent form of socioeconomic penetration wherein the colonizing country literally exports a sufficient proportion of its population to supplant (rather than enslave) the indigenous population of the colony” (Churchill 1993:23). Often, the settler population revolts against the country of origin and establishes itself as a sovereign nation. Thus, instead of colonization from abroad, indigenous populations become colonized within a national territory (Churchill 1993:23). In addition to
the US, peoples in Canada, Northern Ireland, Peru, South Africa and others have experienced internal colonialism (Churchill 1993:23). Many scholars therefore problematize the “post” in postcolonial theory, by arguing that both colonialism in its traditional sense, as well as new forms of colonialism, exist now (Feminism and (Post-)Colonialism 1999:1). To argue that this is a postcolonial period implies that we may ignore current colonial relations and processes in the US against Native American communities. We must, then, be cognizant of the colonial as well as the neocolonial relations of power that continue to structure national and global relationships.

In diverse yet related ways, each of the authors noted above speaks to the need for a new consciousness – one that sees race, nation, class, gender and sexuality as interlocking, mutually constitutive categories that act as fundamental axes of society. In other words, scholars in this analytical framework appreciate that neither gender subordination nor race, class and sexual subordination acts in exclusion of one another; all act in concert to undergird relations of domination, including the domination and exploitation of the so-called “non-human” environment. Most important, these scholars suggest that resistance is useless without an understanding of this matrix of domination – in fact, inattention reinforces relations of domination. Each also suggests the necessity of reformulated definitions of power – definitions that, among other things, speak to physical and ideological violence as well as economic, ecological and social violence. Finally, they suggest a definition of power that speaks to the power of resistance as well.

As previously alluded to, traditional definitions of violence and security in mainstream IR theory have their origin in an understanding as power as “power-over.” Power-over, or domination, is the conception of power prevalent in mainstream IR theory. It is also an outgrowth of the white supremacist, capitalist-patriarchal structure and is similarly rooted in the Enlightenment model of knowledge production. Power-over is created and maintained by the belief that some are more valuable than others; exploitation is the execution of power-over and requires the creation of an “other” that is different and inhuman to “justify” their exploitation (Starhawk 1987:14). This definition of power has come to shape nearly all of our contemporary institutions and structures, and the violence emanating from power-over takes many forms, ranging from the power to destroy the natural world, to the power wielded over “other nations” in the form of imperialism, to the power exerted over women in situations of domestic violence and rape. Power defined in this way also allows mainstream IR theorists to position men and the masculinized state as the foundations of theory and to privilege the goals of domination.

The language of power-over is our system of rules and “abstract, generalized formulations enforced on the concrete realities of particular circumstances” (Starhawk 1987:14). Mechanistic science also sustains power-over because it provides the tools necessary to separate and devalue the world; “if we say that only quantifiable experiences are true, we have not eliminated what cannot be measured, but we have devalued it” (Starhawk 1987:20). Finally, power-over motivates through fear, intimidation and the threat of punishment and violence. Ecofeminist scholar and activist Starhawk explains that what results is a culture of domination within which our worth must be earned and determined by our roles and status, not by our intrinsic worth for “in the world-view of power-over, human beings have no inherent worth” (1987:14). Nature itself also has no inherent worth in this worldview. In other words, the same masculinist discourse in IR that perpetuates violence against women also perpetuates ecological
destruction and simultaneously allows for the construction of scapegoats to explain environmental security issues.

Reformulated definitions of power are essential to understanding and challenging relations of domination. An understanding of power as “power-from-within” or empowerment entails and promotes a different consciousness – one that sees the world as a living being in which all elements are interrelated and inherently valuable (Starhawk 1987:15). Similarly, “power-with” also allows a different type of consciousness, one that sees the world as a pattern of relationships. Power-with “is social power, the influence we wield among equals” and the relationships that allow us to resist the culture of domination collectively (Starhawk 1987:9).

Because a power-over worldview “locks all revolutionary struggles into binary structures – possessing power versus being powerless” (Mohanty 1991b:71), recognizing power-with allows the possibility of building revolutionary struggles that eschew the hierarchical relations that power-over understandings of world politics assumes. A power-with worldview highlights the potential for collective action against all components of the culture of domination and the replacement of the culture of domination with values of love, mutuality, honesty, respect, non-violence and interdependence (hooks 2000). Thus, a new vision of society may be promoted – one based on genuine justice for all within a structure characterized by participatory economics, social democracy, and a global ecological vision of responsibility and sustainability (hooks 2000).

Understandings of power should consider, too, the relationship between knowledge and power. Knowledge produced and reproduced on the basis of power-over relationships and representations of “others” as inferior and/or as threats act as instruments of power. There is little attention to issues of knowledge production and reproduction in the mainstream IR framework, insufficient attention to the concrete and discursive intersections of gender, race, nation, sexuality and class and little analysis of the ideologies that “justify” the destruction of the environment. The analytical framework of this project, however, takes all of these components into account, given its focus on intersectionality as well as representation.

Representation

In her essay “Under Western Eyes,” Mohanty (1991b) examines the discursive colonization of Third World women and argues that discursive representations, although often far removed from material reality, have direct impacts on policy and practice. The discursive production of Third World women as a homogenized category, one characterized by barbarity, weakness and passivity, is bound-up in – and supports – systems of domination. Similarly, Patricia Hill Collins (1990) argues that the oppression of black women in the US is systemized along three structural dimensions: the economic dimension, which relegates black women to low-paid service occupations; the political dimension, which denies black women many of the rights and privileges normally extended to white men and women; and the ideological dimension, which imposes “controlling images” on black women to “justify” their exploitation (Tong 1998:218). I argue that this is also true more broadly for women of color in the US, as well as “other” populations around the world. For Collins (1990) and others included in my analytical
framework, the ideological dimension is perhaps the most powerful of the three; they argue that oppression cannot continue without a powerful ideological justification for its existence.

It follows then that representations of the “other” must be brought to light and confronted in order to address and eliminate all forms of oppression. This includes the representation of Third World women, as well as women of color and poor women in the US, as “irrational baby-makers” and thus enemies of environmental security. Moreover, such stereotypes, as mentioned, are implicated in – and support – relations of domination and validate for instance, population control policies that dramatically diminish the human rights of women around the world. Therefore, the focus on representation in my analytical framework is fundamental to interrogating the manner by which enemies are created within mainstream environmental security discourse.

Analyzing representation is directly linked to intersectionality, for analysis through this lens allows one to read “at the intersections of constructions of race, gender, class and sexuality” and destabilize the master narratives of history and “historically constructed meanings of subordinated race, sexual, gender and class positions” (Smith 1998:xiv). Analysis through the lens of intersectionality illustrates the simultaneous operation of race, gender, nation, sexuality and class, for attention to only one category “masks both the operation of the others and the interconnections among them” (Smith 1998:xv).

Along this line, postcolonial feminists like Ahmed (1992) and Mohanty (1991b) interrogate the representation of women in colonial/neocolonial narratives as well as Western, mainstream feminist discourse. Often, Third World women are represented as an already constituted group with the same interests and desires, despite their different class, ethnic, sexual or racial locations (Mohanty 1991b:55).

Moreover, Third World women tend to be represented as sexualized objects, as victims of particularly repressive traditions, and/or as backwards impediments to development and progress. Scholars such as Mohanty (1991b) have made the recognition of colonialist and neocolonial relations of power, including the colonizing ventures of Western liberal feminists, central to their work and have sought to illuminate the political, social and economic consequences of related discourses.

Characteristic of liberal feminist discourse, for instance, is a concept of universal patriarchy that operates transhistorically to oppress all women. This conceptualization ignores the process of globalization and the differential impacts of this process based upon one’s location (Alexander and Mohanty 1997). In making this point, Gilliam notes Nawal el Saadawi’s argument that, “Western women often go to countries such as the Sudan and ‘see’ only clitoridectomy, but never notice the role of multinational corporations and their exploited labor” (Gilliam 1991:218). In other words, Western liberal feminists, whether consciously or unconsciously, fail to see the larger picture and often ignore how they contribute to economic and political oppression around the world. Instead, liberal feminists often see themselves as “saviors” to masses of victimized and unliberated Third World women.

Essentialist understandings of patriarchy and the representations of Third World women (and women of color in the West) solely as inferior “victims” obscure the unique and varied ways in which women act as agents. Further, Western colonial and neocolonial ventures are legitimized by representations of Third World women as helpless and in need of Western feminist intervention in order to know and combat their oppression. Simply stated, we must move beyond actor/victim and powerful/passive...
dichotomies and toward an understanding of the more complex ways in which “consciousness is structured and agency [is] embodied in power relations” (Macleod 1992:557).

Acknowledging the ways that “other men” are represented is another extremely important area of interrogation and analysis. Western colonial and neocolonial discourse often represents Third World men and men of color in the US as “hypermasculine” – as oppressors of women in all contexts and at all times. “Hyperfeminity,” on the other hand, implies that all women are passive victims of all men in all contexts and at all times: both constructions are played out in the creation of policy and in practice. Scholars such as Ahmed (1992) and Davis (1981) suggest that Western liberal feminists are often complicit in this creation of “other men.” For example, Ahmed exposes the fusion of the Western narrative of Islam with the colonial narrative in the late 19th century and suggests that the Victorian male establishment co-opted the language of feminism and used it against “other men” and “other cultures” in the service of colonialism (Ahmed 1992:150-151). Otherwise stated, issues regarding women, their oppression, and the cultures of “other men” were fused together in the rhetoric of colonialism to “render morally justifiable its project of undermining or eradicating the cultures of colonized peoples” (Ahmed 1992:151). Similarly, representations of indigenous communities as barbaric, and of the land as not only uncivilized, but relatively empty, morally justified schemes such as Manifest Destiny, as communities in the “path of progress” were simply regarded as part of the rugged, unforgiving, undeveloped terrain to be conquered.

Western discourse also often represents African-American men as more sexually voracious and violent than white men. Angela Davis (1981) is particularly critical of the works of feminists like Jean MacKellar (1975), Diana Russell (1975), and Susan Brownmiller (1975) who have helped revive the image of black men as “the rapists” of white women. Davis points out that MacKellar (1975), for instance, argues that black men commit 90% of all reported rapes in US, despite the fact that the FBI’s figure at that time was only 47% (Tong 1998:223). Fifty percent of the 22 rape cases described by Russell (1975) involved women who had been raped by men of color, yet only 26% of the original 95 cases she studied actually involved men of color (Tong 1998:223). Finally, Davis (1981) argues that Brownmiller (1975) plays on society’s fears of “violent black men” in Against Our Will, where she implies that “the average black man agrees with Eldridge Cleaver’s statement that rape is an ‘insurrectionary act’ against ‘white society’” (Tong 1998:223).

Representations of black men as more violent and sexually insatiable than white men were used to “justify” the lynchings of thousands of black men during the 19th century (Tong 1998:224). This thinking is also reflected in contemporary justifications for the criminalization of an entire generation of men of color in the United States. Despite the fact that the biggest crime rate increases in this country have been among white adults over the age of thirty (a 148% rise in violent crimes and a 138% rise in all felonies between 1980-1997) more than half of all prisoners in the US are black (Slate et. al. 2000:19, 16). As Michael Slate of the Unbound Project argues:

The people in prison reflect the current state of society. The cages are filled with those who live on the bottom, those who get crushed by the rules and those who refuse to play or die by the rules. The prison population is mainly Black, Latino and other
minorities and it’s born of systemic oppression, racism, discrimination and enforced
White Supremacy (Slate et. al. 2000:16).

This is in addition to the thousands of cases collected so far in Stolen Lives: Killed by Law
Enforcement. In a joint project between the October 22 Coalition, the Anthony Baez Foundation and
the National Lawyers Guild, people have begun collecting information on civilian murders at the hands
of various police agencies across the US (October 22 Coalition et. al. 2001). Most of the victims of
this violence are young, black and Latino men. Again, this all continues to be “justified” by arguments
attesting to the particularly (and inherently) violent and/or sexualized nature of these “other” men in the
US; hence, representations of the “other” dramatically impact policy and practice.

Raced-based representations of the “other” also characterize some writings on women and the
environment. For instance, in an article for E, Miller generally suggests that all life is interrelated and
valuable, including women. One interviewee notes, “as bearers of children, women have an innate
emotional bond to the Earth” (Miller 1997:3). Although advancing a “women as biologically closer to
nature” argument, Miller and many of those cited in his article tend to assume overpopulation as a
problem in developing countries and thus suggest various population control measures. This implies, I
argue, that the author’s affirmative women/nature correlation does not necessarily apply to all women;
rather, “other” women are enemies of nature. Moreover, it is the fault of “other” men that women have
many children. Miller highlights population growth in developing countries in the opening sentence of the
article, and goes on to quote one interviewee as saying, “men are not aware that the root of the
population problem is that women are left with only one thing to do: mother children” (Miller 1997:4).

However, less attention is given to the need for low consumption lifestyles in the North; for example,
Miller’s article features only one (short) paragraph on the topic. Absent in this paragraph, however, is
the recognition that privileged North Americans and Europeans, who make up 20% of the population,
consume 86% of the world’s resources. Also absent is attention to the unequal global relations of
power that serve as the root of poverty, rapid population growth and hunger.

Postcolonial feminists as well as many indigenist and ecofeminist scholars also scrutinize mainstream
representations of nature – as previously noted – and their link to representations of women. Sturgeon
explains that analysis of women’s oppression through the lens of environmentalism suggests that “if
women are equated with nature, their struggle for freedom represents a challenge to the idea of a
passive, disembodied, and objectified nature” (Sturgeon 1997b:263). The Western development model
– and as Shiva notes, the dominant mode of organizing the world more generally – views nature and
women as subservient and disposable, and the universalization of these constructions has led to the
destruction of nature and the subjugation of women (Shiva 1989:223). Furthermore the foundations of
the global capitalist economy are themselves antiecological with “the oppression of women, racism and
extological destruction…directly linked to economic exploitation” (Kirk 1997:349). The sources of
environmental degradation are the motives, worldviews and priorities afforded by dominant economic
and political institutions (Kirk 1997:346) or, in other words, white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy.
Women’s survival struggles, such as the Chipko movement in India and the Kenyan women’s green belt
movement, among others, challenge the dominant Western model of knowledge production, arguing that
the exclusion of life as a central organizing principle in society has rendered it, as well as the dominant
Western paradigm of development and white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy more generally, a threat to life itself (Shiva 1989:224; Kirk 1997:346).

**Praxis**

The final theme within my analytical framework is praxis, or the combination of theory and practice. In her essay, Mohanty argues for a project which simultaneously focuses on deconstructing and dismantling on the one hand (for instance, destabilizing representations of “others” as discussed in the previous section) and building and constructing on the other (Mohanty 1991b:51). My focus on the theme of praxis through the theories of postcolonial feminism, indigenism and ecofeminism is based on the second aspect of Mohanty’s project. For instance, recognizing the diversity of women’s and men’s lives, experiences and needs, building national and transnational coalitions against systems of oppression, and constructing alternative interpretations of environmental security are essential to resisting the enemy-creation process characteristic of the emerging environmental security paradigm as well as its consequences. All of the authors highlighted in my analytical framework argue, in various ways, for resistance that is historically, materially, culturally and politically contextualized, and for resistance that addresses all forms of oppression as well as the systemic nature of exploitation.

It is a mistake to assume that critiques of universal, essentialized categories of womanhood, for instance, are also rejections of commonalities and common bonds among women (Trend 1995:121). While common bonds and room for transnational activism certainly exist, Mohanty (1991b) and others problematize strict claims of universality and essentialism within liberal feminism. First, central to the creation of oppositional positions and practices against systems of oppression is, as mentioned, the disruption of representations of the “other.” Women, for instance, must be recognized as agents as opposed to homogenized and inferior victims. As agents, women not only reproduce the terms of their existence but also take responsibility for it. Moreover, dismantling discourses that render some “exploitable” interrupts the ideological bases of oppression.

Second, re-evaluations of history and historicity with women’s (and “other” men’s) self-determination at its core (Alexander and Mohanty 1997:xvi) as well as the creation of autonomous, geographically, historically and culturally grounded feminist struggles (Mohanty 1991b:51) are central to the forms of praxis elucidated by many of those included in this analytical framework. Although many of the authors in this analytical framework tend to argue for specific forms of resistance to specific manifestations of oppression, Alexander and Mohanty (1997) also go on to explain that developing feminist praxis globally involves “shifting the unit of analysis from the local, regional, and national culture to relations and processes across cultures,” i.e. developing an understanding of the local in the context of the global (1997:xix).

Alexander and Mohanty (1997:xvii) use the term *re*colonization to refer to the global realignments and new forms of colonization which – like “traditional” forms of colonization – are based on hierarchical, racialized and sexualized constructions and systems of domination. Resistance to this process comes in the form of *de*colonization, which necessitates thinking and acting oneself out of spaces of domination. In other words, we must think through an “anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist lens,” recognize the destructive effects of colonization and then proceed to build “actively anti-colonialist relationships and cultures”
(Alexander and Mohanty 1997:xxii). Indigenists also call for decolonization, and thus “new sets of relationships between peoples which effectively put an end to the era of international domination” (Churchill 1993:432); this will ultimately require dismantling the state system that is itself predicated on systematic domination. Decolonization entails consensual interdependence between the formerly colonized and colonizers as well as the redefinition of “nation” to “conform to its original meaning: bodies of people bound together by their bioregional and other natural cultural affinities” (Churchill 1993:433).

In short, Western liberal feminists, despite claims otherwise, do not hold the key for the universal liberation of peoples around the world. Claims to universality, whether that of universal womanhood or universal forms of oppression, are being met with increasing resistance. Again, this is not to dismiss the opportunities possible through collective strength and action. International and national movements may be built without resorting to essentialized categories of women or men, and without dichotomizing discourses that renders many people’s experiences invisible and/or irrelevant. Maria Mies (1993) provides alternative interpretations of oppression as well as new visions of resistance through the lens of intersectionality. Briefly, the subsistence perspective advanced by Mies relies on recognizing the inherent value of all life as well as the systemic oppression and destruction born of white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy. She then draws on the survival struggles against the Narmada Dam as well as the Chipko movement (among others) to suggest principles for resistance and alternative visions (Mies 1993). These principles are based on values of self-sufficiency, regionality, new relationships with nature and among people, genuine respect for diversity, co-operation, reciprocity, grassroots democracy, social justice, ecological and social responsibility and calls for new paradigms of science, technology and knowledge (Mies 1993:318-322).

The authors within this analytical framework also disrupt the easy distinction made between the world of academia/theory versus the “real world” of activism by suggesting strategies for a mode of political praxis that seeks to challenge and eradicate misogyny, racism, ethnocentrism, homophobia and class discrimination; without an understanding of the manner in which race, class, sexual and gender relations are interrelated, we can do little to challenge current inequalities. “Everyday” forms of resistance and the multiple ways people work for change on a daily basis must also be illuminated (Anderson and Hill Collins 1998d:xiii). For one, this helps destabilize representations of the “other as victim” and/or the “other as threat” and furthermore, it helps make visible those groups rendered invisible/inferior by such representations. The elucidation of the diverse, lived experiences and forms of power among historically marginalized groups itself functions as a mode of resistance by disrupting attempts by social institutions to “suppress the strength of these groups and render them more easily exploited” (Anderson and Hill Collins 1998e:531). Furthermore, as Anderson and Hill Collins explain, there is no “typical activist” (despite stereotypes otherwise), and one need not be a heroic figure like Martin Luther King, Jr., or belong to a specific organization to engage in social activism; strident assumptions like this often contribute to feelings of helplessness in the face of recognized injustices (1998e:531-534). Instead, celebrating diverse, everyday forms of resistance helps illustrate the complexity and variety of modes of social activism, and allows folks to imagine (and act on) possibilities for progressive, systemic change.
Summing Up

My analytic framework – an amalgamation of postcolonial feminism, ecofeminism and indigenism – allows me to challenge the enemy-creation process in the emerging paradigm of environmental security within International Relations, as well as the related process in the mainstream, US media as it relates to population concerns. Given their attention to intersectionality, representation and praxis, these frames offer a lens through which to interrogate this process, and recognize alternative interpretations of environmental security – interpretations based not on the construction of enemies characteristic of IR, but centered on the systemic relations of power and domination that contribute to the destruction of the environment (including the majority of humans in that environment). Similarly, the authors highlighted in my framework challenge ideologies of race, class, gender and nature which underlie not only (neo)colonial relations of power, but the dominant development paradigm as well, which, as a pillar of white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy, seeks progress and development for a few based upon the destruction of many. Mainstream, US population and environmental security discourse is bound up in white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy, and results in destructive policy prescriptions and practices.

Finally, because “every aspect of environmental destruction translates into a severe threat to the life of future generations” (Shiva 1993:84), the authors mentioned in this analytical framework provide countless examples of grassroots organizing and direct action activities based upon new organizing principles (such as those elucidated by Mies [1993]) aimed precisely at confronting and dismantling the current system of domination, violence and devastation. Frankly, resistance can be about more than creating band-aid measures aimed at conserving the environment – resistance can be about ending the destruction of the majority of the world’s peoples and the global environment by dismantling the system upon which such destruction is based. Postcolonial feminism, varieties of ecofeminism and indigenous perspectives offer possibilities for the creation of a transnational environmental justice movement towards this end.

My focus on all three perspectives in my analytical framework – postcolonial feminism, ecofeminism and indigenism – requires concluding explanation. First, as noted, I have only highlighted certain strands of ecofeminism. I argue that some strands of ecofeminism neglect race as central category in examining issues of environmental degradation and may actually reinscribe racist constructions of the “other” within their efforts to “save the environment.” I reject these strands and, instead, focus upon the work of those ecofeminists who recognize, through an anti-colonialist framework, the relationship between white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy and the Western development paradigm, both of which hinge upon racist, sexist, classist and heterosexist definitions of the “other” for their survival. Like Sturgeon, “I believe that without examining the ways in which conceptions of race as well as gender have influenced our ideas about nature, we cannot arrive at adequate solutions to environmental problems” (Sturgeon 1997b:260). Therefore, what is necessary is a mode of analysis that examines, through an anti-colonial framework, the ways in which images of race, gender and nature, as well as class and sexuality are constructed to “justify” practices and policies that engender exploitation and domination.

The ecofeminist ideas that I have chosen to highlight with respect to intersectionality, representation and praxis mirror those of postcolonial feminist scholarship in a number of ways – in fact, attention to these themes may justify positing the work of Mies and Shiva (1993), Kirk (1997) and Sturgeon (1997a,
1997b) within a sub-field of postcolonial feminism. Nevertheless, these strands of ecofeminism bring greater clarity to issues of environmental degradation than do many postcolonial feminists by highlighting precisely the link between the matrix of domination as it relates to race, class and gender, with capitalist-patriarchal domination and environmental destruction, hence their inclusion in this analytical framework. Likewise, attention to themes of intersectionality, representation and praxis in indigenism is similar to that of postcolonial feminists and ecofeminists. Nevertheless, the inclusion of indigenist perspectives in this project highlight issues of internal colonization and related ideologies of domination which impact marginalized communities in the US, and bring further voice to the argument that despite its name (i.e. postcolonial feminism), colonialism is still a reality for Native communities. Therefore, given not only the commonalities, but also the diversity and breadth of outlook among and between the authors highlighted in my analytical framework, I utilize them all in an interrogation of the enemy-creation process as it relates to environmental security concerns over population growth.

**SECTION TWO: ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND POPULATION**

As previously noted, my central argument is that, despite the growth of mainstream IR to include issues of race, gender, class and the environment, the discourse of the emerging mainstream, environmental security paradigm mirrors that of traditional IR security discourse. In both discourses, gender, class, nation and race are mobilized in the enemy-creation process characteristic of IR. In other words, raced, classed and gendered “others” are constructed as threats to national security. Within mainstream environmental security discourse, this enemy-creation process is carried out by constructing raced, classed and gendered “others” as threats to environmental security vis-à-vis overpopulation. The creation of these “others” legitimizes Western neocolonial efforts in the form of coercive population control programs targeting non-Western women (and women of color and poor women in the US).

After briefly discussing the population debates within International Relations, I examine the discourse of the emerging paradigm of environmental security as it relates to population growth to illustrate the ways in which race, class and gender are utilized in the construction of environmental security concerns. I pay particular attention to the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon, who serves as one of the foundational theorists in this emerging paradigm. Further, I examine the mainstream, US media discourse on population and the environment, which provides “popular” interpretations of ecological destruction that both reflect and support constructions of the “other as enemy” within the emerging mainstream environmental security paradigm. In this section, I also highlight several alternative interpretations of, and approaches to, environmental security.

First, however, my methodology deserves explanation. I draw on notions of “discourse,” defined by Jennifer Milliken as “an ordering of terms, meanings and practices that form the background presuppositions and taken-for-granted understandings that enable people’s actions and interpretations” (1999:92). Discourse is more than a simple presentation of ideas. It refers to the relationship between knowledge and power, and thus the power to define or represent the “reality” of a situation or issue in a particular way; as such, there are dramatic implications for both policy and practice. Discourse allows for the naming and characterizing of subjects and objects in IR which “provide ways of relating these subjects and objects for example, in standardized narratives for how one state can threaten others through conquest, or how a community of states may collapse from internal divisions” (Milliken
For the purpose of this project, environmental security discourse and mainstream US media discourse, through the naming and identification of population growth in non-Western countries as a threat to environmental stability, allow for “standardized narratives” of how the behavior of certain (raced, classed and gendered) peoples, particularly those in so-called Third World countries, threatens US national security. My use of content and discursive analysis is meant to illuminate and dissect these standardized narratives.

I use both a quantitative (content analysis) and a qualitative (discursive analysis) approach in this project; I employ a primarily qualitative approach in my examination of the discourse of the emerging environmental security paradigm, and both qualitative and quantitative approaches in my examination of mainstream US media discourse on population and the environment. First, content analysis involves studying cultural artifacts (written records, narratives and visual texts, material culture and behavioral residue) or events “systematically by counting them or interpreting the themes contained in them” (Reinharz 1992:146-7). For the purpose of this project, content analysis means counting specific words and phrases in order to “identify patterns in authorship, subject matter, methods, and interpretation” (Reinharz 1992:155).

Specifically, I use content analysis to study mainstream US media discourse on population and the environment to highlight patterns in perspective and argument. In so doing, I use three over-arching categories to examine 58 articles selected from *The New York Times, U.S. News and World Report, The Economist, USA Today Magazine,* and *Time/Time International,* from 1997 to 2000. The first over-arching category highlights the areas where overpopulation is considered “a problem” by the author and/or those cited in the article, and the areas where population growth is thought to be slowing by the author and/or those cited in the article. The second category focuses on the explicit and implicit causal links provided in the articles – explanations for overpopulation and its consequences – as well as policy prescriptions. Finally, the third category highlights the ways in which both men and women are represented in these articles, as well as the activities of both Western and non-Western states and NGOs.

Although I discuss the significance of my findings in this section, I have also included the specific results of the content analysis in several tables located in Appendix A. The tables themselves are arranged under the over-arching categories just mentioned. There are also several components within the tables that deserve explanation. The first column of each table indicates the specific words and phrases that I chose and counted in each of the 58 articles (“N=58” at the bottom of each table refers to the 58 articles chosen for this project). The second column of each table indicates the number of times each term/phrase is mentioned, or rather, the frequency with which each term/phrase is used by the author or those cited in the article. The third and fourth columns of each table indicate the number and percentage of articles within which each term/phrase is used; to simply say that the term “irresponsible,” for instance, is used 100 times is misleading as it could have been used 100 times in only one of the 58 articles. Focusing on the number and percentage of articles in which terms are used allows me better to identify patterns in perspective and argument across the articles.

The qualitative approach or discursive analysis allows me both to interpret the patterns identified through content analysis and to “deconstruct” phrases and sentences within the texts for their embedded
meanings, or as Reinharz explains, to “apply an inductive, interpretive framework to cultural artifacts” (1992:159). Applying an interpretive approach to the content analysis results allows me to take into account the contexts within which particular words or phrases are used and to account for the broader arguments the authors are trying to make. Moreover, this approach allows me to interpret the patterns highlighted through content analysis. I also use a primarily interpretive approach to examine the emerging environmental security paradigm, particularly as it relates to interrogating phrases and broader arguments for their embedded meanings.

In sum, at first glance the tools of content and discursive analysis may appear at odds with one another, as content analysis tends to be associated with positivist methodologies and discursive analysis with post-positivist methodologies (Chowdhry and Urban 1998:14). A combination of the two, however, allows for fuller analysis, as I am able to use statistical and interpretive approaches to understand and demonstrate better the manner by which race, class and gender are utilized in the construction of environmental security concerns. Furthermore, Reinharz explains that results from this type of analysis may be used “to generate or test hypotheses relevant to feminist theory and concerns, or to press for social change” (1992:155). I am highlighting the utilization of race, class and gender in the construction of environmental security through my analytical framework and discourse analysis because representations of the “other as enemy” vis-à-vis environmental security have policy implications ranging from the erosion of women’s rights to have children and adequate health care, to state-funded sterilization programs. By exposing the underlying assumptions which act as “justification” for such policies and practices, I hope to build on feminist theory in this realm and press for progressive social change by highlighting alternative perspectives, modes of activism and policy options related to environmental responsibility and security.

**Population Debates**

While the debates surrounding population growth in the field of International Relations (as well as the Development field) may seem merely academic to some, population is a central issue within the emerging paradigm of environmental security, and these debates themselves have a profound influence on international and domestic policy and practice. A clear understanding of the assumptions associated with the population debates is essential if one is to offer more than band-aid solutions to environmental destruction, and if one is to avoid the perpetuation of racism, ethnocentrism, sexism and classism. Moreover, tracing the population debates allows for an illustration of the enemy-creation process characteristic of IR – environmental security included – and provides foundation for the manner by which issues of population are treated in both mainstream environmental security and US media discourse. Therefore, I discuss some of the arguments associated with three of the primary approaches to issues of population in IR: 1) Malthusian.neo-Malthusian; 2) cornucopian; and 3) distributionist and/or left-feminist approaches. I will then link these debates, as well as my analytical framework, to mainstream environmental security discourse and mainstream media discourse as they relate to population, in order to illustrate the utilization of race, class, gender and nation in the construction of environmental security concerns.
Malthus and the Repackaging of Malthus

Despite his revisions in 1803, the “Principle of Population” by Thomas Malthus (1798) continues as a foundational work for the Western population paradigm. The tenets and assumptions associated with his work, albeit repackaged, continue to inform the contemporary population paradigm within which population control as a “major international development strategy” dates back to the end of the WWII, although its ideological origins date back to the 19th and early 20th centuries (Hartmann 1995:93). The propositions advanced by Malthus are quick, easy to follow formulations based on the assumption that, while food production increases arithmetically, population increases exponentially. Given the unyielding passion of the sexes, population will continue to grow, eventually outstripping food supplies. Therefore, Malthus originally spoke out against “Poor Laws” and advocated instead “benign neglect” and natural checks on population growth as for Malthus, addressing the problem of poverty through aid/charity would only make the problem worse.

Garret Hardin (1998 and 1980) adopted many of the Malthus’ arguments and is perhaps best known for “The Tragedy of the Commons” and “Lifeboat Ethics: A Malthusian View” (originally written in 1968 and 1974 respectively). Hardin also assumes resources to be finite and that the unrestrained “freedom to breed” will eventually out-strip the world’s resources. Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” metaphor hinges upon his belief that lands held in common in medieval and post-medieval England were destroyed via overpopulation and thus, over-use, given man’s inherent selfishness. Hardin also targets population density as the cause of pollution and emphasizes private property laws as one solution to the destruction of the Commons (Hardin 1998). Perhaps more important, Hardin assumes that “over-breeding” results from a lack of conscience and morality. Hardin thus advocates mutual coercion “agreed upon by the majority of the people affected” (Hardin 1998:45). For Hardin, injustice to some is preferable to the destruction of the Commons because the “freedom to breed will bring ruin to us all” (Hardin 1998:47).

The “Lifeboat Ethics” metaphor is also compelling in its simplicity and advances a similarly pessimistic view of the consequences of “over-breeding.” It suggests that other communities, who have run roughshod over the carrying capacities of their own countries, want to migrate to “our” lifeboat for sanctuary. The increased number of bodies will then sink our own lifeboat. Therefore, we must save ourselves by denying them access (Hardin 1980). The arguments featured in the ad from the Balance-Activist noted in the introduction to this paper are based precisely on Hardin’s lifeboat metaphor. Like those of Malthus, the arguments advanced by Hardin remain foundational to the contemporary population paradigm. As Feeny et al. explain, the conclusions drawn by Hardin have reached the “status of scientific law” and are standard fare within environmental studies, resource science and economics (and their respective textbooks) and are used routinely in resource-management policy formulation (Feeny et al. 1998:55-56).

Paul Ehrlich (1971) is perhaps the most well known author associated with neo-Malthusian pessimism. His “population bomb” metaphor is also based on the assumption that the world has a limited resource base, and population growth will exceed food production capacities. Unrestrained population growth is to blame for hunger and environmental degradation and deteriorating quality of life in general. Admittedly, Paul and Anne Ehrlich, along with Gretchen Daily (1993), present a slightly more nuanced discussion of overpopulation in their piece “Food Security, Population and Environment” than in
Ehrlich’s (1971) *Population Bomb*. Here, they discuss issues of over-consumption and unequal access to food and other resources. The authors nevertheless maintain their primary argument that the provision of a minimal diet for all will be hindered by “growing population-related stresses on the world’s finite food production systems” (Ehrlich et. al. 1993:4). Thus, while Malthus is slightly re-packaged in this work of the Ehrlichs, the central message remains the same: Overpopulation is the root cause of hunger and environmental degradation. Furthermore, for this school of thought, overpopulation is *not* necessarily characteristic of the North but the global South, for as the authors also note, “indeed, the future world food situation may be better represented by Rwanda than by Iowa” (Ehrlich et. al. 1993:23). This argument provides another glimpse into the enemy-creation process I have mentioned; blame for environmental destruction, conflict and a host of social ills for the US is placed squarely on the doorstep of the so-called Third World.

The solution to the food/environment/population crisis for pessimists lies in reducing human fertility and halting population growth “as soon as humanly possible” with the implication that population control policies are the best way to proceed – although attention to the importance of expanded food production is not absent in Ehrlich’s work (Ehrlich et. al. 1993:24-25). As Hartmann (1999a) explains, however, US foreign assistance in the reproductive health field is grounded in the neo-Malthusian understandings of overpopulation – fertility reduction is given the pride of place in policy. For instance, according to the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, USAID still funds maternal-health services less than it does family planning services (Hartmann 1999a:1) and attention to women’s overall health is routinely sacrificed in the name of fertility reduction. The adoption of neo-Malthusianism in international responses to development, hunger and environmental degradation is also illustrated in preparations for the Rio Conference (UN Conference on Environment and Development) in 1992, and in those for the Cairo Conference (UN International Conference on Population and Development) in 1994. During both, proponents of population control “greened” the population agenda by linking it to environmental destruction – a movement substantiated by the USAID declaration that overpopulation poses a key “strategic threat” to the environment as well as democracy (Silliman 1999:x). As another example, the World Bank often requires that Third World states accept/promote strong population-control measures in order to receive structural adjustment loans (Bandarage 1999:33).

Neo-Malthusianism is a compelling framework through which to explain ecological destruction, hunger and poverty around the world. It is relatively simple to follow, and, more importantly, this perspective (and policy options created under this perspective) essentially negates the responsibility of the North with respect to colonialism, neocolonialism and related acts of exploitation. This includes actions against the Global South and “other” peoples within the North that fostered massive hunger, poverty and environmental damage, for instance, the policies and practices associated with Manifest Destiny and the “dirty wars” in Central America during the 1980s.

Moreover, neo-Malthusians often ignore or downplay the role of over-consumption and waste among the wealthy Northern elite and their role in creating ecological damage. Further, upper-class, white Northerners are rarely targeted for population control to save the environment. Instead, pessimists speak of the lack of conscience and knowledge among “others” who, apparently, are not “fit to breed.” Neo-Malthusian pessimism relies upon and reinforces racist, sexist and classist constructions of the “other” and fails to challenge entrenched assumptions related to the division of power, wealth and *worth*
within the world system. In sum, rather than communism in “our” backyard, now “over-breeding” in – and immigration from – “backwards” countries is an imminent security threat to the US.

Right Cornucopians (Non-Malthusians) and the Promise of Technology

The second primary position within the population debates is that of the right cornucopians. Arguing from the “radical right” (as opposed to the conservative right position advanced by Malthus), Julian Simon and Herman Kahn (1984) argue that population growth will *not* outstrip resources because technological advances and free market economics will ultimately save the day. In the introduction to *The Resourceful Earth*, Simon and Kahn (1984) challenge, point by point, the arguments advanced in the 1980 Global 2000 Report to the President and, in fact, counter nearly all of the doomsday prophesies offered by the pessimist school. To paraphrase, Simon and Kahn suggest that by year 2000, the world will be less crowded (although more populated), less polluted, more ecologically sustainable, less vulnerable to resource disruption and better off overall in terms of the necessities of life (Simon and Kahn 1984:43). Broadly speaking, Simon and other right cornucopians take an instrumentalist view of nature and suggest that resources are not finite. In addition, Simon argues that population rates have in fact been in *decline* during the previous two decades (Simon and Kahn 1984:44).

Simon and other cornucopians (a.k.a. “optimists”) demonstrate a remarkable faith in the potential of science and technology, and suggest that population growth is not itself a problem, but rather a catalyst for the creation of wealth and technological advances. Simon argues, for instance, that technological/scientific innovations have allowed for an increase in life expectancy and that the “increase in life expectancy, which is the main cause of the increase in population size, is not only a sign of success in agriculture and public health, but is also the fundamental human good” (Simon and Kahn 1984:64).

In addition, optimists draw on the example of the Green Revolution to demonstrate the power and promise of technology, and to suggest that with more people comes greater opportunity for technical innovation and thus, scientific solutions to the problems humans have created. Underlying this approach is an assumption of the unlimited bounty of nature, as well as the related modernist discourse that assumes the infallibility of technology and faith in objective, rational scientific approaches for ending all the ills of the world. This is also a compelling approach and its faith in technology has drawn a great number of adherents, as demonstrated by the dramatic increase in recent years of arguments suggesting the necessity of biotechnology for ending world hunger.

Despite Simon’s applause for the Green Revolution, its technology – and associated ideologies – has brought a good deal of environmental destruction itself, as has (and will) the current “biotechnology revolution” (see Shiva 1989 and 1997). The arguments of the right cornucopians fail to challenge the Western model of development and the Western model of scientific knowledge production, much less the relations of power present on the global scale. As scholars included in my analytical framework suggest, the dominant Western development paradigm and all its attendant baggage is partly responsible for the mal-distribution of resources that account for hunger and poverty to begin with. Such “technological fix” approaches fail to address the underlying causes of hunger and environmental degradation, which in the end serve only to perpetuate their existence.
Left Feminist and Distributionist Alternatives

The third primary area within the population debates in IR includes the arguments provided by left feminists and distributionists. As mentioned, Hartmann (1995, 1999a, 1999b), Silliman (1999) and Bandarage (1999) as well as Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins (1986) employ frameworks similar to those of the postcolonial feminist, ecofeminist and indigenist authors previously discussed. However, the work of left feminists and distributionists are crucial to the population debates in IR and to dissecting the arguments of neo-Malthusians, hence their inclusion in this section.

Although feminist responses to issues of population growth are diverse, critics argue that many Northern liberal feminists have adopted the assumption that overpopulation causes hunger and environmental degradation, and therefore, they seek to advance population control programs in the Global South under the guise of “pro-choice” sensibilities. Northern liberal feminist claims to pro-choice politics can be thinly veiled calls for population control. This is particularly so when programs are advanced that promote abortion and sterilization services, but deny or reduce access to – and information on – other forms of family planning, the side-effects of sterilization, abortion and chemical contraceptives, and especially services focusing on women’s health more broadly.

Hartmann (1995) illustrates some of the sexualized, racialized and classed consequences associated with population control stances. These consequences range from federally-funded forcible sterilization programs against Native American and Latina women in the US to state-funded “sterilization camps” for poor women and men in India, as well as the policies of specific agencies like International Planned Parenthood Federation and USAID. Today, sterilization is still one of the most pervasive forms of birth control in the world, particularly in developing countries, and especially for women (Hartmann 1995:244). Hartmann suggests that for some Northern liberal feminists, “The belief is you can have your cake and eat it too: you can support women’s rights, while scapegoating their fertility for the planet’s ills. You can cross-dress Malthus and parade him around as a feminist” (Hartmann 1999a:1). In other words, Malthusian inspired population control prescriptions can be advanced under the banner of “pro-choice” politics, but this contributes to a severe erosion of a woman’s right to have children – and women’s rights more broadly – in the name of fertility reduction.

In response to the growing linkages being made between environmental destruction and overpopulation by mainstream environmentalists and some Northern women’s groups, members of the Committee on Women, Population and the Environment (CWPE) developed a “Call for Action” in 1992. This call challenged the environmental degradation/overpopulation argument and identified “the root causes [of global environmental degradation] to be social and economic structures, rather than population demographics and women’s fertility” (Silliman 1999:xi, emphasis added). Further, CWPE argued “demographically driven population-control programs treat women as objects of control and violate the basic feminist tenets of reproductive choice and bodily integrity for women” (Silliman 1999:xi). The definition of “reproductive choice” in this context is the more holistic definition advanced in Reproductive Rights and Wrongs in which Hartmann (1995) suggests that “choice” implies not only the right to adequate information on birth control choices (including abortion, sterilization, and contraceptives) and the right of access to a safe medical environment, but also the right to safely have
children, with primary focus given to women’s overall health and well-being rather than objectifying women as targets of population control.

The focus on social and economic structures by postcolonial feminist, ecofeminist and indigenist scholars allows for recognition of the unequal distribution of the world’s resources, and the perpetuation of the racism, classism and sexism that underlie colonial and neocolonial penetrations into so-called developing countries. Left feminists and distributionists, through similar frameworks, argue that “hunger, the most dramatic symptom of pervasive poverty, and rapid population growth occur together because they have a common cause” (Moore Lappe and Collins 1986:25); the same holds true for environmental degradation. Nowhere in the world does population density explain hunger for, like hunger itself, rapid population growth is the result of underlying inequities that deprive people, particularly women, of economic, political and social opportunities and security (Moore Lappe and Collins 1986:32). Hunger and malnutrition are also directly attributable to the dominant development policies and practices of the West. Despite rhetoric otherwise, world hunger and environmental destruction is attributable to the consumption habits of elite populations in the Global South and North and the unequal distribution of power and wealth in the world. As Mira and Vandana Shiva note, “poor people use insignificant fractions of the resources used by the North and the elites of the South. An average American citizen uses 250 times as much energy as an average Nigerian” (Shiva and Shiva 1993:1). However, it remains the poor, people of color and women in the global South and North who are targeted for population control measures, despite the fact that “wealthy lifestyles contribute disproportionately to the pressure on resources” (Shiva and Shiva 1993:1).

To avoid responsibility for ecological destruction, proponents of the Western population paradigm, which is characterized most fundamentally by neo-Malthusian sensibilities, essentially scapegoat Third World women, poor women and women of color in the US by highlighting their “unrestrained right to breed” as the cause of environmental damage on the world scale. By virtue of the arguments highlighted in the analytical framework for this project, one is able to recognize that this scapegoating takes place in order to avoid accepting responsibility for the history of colonialism, contemporary neocolonialism and internal colonialism as well as the inequities that characterize the current world system. Raced, gendered and classed bodies are constructed as backwards and in need of Western intervention – in fact, the well-being of the world is assumed to hinge upon such intervention. This scapegoating is played out in the form of population control policies that also serve to reaffirm colonial constructions of the “other,” as well as (neo)colonial relations of power. As Hartmann suggests, “the modern-day proponents of population control have reinterpreted Malthusian logic, selectively applying it only to the poor majority in the Third World, and in some cases, to ethnic minorities in the West” (Hartmann 1995:15).

The pessimist perspective is also inherently anti-woman; women – especially women of color – are constructed as irrational, over-sexed, passive “baby-makers” who must be taught proper moral responsibility and behavior by outside “experts.” Such representations allow the “justification,” for instance, of more “Mississippi appendectomies” and similar practices. Tong explains that in the 1960s, gynecologists applied the “rule of 120” to white, middle class women to prevent them from having sterilization procedures unless their age multiplied by the number of their children equaled 120 or more (1998:231). On the other hand, in some southern states the sterilization of women of color, especially
indigent women, was so common that they came to be known as “Mississippi appendectomies” (Tong 1998:231). Similarly, such representations serve to “justify” policies that now attempt to compel “welfare mothers” to accept Norplant as a requirement for financial assistance (Tong 1998:232), as well as policies focused on promoting sterilization and chemical contraceptives around the world rather than programs committed to addressing women’s health overall. As Hartmann explains, “images of overbreeding single women of color on welfare and bare-breasted, always pregnant Third World woman are two sides of the same nasty coin” (Hartmann 1999a:2).

Rather than “irrational over-breeding,” those included in my analytical framework tend to characterize the development paradigm itself as “inherently destructive of the environment” (Shiva and Shiva 1993:1). As Bandarage notes, rather than relying on social constructions of the “other” which suggest that rapid population growth is the result of ignorance and irrationality, the fundamental reasons for rapid population growth in the South and decline in the North rests in the advancement of industrial capitalism and Western imperialism (Bandarage 1999:24) as well as neocolonial practices and policies such as the proliferation of Third World debt and Structural Adjustment Programs. Blaming women’s “over-breeding” – like blaming immigrants – for environmental destruction ignores the larger picture, including the role of the white supremacist capitalist-patriarchal system in perpetuating poverty, alienation, war, environmental devastation and hunger; otherwise stated, it ignores the structural causes of all the above. Nevertheless, it is the “greening of hate” (Silliman 1999:xii), or contemporary linkages between environmental security and overpopulation (as well as illegal immigration), that has captured the imagination of many mainstream environmental security scholars, and it is the “greening of hate” that reflects and supports the enemy creation process characteristic of mainstream IR security discourse – environmental security included.

**Homer-Dixon, the Mainstream Media and Environmental Security**

The discourse of the emerging, mainstream environmental security paradigm in International Relations mirrors traditional IR security discourse in that raced, classed and gendered “others” continue to be constructed as threats to national security. Based on neo-Malthusian understandings of “overpopulation,” peoples – especially women – of Third World countries in particular, threaten environmental security by virtue of their “unrestrained freedom to breed.” Within the mainstream environmental security paradigm, overpopulation is credited with causing environmental destruction, which will lead to conflict and ultimately “a world in which we all end up losers” (Myers 1995:256). Therefore, what emerges (or rather re-emerges) are particular raced, classed and gendered “others” who threaten US national security. Constructions like this reaffirm colonial relations of power and substantially impact the solutions proposed to address environmental enemies.

In the following pages, I discuss environmental security through the analytical framework of postcolonial feminism, ecofeminism, indigenism, and the left feminist and distributionist perspectives on population. In addition, with the methodological tools previously discussed, I will illustrate how race, class and gender are utilized in the construction of environmental security concerns by examining mainstream environmental security discourse as it relates to population growth, with particular attention to Homer-Dixon (1998, 1999) who is considered the main architect of this developing paradigm. I also examine mainstream US media discourse on population and the environment, as it provides “popular”
interpretations of environmental security that both reflect and support constructions of the “other” within the IR sub-field of environmental security.

Scholars and activists alike have come to the conclusion that environmental degradation poses serious threats to both rich and poor nations. Therefore, many IR scholars have begun to challenge images of closed, artificial boundaries (not to mention traditional state roles) and replace them with new visions of geopolitical space (Tickner 1992:100). Artificial orders created to tame nature and offer unlimited use of its resources do not themselves impede the spread of transboundary pollution, ozone holes or biodiversity loss. Therefore, many scholars have moved beyond the boundaries erected within traditional security discourse as well as traditional definitions of sovereignty (i.e. the “greening of sovereignty”), security and power.

Scholars such as Myers argue, “security concerns can no longer be confined to traditional ideas of soldiers and tanks, bombs and missiles. Increasingly they include the environmental resources that underpin our material welfare” (Myers 1995:257). This is also true of the emerging environmental security paradigm more generally, within which scholars have attempted to include environmental degradation as an important national security issue. Scholars and political leaders including Lester Brown, Jessica Tuchman Matthews, Michael Renner, Hal Harvey, Al Gore and many others have redefined security to include resource and environmental threats (Deudney 1998:305). Others such as Myers (1993, 1995) and Kaplan (1994) have also received attention for their work in this vein, not only in the media – but with respect to Kaplan, by former President Clinton himself. Some of the primary themes running through the environmental security discourse include the recognition that environmental change “is an important source of social conflict; that many societies face graver dangers from environmental change than from traditional military threats; and that security policies must be redefined to take account of these new realities” (Conca and Dabelko 1998:281). Simply stated, environmental issues must be raised to the level of “high politics” as pluralist scholars argued in the 1970s and 1980s.

Although pluralists have had much influence, the roots of the environmental security paradigm can be traced to the post-WWII era and include theoretical frameworks other than pluralism as well. Mainstream IR scholars in general scrambled to comprehend the new security threats posed to Western nations in the post-Cold War era, although the actors they recognized as well as the solutions they offered varied from school to school. For many mainstream IR theorists, the need for “new enemies” also emerged in the post-Cold War era, and these enemies came to include “fundamentalist Muslim terrorists” as Huntington (1995) suggests in “The Clash of Civilizations,” unpredictable “rogue states” as illustrated by Klare’s Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (1995), as well as, I argue, the “enemy” of overpopulation and its perpetrators – Third World women and women within marginalized constituencies in the West.

There are a number of debates surrounding the emerging paradigm of environmental security – not the least of which relates to the quality (and existence) of evidence supporting the relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict, and varied critiques of the desire to “militarize” responses to environmental concerns. The focus of this project, however, is on the role of population in the emerging paradigm of environmental security. Central to this emerging paradigm is the work of Thomas Homer-Dixon (1998, 1999). For Homer-Dixon, “environmental scarcity” resulting from environmental change,
population growth, and the unequal social distribution of natural resources is an increasingly important cause (though not the only cause) of “social instability, civil strife, and violence within and between societies” (Conca and Dabelko 1998:281). These three components may act alone or in combination with one another as sources of scarcity and conflict. Because environmental stress can result in chronic internal or sub-national conflict, countries may fragment and/or become more authoritarian. Fragmenting countries are a large source of out-migration, and fragmentation may cause countries to ineffectively negotiate and implement international agreements. Finally, authoritarian regimes may be more likely to launch attacks against other countries to divert attention from their internal problems (Homer-Dixon 1998:296 and 1999:167-168). Given the potential for violence and conflict, Homer-Dixon argues that it is imperative that IR/security scholars expand traditional understandings of security to include the ways in which environmental degradation threatens the well-being of states, society and the individual (Homer-Dixon 1998:297).

The basic arguments highlighted in the preceding paragraph are further developed in (1999) Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Although more in depth, Homer-Dixon’s central argument remains the same as in his essay “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict.” Simply stated, environmental scarcity “contributes to social breakdown and violence” (Homer-Dixon 1999:4). Homer-Dixon’s assumptions about population growth are fundamental to this central argument; his assumptions are elucidated for instance, in his discussion of the population debates. In chapter three, Homer-Dixon discusses the debates between Malthusians/neo-Malthusians (pessimists), optimists (right cornucopians) and distributionists. For Homer-Dixon, this debate has become “sterile” — particularly as it relates to the debate between pessimists and optimists, as the distributionists garner much less attention in the “popular debate” (Homer-Dixon 1999:28). One goal for Homer-Dixon is to move this debate forward and synthesize the three perspectives towards an understanding of environmental scarcity (1999:43).

Rather than a strict synthesis (although I recognize his inclusion of the insights of geochemists, ecologists and other scientists), I argue that Homer-Dixon’s central argument is grounded in neo-Malthusian sensibilities more than optimist or distributionist perspectives, and further argue that his work does little to vastly expand the boundaries of mainstream International Relations. First, like his neo-Malthusian predecessors, Homer-Dixon views the earth and its resources as finite and assumes that overpopulation will eventually outstrip the earth’s resources and cause significant environmental damage. While he does recognize the role of technological innovation in mitigating the consequences of overpopulation (as optimists suggest), Homer-Dixon argues that environmental scarcity can, in fact, disrupt ingenuity supply and adaptation. Otherwise stated, “environmental scarcities can sometimes hinder adaptive institutional and technological change” (Homer-Dixon 1999:44). This is, in fact, one of the main points of his book (Homer-Dixon 1999:43).

With respect to the mainstream IR worldview, Homer-Dixon does call for an expanded role for the state but, like many mainstream IR scholars, much of Homer-Dixon’s attention is on the role of the state as opposed to other international and national actors. He argues, in fact, that the state is the most important actor, but that it may be greatly weakened in developing countries by environmental scarcity and its consequences (e.g. population movements and economic decline) (Homer-Dixon 1998:293 and 1999:98). Homer-Dixon also relies on the realist assumption that, given the innate selfishness of human
nature, the Commons will be destroyed in the absence of clear property rights guidelines (Homer-Dixon 1999:48).

I also find it exceedingly interesting that in his discussion of the population debates – which is supposed to outline their main structure – there is little attention to left feminist perspectives, or substantive attention to any feminist voices in his work more broadly (Homer-Dixon 1999:29). Am I to assume that women are merely objects/targets in the debates over population rather than subjects/actors? Consequently, I argue that his work substantiates the previously mentioned argument that women are effectively homeless in mainstream IR given the manner by which the field is generally constructed, including the actors, definitions and focal points privileged in the field (Pettman 1996:viii). I will return to this point in the pages to follow.

Overall, as it relates to his conception of the earth and its resources, human nature and the primary actors in world politics, Homer-Dixon’s work presents little challenge to the mainstream International Relations framework and, given the manner by which he focuses on population, Homer-Dixon ends up replaying many of the same neo-Malthusian understandings of environmental degradation. The same may also be said of theorists like Myers, who perpetuate images of an anarchical, unstable world in which resources are finite and people are self-interested. This world will only be made worse “as growing numbers of people seek to sustain themselves from declining environments” (Meyers 1995:257).

While Homer-Dixon does note other contributing factors to environmental scarcity, concerns regarding overpopulation seem – as mentioned – foundational to his work. For instance, he begins his essay with the statement, “within the next 50 years, the planet’s human population will probably pass nine billion, and global economic output may quintuple. Largely as a result, scarcities of renewable resources will increase sharply” (Homer-Dixon 1998:287). Similar focus on population and population statistics pervade Environment, Scarcity and Violence. In both, Homer-Dixon fails to vigorously discuss reasons behind rapid population growth. This focus is even more obvious in the work of Myers, who notes that, although there are a number of factors other than environmental degradation that may cause conflict, “the biggest factor of all in many developing countries is the population explosion, still to enter its most explosive phase” (Myers 1995:258).

Like the Ehrlichs and Daily (1993), Homer-Dixon attempts to present a more nuanced view of the population/environment problem (i.e. more nuanced than Malthus or Hardin) by noting consumption patterns and by discussing unequal distribution of resources within states. He also calls Malthusian scare-scenarios “simplistic and flawed” because, among other things, they are grounded in generalizations. His research, in contrast, is to provide a specific and detailed model illustrating the links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999:73). To his credit, Homer-Dixon also argues, “unfortunately, analysts often study resource depletion and population growth in isolation from the political economy of resource distribution” (Homer-Dixon 1998:289). Nevertheless, Homer-Dixon frequently emphasizes the role of overpopulation, arguing for instance that 90% of population growth today is occurring in developing countries, thus re-affirming the assumption that overpopulation in these areas is a threat (1999:56). In fact, he argues against “the spate of revisionist articles” suggesting that population growth is not a problem anymore; Homer-Dixon explains that for
some countries (like China, Pakistan, India and Egypt) populations far into the future “will exact a huge
toll on underlying environmental resources” (Homer-Dixon 1999:57-8). Homer-Dixon perpetuates,
however implicitly, the overpopulation/hunger/environmental degradation link proffered by neo-
Malthusians and, therefore, the construction of an enemy of environmental security – women who have
too many children.

The mainstream media also reflects neo-Malthusian pessimism and supports Homer-Dixon’s focus on
overpopulation as a cause of environmental destruction and scarcity. According to 43% of the articles I
surveyed, overpopulation in non-Western countries is to blame for ecological destruction (See
Appendix A, Table IIB). As one Worldwatch Institute spokesperson argues, the question “isn’t
how many people can the Earth sustain, but what level of suffering and ecological destruction we are
willing to tolerate” (Satchell 1999:46). Likewise, in the tradition of neo-Malthusian doom and gloom
scenarios, the author of one Time article writes:

Odds are you’ll never meet any of the estimated 247 human beings who were born in
the past minute. In a population of 6 billion, 247 is a demographic hiccup. In the
minute before last, however, there were another 247. In the minutes to come there will
be another, then another, then another. By next year at this time, all those minutes will
have produced nearly 130 million newcomers to the great human mosh pit. That kind of
crowd is awfully hard to miss (Dowell et. al. 2000:1).

A Time International article begins with the statement, “6 billion: the total population of the world last
week after Fatima Nevic gave birth to a son in Sarajevo” (Numbers 1999:26). As a final example, a
US News and World Report article begins with, “Morgan Luta came into the world two months ago,
delivered on the dirt floor of a tin shack in a scabrous Nairobi Kenya slum...The birth of another
impoverished family member in another African shanty is unremarkable but for a singular coincidence.
The world’s population recently hit 6 billion, and who is to say that little Morgan Luta isn’t the one?”
(Satchell 1999:46). In addition to the gloomy forecasts, there are several other commonalities among
these articles and the work of Homer-Dixon.

First, for the mainstream media (not unlike Homer-Dixon) “developing” countries (36%), “poor”
countries (17%) as well as Africa (26%), Sub-Saharan Africa (12%) India (22%) and Asia/South Asia
(17%) are the prime areas of excessive population growth (Appendix A, Table IA, IB). Additionally,
the areas targeted above are generally treated in a rather essentialized manner in the mainstream press
with little regard to regional variations and differences. Often, it seems readers are to assume that the
continent of Africa for instance, is just one, large, homogenous, undifferentiated area with no cultural,
economic, social or political variations. Moreover, depictions of “overpopulation in Africa” in the
mainstream media often leave readers with Tarzan and National Geographic-type images of barbaric,
animalistic, uncivilized masses living in shanty towns and slums, who are reproducing themselves, and
eventually the rest of the world, into extinction – images similar to those of Kaplan’s (1994) African
anarchy.

Furthermore, are readers to blame Fatima Nevic, Morgan Luta and/or women in general for population
growth and environmental damage? Generally speaking, neither Homer-Dixon nor the US mainstream
media provide appropriate, in-depth, or fair depictions or discussions of women as it relates to population growth in so-called developing countries (with a few notable exceptions among the print media articles). However, rather than simply asking “where are the women?” a better question for the purposes of this project is: what would their analyses look like through the lens of gender or, better yet, through the analytical framework of postcolonial feminism and strands of ecofeminism and indigenism?

Homer-Dixon explains that “the easiest part of fertility reduction tends to occur first: it is more difficult to convince mothers to forgo the last one or two children to bring down family size to replacement rate” (Homer-Dixon 1999:55). Not only does he fail to explain this remark, he fails to discuss anything related to why this might be so. Instead, readers are simply left to believe that women are somehow too ignorant, irrational or stubborn to forgo those last couple kids, a problem to be solved through the spread of – not necessarily of higher standards of living, but – “modern” ideas (via television and radio) about “lifestyle, family size, and women’s status” (Homer-Dixon 1999:56). More to the point, women are rarely discussed in Homer-Dixon’s work in general – just reproduction and overpopulation. Women are instead often treated as objects – as “baby-makers” – devoid of value, agency, experience, needs and desires beyond their role as birth-givers.

Similarly, in 40% of the 58 articles (with a frequency of 72), women are discussed in the context of having babies, e.g. in discussions of the number of “children per women,” and in similar fertility statistics. Women are rarely discussed here either – only their capacity to give birth – with little substantive analysis of the diversity of women’s experiences or situations themselves (Appendix A, Table III A). Only three articles (5%) problematize the tendency for population policies and organizations to target women alone for family planning, and only six articles (10%) discuss any type of agency among women (Appendix A, Table III A). In fact, aside from relegating women to the realm of “baby-makers,” little substantive attention is given to women in any of the articles. Constructed as a monolithic, undifferentiated mass of over-breeders, women – particularly Third World women – generally become the targets of population control in the articles surveyed.

Generally speaking, the treatment of women by Homer-Dixon and the mainstream US press offers an illustration of the ways in which environmental security concerns are constructed on the bodies of women. An image of the “average Third World woman” (re)emerges, and this average woman is assumed to be backwards, inferior and poor. They become, then, easy scapegoats for ecological damage and, thus, targets of policy-makers seeking to control their “unrestrained fertility.” Discussions of the role of men vis-à-vis population growth are generally absent in the selected print media articles as well. In one article, men are constructed as oppressors of women and, as mentioned, three articles argue that men should be involved in family planning. Overall however, the enemy-creation process characteristic of traditional IR security discourse is mirrored in discussions – popular or otherwise – of environmental security. This process is facilitated by neo-Malthusian population arguments that in sum suggest, “over-breeders of the Third World” threaten “our” carrying capacity.

It follows then that family planning is highlighted in many of the selected articles, and it also follows that many focus on fertility reduction rather than women’s (or men’s, for that matter) overall health and well-being. Indeed, 21% of the articles do specifically mention elevating women’s status in society as a means by which to reduce population growth (Appendix A, Table IIC). However, 26% of the 58
articles surveyed (or 15 of the 58 articles) call for contraceptives and another 26% call for family planning programs with little to no discussion of what such programs entail beyond birth control or abortion. Finally, only 14% of the 58 articles surveyed discuss more holistic approaches to women’s health, e.g. health services focusing on women’s overall health rather than reproduction alone (Appendix A, Table II C). Instead, like the neo-Malthusians, many of the mainstream media sources focus squarely on birth control or, rather, fertility reduction.

Analysis through the lens of intersectionality suggests that whether or not reproductive technologies are regarded as liberating or oppressive depends upon one’s class, race, sexual preference, religion and national origin (Tong 1998:231). In many cases, technologies considered liberating among middle and upper class white women in the US have been used as tools of social control among “other” populations. Access to safe and voluntary abortion, sterilization and contraceptive services must be part of broader, culturally sensitive health service programs for women and their families – women’s health must be the priority, not population control. Moreover, policies attempting to halt overpopulation through fertility control have not solved environmental problems. In fact, despite the millions of dollars spent on fertility-reduction based family-planning services, ecological damage, poverty and even population growth continues because “false perceptions of the problem lead to false solutions” (Shiva 1993:2).

With respect to Homer-Dixon’s solutions/suggestions, he notes that “the world’s wealthy regions should not assume that they will be able to wall themselves off from turmoil in societies that do not adapt well to scarcity. We are living cheek by jowl on this planet now. We are all next-door neighbors” (Homer-Dixon 1999:181). This is followed by his suggestion on the following page that research be undertaken on (among other things) the role of democracy in mitigating environmental scarcity and violence (Homer-Dixon 1999:182). It seems then that, for Homer-Dixon, it is primarily the responsibility of the Global North to address issues of environmental scarcity and conflict; this seems even more the case considering the amount of attention placed upon the deleterious effects that environmental scarcity and conflict may have on the state (and social institutions) of developing countries in particular.

Similarly, according to the mainstream US media, it is primarily the North’s responsibility to address overpopulation. Of the 58 articles surveyed, 33% focus on what Western nations are doing and should do to help solve “population problems” in non-Western countries, while only 19% focus on non-Western states in this light (See Appendix A, Tables III C and III D). Thus, both Homer-Dixon and the mainstream media tend to perpetuate a savior/victim dichotomy problematized by the scholars featured in the analytical framework of this project, which has the effect of invisibilizing the agency of non-Western nations and organizations, further “justifying” Western intervention into their countries and ultimately supporting (neo)colonial power hierarchies around the globe.

Getting back to issues of causality and consequences, according to Homer-Dixon the three primary sources of environmental scarcity (environmental change, population growth, and unequal social distribution of resources) may occur alone or in combination with one another and the implications of scarcity are often harshest when these factors combine – but my questions are, how do these factors combine and what are their sources? Homer-Dixon discusses the unequal distribution of resources, for instance, by suggesting that increased population combined with scare resources compel more powerful
groups to shift the distribution of resources in their favor; he terms this process “resource capture” (Homer-Dixon 1998:290 and 1999:73). He further argues that unequal resource access combined with population growth causes less powerful groups in a given society to migrate to ecologically fragile areas, which leads to “ecological marginalization” (Homer-Dixon 1998:290 and 1999:73). Simply stated, in both his article and his book Homer-Dixon argues that it is overpopulation and scarce resources that generally cause elite groups to hoard resources – not the other way around; overpopulation is again an important culprit (see also Homer-Dixon 1999:177).

Similarly, Homer-Dixon suggests that governments are obliged to introduce subsidies that drain revenues, distort prices, and cause misallocations of capital “in response to swelling urban populations” which, in turn, hampers economic activity (Homer-Dixon 1998:293, emphasis added). State intervention in the marketplace may then concentrate power in the hands of an elite at the expense of other segments of the population (Homer-Dixon 1998:293). Again, overpopulation seems to be the culprit. Homer-Dixon does not recognize that the nature of the globalized white supremacist capitalist-patriarchal system engenders these very state policies and relationships in the first place – not overpopulation in and of itself. Next, while he does recognize the unequal distribution of resources, his focus tends to be on the role of elites and elite structures within countries. In other words, there is very little attention to the relationships between elite groups and global (neo)colonial structures of power in this argument which, according to postcolonial theorists and others, guide current international relations between states. Instead, elites are viewed in isolation from the very global processes and relations of power that in many ways support their privileged status in the first place. Thus, his is not an analysis through the lens of intersectionality; Homer-Dixon does not recognize how race, class, sexuality, gender and nation converge to form a matrix of domination that structures relations of privilege and disadvantage, nor does he therefore recognize the structural determinants of poverty, hunger and environmental destruction, despite the lip-service he pays to issues of unequal distribution.

Homer-Dixon uses the example of Haiti, among others, to substantiate his claims. Haiti has experienced an irreversible loss of forest and soil that has deepened economic crisis and social strife. What is particularly interesting is his argument that “unequal land distribution was not a main cause of this catastrophe” because Haiti gained independence in 1804, dissolved its plantation system and instituted an agricultural structure unique to Latin America (Homer-Dixon 1998:295 and 1999:135, emphasis added). He goes on to explain that, rather than land distribution issues, “inheritance customs and population growth” are to blame for scarcity (Homer-Dixon 1998:295 and 1999:135). Readers, therefore, are not to believe that it is the globalized system of white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy, the unequal distribution of the world’s resources, nor (neo)colonial relations of power that are to blame for this environmental catastrophe. Readers should instead believe inheritance customs (read “backward traditions”) and overpopulation (read “irresponsible and threatening over-breeding by women”) in this “developing country” are to blame for environmental destruction.

As another example, Homer-Dixon does identify the “grossly unfair” distribution of cropland in the Philippines left behind by Spanish and American colonial practices – “an imbalance perpetuated since independence by a powerful land-owning elite” (Homer-Dixon 1999:77). Yet, Homer-Dixon hails Green Revolution technologies for increasing low-land production and later argues that, despite population growth rates, in many poor countries these technologies have “more than compensated for
increasing land scarcity” (Homer-Dixon 1999:77 and 83). Critics, such as Mies and Shiva (1993) are quick to point out the false hopes and promises associated with the Green Revolution, and even Homer-Dixon later notes that such technological fixes are not panaceas (Homer-Dixon 1999:86).

What is perhaps more important about this, however, is the utter simplicity with which he discusses former and continuing colonial relations of power in general. This simplicity is made all the more evident in light of the work of postcolonial theorists emphasizing the continuing hierarchies of power and geographic borders characteristic of colonialism and colonial domination as an “epistemological and ontological system as well as a form of structural violence...[It] was much broader than economic exploitation...It was civilizational and...racial in content” (Persaud 1997). Moreover, like proponents of neo-Malthusian pessimism, by scapegoating population growth among “others,” Homer-Dixon is also able to evade the global North’s responsibility for colonialism and contemporary colonial relations of power, an evasion which further validates neocolonial interventions into “other” countries in the form of population control programs.

None of the 58 articles surveyed suggest the roles of colonialism and/or neocolonialism in rapid population growth and ecological damage, while only three (5%) of the fifty-eight articles surveyed in this project mention Northern consumption patterns as a source of environmental degradation (Appendix A, Table IIB). Rather, as mentioned, for 43% of the articles, population growth causes ecological damage; 25 of the 58 articles note the ecological damage caused by overpopulation with a frequency of 55, meaning that the authors of, or those cited in, the 25 articles argue that ecological damage is caused by overpopulation on 55 occasions (Appendix A, Table IIB).

Aside from immigration into the US (which is mentioned as a cause of population growth in 10% of the articles) and into Europe (3% of the articles), as well as the attitudes and values of non-Western countries in promoting overpopulation (mentioned in 5% of the articles), few of the articles offer any explanation for population growth – or rather, “overpopulation” – whatsoever. For instance, 3% of the 58 articles suggest that those in the developing world have little knowledge of family planning technologies and another 3% argue that those in the developing world have inadequate access to family planning technologies. Three percent (or two of the 58 articles) mention unequal relations of power (political or economic) either globally or internally, 3% mention unequal gender relations specifically as a cause, and another 3% mention social pressures on women specifically to have children. Religion is mentioned by 3% of the articles, and finally poverty (2%) and child mortality (2%) are noted as factors behind population growth (see Appendix A, Table IIA). In sum, readers are generally left to focus only on the “excessive breeding” among women of non-Western countries as the culprits behind ecological devastation, with little discussion of dynamics behind population growth or decline. This helps to create an easy enemy – or an easy scapegoat – for which to blame environmental problems.

Ultimately, Homer-Dixon’s focus is not on the underlying sources of rapid population growth outlined by left feminists or distributionists. He argues instead that unequal social relations make it more likely that environmental scarcity will cause conflict, not that these unequal relations are the source of rapid population growth and environmental scarcity, degradation and conflict (Homer-Dixon 1999:42-3). In other words, with respect to the root causes of rapid population growth, environmental degradation, resource scarcity and conflict, Homer-Dixon’s work is not foregrounded by analysis of the globalized
system of white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy, unequal distribution of the world’s resources, nor structures of racism, classism and sexism that underlie colonial and neocolonial penetrations into developing countries. Rather, Homer-Dixon, however implicitly, targets overpopulation as a primary culprit of environmental degradation, scarcity and conflict. Despite the fact that Homer-Dixon does argue that environmental change, overpopulation and unequal resource distribution may occur alone or in combination with one another, he continually highlights the role of overpopulation in scarcity without examining the root causes of rapid population growth itself. Not surprisingly then, Homer-Dixon ends up implicitly targeting women in developing countries as the problem.

In sum, the overall contribution of Homer-Dixon’s work is the validation of a paradigm that sees overpopulation among “other” countries as a primary source of the world’s woes, particularly as it relates to security. Grounded in neo-Malthusian sensibilities, Homer-Dixon also advances the enemy-creation process characteristic of traditional security discourse in International Relations by highlighting the “destructive behavior” of raced, classed and gendered “others.” Finally, this process is advanced further, and supported, by the rhetoric of the mainstream US media. In the end, this supports critiques like those of Saad who suggests that the North has, in general, merely “seized hold of environmental issues by using them to cloak its own security concerns” (Saad 1998:314) – concerns constructed through the enemy-creation process characteristic of mainstream IR.

**CONCLUSION**

The theoretical framework advanced in this project allows one to recognize the process of enemy-creation characteristic of mainstream IR, the emerging environmental security paradigm included, as well as the dangerous consequences of simplistic analysis (Silliman 1999:xi). I argue that neither Homer-Dixon’s work, nor the neo-Malthusian perspective characteristic of the Western population paradigm, should be viewed simply as a case of putting “the cart before the horse” – or more specifically, simply a case of Homer-Dixon misarranging the components of his implicit causal daisy chain. It is much more than this for, as Deudney notes, “taken to an absurd extreme – as national security threats sometimes are – seeing environmental degradation in a neighboring country as a national security threat could trigger various types of interventions, a new imperialism of the strong against the weak” (Deudney 1998:309).

If the work of Hartmann (1995, 1999a, 1999b) is any indication, this “new imperialism” has already begun in the form of coercive population control programs aimed primarily at women in developing countries, as well as poor women and women of color in the US, women represented as passive, irrational threats in need of Western guidance and intervention. Simplistic analysis, in short, has already resulted in, and will continue to result in, programs and policies which, in the name of environmental security, attempt to coerce and force women into accepting unwanted contraceptive choices, unwanted abortions and unwanted sterilizations, all of which are, after all, human rights violations.

The solutions offered by the scholars represented in my analytical framework rely *not* on the extension of colonial/neocolonial relations of power, nor the perpetuation of racism, sexism and classism. Instead, these authors/activists emphasize empowerment and social justice through the lens of intersectionality and an anti-colonialist framework. Further, they suggest the integration of progressive social science
research with the experiences of women’s environmental, peace and other grassroots movements in order to garner a greater and more nuanced understanding of the structures which create and sustain poverty, inequality and environmental destruction (Hartmann 1999b:19). This “view from below” relies upon asking women what they want, and refuses to view issues of reproduction separately from gender or sexual relations, the sexual division of labor, and the economic, historical, political and social context more broadly, as all are steeped in capitalist ideology and practice (Mies and Shiva 1993:293-4).

Central to these solutions is the disruption of representations of the “average Third World woman” as a passive, backwards victim, and the reconceptualization of women as agents. Representations of the “other,” although constructed, have real material implications and, as such, may be (and have been) used as tools of power/domination – hence the importance of elaborating the “historical specificity and varied perspectives of Third World women” against “the monolithic perception of Third World women” (Sedghi 1994:90). It is also upon the reconceptualization of women as agents that diverse forms of resistance can be recognized and articulated, including diverse struggles among women to regain/assert control over their sexuality and reproductive capacities, as well as struggles against systems of domination more broadly. In fact, Sedghi calls for resistance to all forms of domination, “whether exercised by class, race, the state or gender…The goal of the struggle for Third World women remains the eradication of multiple forms of domination both at the national and international level” (1994:90-1).

Similarly, to avoid becoming “collaborators in racist ideologies whose costs to humanity have been no less brutal than those of sexism” (Ahmed 1992:247), feminists must remain watchful and aware of contemporary structures of global power, and Western feminisms’ historical and political situatedness within that structure (Ahmed 1992:247). Feminists also cannot ignore the “complex interconnections between First and Third World economies and the profound effect of this on the lives of women in all countries” (Mohanty 1991b:54). Nor can they ignore their positions within this context. As Winona LaDuke argues, “I cannot fix everything, but I can be aware of my complicity” (Feminism and (Post-) Colonialism 1999:5) and thus, continually fight against paradigms and discourses (and our own situatedness within them) that assume some are less valuable – and more exploitable – than others, therefore validating policies and practices that rearticulate colonial relations of domination and subordination.

In resisting multiple forms of domination, many suggest the need for new visions that reject the prevailing model of capitalist development, reject systems of domination and provide alternatives based not on a power-over, hierarchical model, but on a power-with model. One such example is the subsistence perspective elucidated by Mies, as I have previously discussed. Again, this perspective is characterized by “the search for an ecologically sound, non-exploitative, just, non-patriarchal, self-sustaining society” (Mies 1993:297).

In fact, in contrast to optimist/right cornucopian promotions of free-market policies and Western technology, and rather than pessimist promotions of population control to solve the world’s environmental problems, many alternative visions and modes of resistance against the culture of domination currently exist. These include the burgeoning global movement aimed at challenging neocolonial practices, including corporate-led globalization, and the structures of racism, sexism, heterosexism and classism upon which they are built. Scores of people in this diverse movement
promote nonviolence, challenge the devaluation of “others” and nature, as well as inequalities in wealth, power, privilege, rights and status. Jones (2000) offers a list encompassing several of the broad principles that, in her estimation, characterize the worldviews and desires of many present at the protests in Seattle, Washington D.C., Prague, and Quebec among others and, I would add, characterize the worldviews of those engaging in “everyday” forms of resistance around the world. As Jones explains,

We are: for sustainable, healthy, locally-based agriculture, for the placing of human need before corporate profit, for the rights of small farmers, workers and consumers everywhere to an economically just and socially harmonious way of life, in which everyone can earn a decent living without exploiting anyone, for a world free of violence. These are the aspirations of just about everybody who ever attended a mass protest outside the meetings of the World Trade Organization or the IMF (Jones 2000:4).

In addition to these principles, folks (including myself) are also guided by the desire to help expose and dismantle structures and policies that enable domination and destruction under white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy, including racist and sexist population control programs.

Grassroots perspectives such as the aforementioned are not recognized in the work of Homer-Dixon. The perspective advanced by the pessimists and Homer-Dixon ultimately rely upon – and reinforce – existing racist, sexist and classist constructions of the “other.” Both comfortably fail to threaten the raced, classed and gendered assumptions that characterize US mainstream thought on population growth. As mentioned, it is the overpopulation perspective that has been given the most voice in international responses to development, hunger and environmental degradation. Moreover, since the focus tends to be not just on overpopulation, but overpopulation in the developing world – without real discussion of its causes, nor the diverse experiences of men or women – Homer-Dixon does little to challenge the enemy-creation process characteristic of traditional security discourse nor mainstream IR discourse in general. In fact, he advances this process further.

This perspective is reinforced by the mainstream, particularly US media, within which overpopulation in the developing world is generally targeted as an important cause of environmental destruction. Investigation of men’s and women’s diverse experiences, conditions, needs and analyses are nearly absent in this discourse, and the causes of rapid population growth themselves are given scant attention. Readers are simply left to focus on the role of excessive population growth in non-Western countries as a primary cause of environmental degradation. And why not? After all, according to one Economist author, “we” are absolved from guilt; “Today’s 6 billion people may be 9 billion by 2050. Yet the increase has slowed; rich nations breed less” (Like Herrings in a Barrel 1999:1, emphasis added).

In the end, despite efforts to expand the purview of mainstream International Relations analysis to include issues of gender, race and the environment, the mainstream discourse of environmental security mimics traditional security discourse in that raced, classed and gendered “others” continue to be represented as threats to US/Western security – this is particularly true as it relates to issues of population growth. Gender, class, nation and race remain crucial to the political mobilization of identity and the enemy-creation process characteristic of IR. For mainstream environmental security discourse,
overpopulation in non-Western countries receives much of the blame for environmental problems and, like traditional security discourse, the bodies of women act as an important site for its construction. This is reflected in, and supported by, the rhetoric of the mainstream US media, which, like the work of Homer-Dixon, reflects neo-Malthusian pessimism with respect to overpopulation and environmental degradation. The creation of raced, classed and gendered “others” serves to legitimize Western neocolonial efforts against “other” countries. Hence, with an eye towards the maintenance of US/Western political, economic and social hegemony, often coercive – if not genocidal – population control programs targeting non-Western women (and women of color in the US) have been and are “justified” by virtue of the status of these women and nations as “other.”
## Appendix A: Content Analysis Results

### IA. AREAS OF OVERPOPULATION/LARGE POPULATION GROWTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>World/Globe</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrialized</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First World</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Un/Underdeveloped</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor/Poorest</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Developed Countries (LDCs)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US (Fertility)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain &amp; the E.U.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia/South Asia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America/Caribbean</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I C. AREAS WHERE POPULATION GROWTH IS SLOWING</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Population Slowing</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing, but will take time to show</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Stabilization -non-Western countries</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Stabilization –Western Countries</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization -Former Soviet Union (Specifically)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization -Western Europe (Specifically)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – China</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization - India</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – East &amp; SE Asia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Taiwan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Thailand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Indonesia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Bangladesh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Singapore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization - Latin America</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Mexico</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slowing/Declining/Stabilization – Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overpopulation is Not a Problem Overall</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
### II A. CAUSES OF OVERPOPULATION / HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To US – Immigration</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Western Europe – Immigration</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Little Knowledge of Family Planning</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Little Access to Family Planning</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Unequal Pol/Eco Relations (Internal or Global)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Poverty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Unequal Social/Gender Relations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Social Pressure to Have Children</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Colonialism/Neocolonialism</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Child Mortality Rates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Attitudes/Values</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries – Traditions/Customs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* N = 58
### II B. CONSEQUENCES OF OVERPOPULATION / HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Degradation</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunger, Malnutrition, Famine, etc.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty, Unemployment, etc.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts Economic Growth</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts Agricultural Production</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts Income Distribution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts Public Services &amp; Housing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts Educational Services</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurts Health Services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes Violence</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitates the Spread of Disease</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Consumption &amp; Environmental Harm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
## II C. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR OVERPOPULATION/ HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Prescription</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contraceptives/Birth Control (Alone)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Abortion</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Sterilization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Women’s Rights</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning (Alone)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning (Holistic)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduce Immigration, Increase Deportation in the West</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMOs and Other Technology</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Trade/Better Trade Relations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Characteristics of Population</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentions Malthus (as correct or not far off)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentions Demographic Transition Theory (as correct or not far off)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Countries Should Adopt “Western Values”</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
### III A. REPRESENTATION: WOMEN & OVERPOPULATION

#### HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role of Women</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women as Victims</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women as Agents</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women as Just Giving Birth to Children</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problematize Women as Only Targets of Family Planning</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
### III B. REPRESENTATION: MEN & OVERPOPULATION

#### HIGH POPULATION GROWTH RATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role in Overpopulation</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men as Victims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men as Oppressors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men as Agents</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men Must Be Part of</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Planning Programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
### III C. REPRESENTATION: WESTERN STATES, NGOs & INSTITUTIONS

**VIS A VIS POPULATION GROWTH & POLICIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppressors</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western States Are Doing Nothing to Help</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western States Are Making “Problems” Worse</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N = 58*
### III. REPRESENTATIONS: NON-WESTERN STATES, NGOs & INSTITUTIONS

#### VIS A VIS POPULATION GROWTH & POLICIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppressors</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western States Are</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doing Nothing to Help</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western States Are Making “Problems” Worse</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 58
Appendix B:
Articles Used for Content and Discursive Analysis

6.3 Brides for Seven Brothers: China Faces Sex Discrepancy Due to Population Control and a Preference for Sons

The Ageing of China

And a President Was Born
   1999   The Economist (US) May 15 (351)8119:44.

Asia’s Population Advantage
   1997   The Economist (US) September 13 (344)8034:80.

Associated Press
   1999   World’s Population is Expected to Top 6 Billion Next Month. The New York Times
          September 23, Section A, Col. 1:9
   2000   Price of Safe Water for All: $10 Billion and the Will to Provide It. The New York Times
          November 23, Section A, Col. 1:10.

Be Fruitful and Multiply

The Best Environment of 1999

Bryjak, George

Call of the South

Central Asia: Population Concerns in Kazakhstan
   1999   The Economist (US) April 3 (351)8113:35.

Cook, William J. and Marianne Lavelle

Crossette, Barbara
   1998a  UN Gives Its First Grants From Big Ted Turner Gift. The New York Times May 20,
          Section A, Col. 1:12.


Dowell, William, Meenakshi Ganguly and Dick Thompson
2000 The Big Crunch: Birthrates are falling, but it may be a half-century before the number of people–and their impact–reaches a peak. Time April 26, 155(17):1-5.

Emerging Market Indicators: More People
1997 The Economist (US) February 1 (342)8002:108.

Ganguly, Meenakshi, Helen Gibson, Donald Macintyre and Amany Radwan

Garrett, Major

The Green Gene Giant
1997 The Economist April 26 (343)8014:66.

Grose, Thomas K.

Grose, Thomas and Nina Planck

Growth’s Limits in Latin America

Happy Anniversary? Politics and Economy of India

Hart, John
1997 Can We Stop Global Warming? USA Today March (125)2622:1-6.

Hollingsworth, William G.
Holmes, Steven
December 31, Section A, Col. 1:6.

India’s Growing Pains
1997 The Economist (US) February 22 (342)8005:41.

Kelly, Katy and Rachel K. Sobel

Kilborn, Peter
1999 Definition of Abortion is Found to Vary Abroad. The New York Times November 24,
Section A, Col. 5:18.

Latin America’s Birth Surprise

Lewis, Paul
A, Col. 4:3.
1999b UN Meeting Splits Sharply on Limiting Population. The New York Times June 30,
Section A, Col. 1:9.

Like Herrings in a Barrel

Little Help in Curbing Population

Litvin, Daniel

Marston, Wendy
1998 In Peru’s Shantytowns, Cholera Comes by the Bucket. The New York Times
December 8, Section G, Col. 1:9.

A New Map of the World

Neilan, Terence
Col. 4:12.
Numbers

Passell, Peter

Plenty of Gloom

Political Ecology Group

Population Binge, But Signs of Slowdown

Population Growth

Satchell, Michael

Sciolino, Elaine

Simcox, David

Slow, Quick, Quick, Slow Are the Dance-Steps of Reform: Egyptian Economic Reform

Speaking Her Mind: Narmala Palsamy.

Stevens, William K.
Too Many People: Galapagos

Too Many or Too Few

The Troubled Seas

Turn of the Tide? Immigration
  1997  The Economist (US) September 27 (344)8036:1-3.

Unshapely World, Too Old or Too Young

Why Italians Don’t Make Babies

Women, Population, and the Environment: Call for a New Approach

Wren, Christopher
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my partner Daniel and my mom LeAnn for their unwavering love and support, as well as my family and Daniel’s family for theirs. I would also like to thank Dr. Geeta Chowdhry at Northern Arizona University for all of her guidance and friendship. Additionally, I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for all the helpful comments, as well as Tara Hefferan for her meticulous editorial assistance and her help and support throughout this entire process.

Notes

1 For an extended discussion of liberal, socialist and postmodern feminists’ contributions to International Relations, please see Urban (1998).

2 It should also be noted that many of the critical arguments on “overpopulation” provided by Hartmann (1995, 1999a, 1999b), Silliman (1999), Bandarage (1999), and Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins (1986) share many of the same underlying assumptions as the postcolonial feminist, ecofeminist and indigenist authors highlighted in my analytical framework even though they are not necessarily associated with these frameworks. In fact, I often refer to Hartmann, Silliman, Bandarage and Moore-Lappe and Collins as “left feminists” or “distributionists.” Their work as it relates to population growth, hunger and the environment will be discussed in depth in the second section of this paper.

3 “Patriarchy” refers to the system of oppression/exploitation characterized by unequal man/women relations supported by direct and structural violence (Mies, 1986). Additionally, ”capitalist-patriarchy” denotes a system or structure “which maintains women’s exploitation and oppression,” although its characteristics and impacts vary depending on one’s race, class, gender, sexuality and geographic location (Mies 1986:37). This phrase is used by Mies to refer to “the totality of oppressive and exploitative relations which affect women,” their systemic nature, and the historical, societal, political, and economic dimensions of women’s oppression (Mies, 1986:37-8). Capitalism connotes the most recent manifestation of patriarchy and, as Mies argues, it cannot function without patriarchy because the goal of capitalism – the continual process of capital accumulation – cannot occur without the unequal man/woman relations characteristic of patriarchy (Mies, 1986:38). Finally, Mies argues that feminism must struggle against all capitalist-patriarchal relations including those between men and women, human beings and nature, and metropoles and colonies (Mies 1986:38). hooks (2000) refers to this structure as “white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy” to highlight the racism which, like sexism and classism, undergirds capitalist patriarchy. I tend to use hooks’ phrase in this project.

4 Race, class and gender are social constructions; however, the consequences and impacts of sexism, classism and racism as well as heterosexism are very real indeed. For an in-depth discussion of each, please see Anderson and Hill Collins (1998c). For further discussion of the social construction of race specifically, please see Gould (1996).
“Third World” is a very contested designation but, like the editors of Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, I too use it deliberately to refer “to the colonized, neo-colonized or decolonized countries (of Asia, Africa, and Latin America) whose economic and political structures have been deformed within the colonial process” (Mohanty et. al. 1991:ix). Thus, in this paper, I do not use phrases like “Third World,” “developing counties” or “non-Western countries” unproblematically. Rather, I use them to draw attention to histories of colonialism and contemporary inequalities of wealth and power both within and among countries and, similarly, contemporary neocolonialism. The use of these phrases is not intended to suggest homogeneity within the so-called “First World” or “Third World.” Rather, it is also used to highlight inequalities in wealth and power within various countries. In other words, I recognize that the “Third World” certainly exists within the “First World,” and vice versa.

While multiple and often contradictory Western models of development exist, to delve into the complexities of international development – broadly defined – is beyond the scope of this paper. However, by “dominant Western development paradigm” and/or model, I am referring to the model of development that emerged and gained strength following WWII, the division of the world into Cold War camps, and the proliferation of “new states” around the world. This model of development – influenced primarily by the United States – has its roots in the Modernization school (which is itself rooted in the Enlightenment model of knowledge production). This development model took off towards the end of WWII and, simultaneously, several of the pillars of the US-led Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO) were created, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which became the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Similarly, the National Security State in the US was constructed with the National Security Act of 1947, and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, Department of Defense, as well as North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Simply stated, at the end of WWII and thereafter in particular, the United States consciously laid the ground-work to create and ensure its position of power (economically and politically) in the post-war world. Ideologically, “development” for the US in this context means “civilizing” the “backwards” Third World (as well as “backwards” communities within the First), through the promotion of market economies, free trade and export production (often to the benefit of the Global North) and, in fact, development based on the US experience of “progress” in general. The ideological basis for Western-led development is discussed in the text of this project.

Currently, we see the dominant development model play out in World Bank and IMF “loan conditionalities” attached to Structural Adjustment Programs/Loans and infrastructure projects like Narmada Dam in India and Three Gorges Dam in China; according to Rainforest Action Network (2001), 1.9 million people are being forcibly displaced as a result of the Three Gorges Dam project alone – a project funded by the multinational corporation Citigroup. In speaking of “Western-led development” or the “dominant Western development model,” I am also referring to the process of maldevelopment suggested by Shiva (1989). Maldevelopment is development largely based on reductionism, hierarchy, duality, linearity, power-over, homogeneity and the Enlightenment model of knowledge production in general; it is largely devoid of ecological and life-serving principles, is supported by gender, racial, class, national and sexual inequalities and domination, and it is a basic component in the perpetuation of hunger, exploitation and ecological degradation around the world (Shiva 1989:4-10). Maldevelopment and its ideological foundations, in short, threaten life itself.
Finally, the dominant Western model of development characterizes contemporary corporate-led globalization. “In the last 200 years science and technology have changed the face of the Earth. Armed by the Industrial Revolution, European countries conquered continents, established colonial empires, had access to raw materials and markets and used their power to control much of the world” (Chowdhry, K 2000:1) and this process continues under “globalization from above” or corporate-led globalization. Henderson argues, however, that today’s globalization is much different as it leads to the “radical restructuring of national economies and societies” (Henderson 1999:1).

7 Escobar’s (1984-85) examination of Foucault also influenced my focus on discourse, particularly as it relates to the relationship between knowledge and power (the knowledge/power nexus) in hegemonic Western discourses. According to Escobar, Foucault provides analytical tools with which we may illuminate the creation of Western discourses which seek to effect and maintain domination over peoples of the (so-called) Third World, for it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together (Escobar 1984-5:379). Furthermore, discourse is not simply language, but the “matrix of social practices that give meaning to the way that people understand themselves and their behavior” (George 1994:29). Discourse generates “the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained [and] makes ‘real’ that which it prescribes as meaningful” (George 1994:30). My choice of tools, then, allows for an interrogation of these categories of meaning and the relations of power that lie behind their construction.

8 I chose these sources primarily because of their popularity and the wide audience each commands. The New York Times, for instance, has an approximate circulation of 1.1 million readers on weekdays and 1.6 million on Sundays (based on 1997 statistics, the most current statistics available). For U.S. News and World Report, circulation is 2 million although it claims an audience of approximately 10 million. The Economist circulation is over 700,000 and American readers account for a third of this total. USA Today’s Monday through Thursday circulation is 2,165,000 and its Friday circulation is 2,604,000. Circulation for the second part of the year 2000 for Time was 4,056,150. This information is available on their respective websites. For another, I argue that these sources are not only popular, but popular mainstream sources for news and opinion in the United States.

The specific articles used for the content and discursive analysis are located in Appendix B, and all of The Economist articles are arranged by article title rather than author as all of its articles are written under the collective voice of The Economist. The articles used for the content and discursive analysis were obtained through computer databases such as Infotrac and Lexis Nexus. As a result, the page numbers indicated in Appendix B do not always correspond to the page numbers of the original texts.

I used terms such as “population” and “world population” in my database search for articles within the abovementioned sources and pared down the thousands of articles I found to those which spoke to issues of the human population and its growth or slowdown specifically. I chose fairly nebulous terms such as “population” and “world population” so as to not unfairly obtain only those articles speaking against, or in favor of, population growth. Finally, because world population reached 6 billion in 1999, I chose a time frame (1997-2000) which would allow a “before and after shot” of the population discourse surrounding and including this event.
For a wonderful analysis of the fundamental flaws of Hardin’s examination, please see Buck (1998).


Esther Boserup – who tends toward liberal feminism – is mentioned in this chapter, but not necessarily in the context of feminism or feminist analyses of issues of development or population (see Homer-Dixon 1999:31, 34 for instance). While I certainly recognize the difficulty in doing justice to all authors and voices associated with any given debate or school, I find his exclusion of various feminist perspectives on population very disturbing. For one, he suggests that distributionist perspectives were voiced most widely in the developing world during the 1970s and 1980s, which itself discounts the tremendous work done in this area since this time – feminist or otherwise. For another, and perhaps more importantly, am I to assume that we may talk about women as targets/objects of population reduction, but not in terms of women’s widely diverse experiences, worldviews, alternatives, needs, and understandings of environmental degradation and scarcity?

To be fair, many of the 58 articles surveyed for this project point to slowing population growth rates; however, much of this slowing/stabilization is thought to be occurring in Western countries, according to authors of the articles and those cited in the articles. When slowing population rates in non-Western countries are mentioned, it is often with a caveat that such slowing will take time to show itself, or that such slowing is minuscule in comparison to actual population growth rates. Moreover, 36% of the articles note a growing global population versus the 21% that point to slowing global population rates (Appendix A, Tables IA, IB and IC).
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